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V 
Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to investigate an unexpected islanding operation (IO) which has been identified 
in a real distribution network. The process of recording and processing the data obtained from the 
field measurements in the distribution network (DN) has been the starting point of this research. 
It has to be underlined that this IO raised a problem and became a major challenge for the 
distribution operator. Therefore, the aim of this thesis is twofold; solving a real problem as well 
as further enhance the current research studies about IOs in DNs. IOs have been object of study 
during the recent years due to the rapid proliferation of the distributed generation (DG) within the 
so-called smart grids (SGs). Commonly, the power of these DG resources ranges between 
hundreds of kW and few MW and are allocated at either low voltage or medium voltage levels. 
One of the significant issues that these resources are raising is, undoubtedly, the IOs. These 
situations occur when a portion of the grid operates in parallel with the main grid following a 
disconnection. Thereby IOs, where the DG is energising the grid after a CB opening, must be 
identified and tripped in the minimum time possible. Failure to do so, the list of hurdles may 
include; power quality (PQ) disturbances (e.g., frequency and voltage out of range), a safety 
hazard for the network personnel or out-of-phase reclosings. That is the reason why the research 
towards the anti-islanding protection methods has elicited great interest.  
Fundamentally, the substantial improvement of this thesis lies in the fact that, in this IO, there are 
no DG resources, but large induction motors. In fact, the grid remains energised after the CB 
disconnection due to the induction motors (IMs) which transiently, act as generators. The island 
begins with the CB operation and ends when the CB recloses the circuit to restore the electrical 
supply. This rapid reclosing operation is widely adopted in DNs to avoid manual operations in 
self-extinguished faults and typically ranges between 0.5 and 1s.  Given the fact that usually IOs 
are originated in the presence of DG, indeed, this IO is utterly unexpectedly for the DSO. 
Due to the phenomenon mentioned above, the specific goals of this thesis are described down 
below: 
1. The first goal of this thesis focuses on developing a model suitable for validation purposes. 
To make a proper model validation, the simulations results obtained with this model will be 
compared with those obtained from field measurements. Thus, once the model has been 
validated, a thorough investigation regarding the most influential factors will be carried out.  
2. The second goal of this thesis falls within the scope of the PQ. During the IO mentioned 
above, a new voltage sag topology is observed. Consequently, the efforts will be focused on 
modelling this new type of sag. 
3. The third goal of this thesis emerges from the protective point of view. Once the IO has been 
defined and characterised, the need for identifying and preventing it becomes the main 
concern. In such a way, the third pillar of the thesis is targeted at implementing a suitable tool 
to prevent this particular IO.  Besides, this new tool will be compared with the currently 
available methods for ID developed for scenarios with DG. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VII 
Resum 
 
Aquesta tesi te com a objectiu investigar una operació en illa no intencional, que ha set 
identificada en una xarxa de distribució real. El procés de registre i processament de les dades 
obtingudes a partir de les mesures de camp en la xarxa de distribució, ha estat el punt de partida 
d’aquesta investigació. Cal subratllar que aquesta operació en illa va plantejar un problema i es 
va convertir en un repte important per l’operador de distribució. Per tant, l'objectiu d'aquesta tesi 
és doble; resoldre un problema real, així com millorar els estudis de recerca actuals sobre les illes 
no intencionals en xarxes de distribució elèctrica. El fenomen de les illes dins una xarxa elèctrica, 
han estat objecte d’estudi durant els darrers anys a causa de la ràpida proliferació de la generació 
distribuïda. Habitualment, la potència d’aquests recursos distribuïts oscil·la entre centenars de 
kW i pocs MW i s’assignen a nivells de baixa tensió o mitja tensió. Una de les qüestions 
importants que plantegen aquests recursos és, sens dubte, les illes. Aquestes situacions es 
produeixen quan una part de la xarxa elèctrica funciona en paral· lel amb la xarxa principal després 
d’una desconnexió. Per això, les illes no intencionals es donen quan la generació distribuïda 
energitza la xarxa després de la obertura d’un interruptor. Principalment, l’objectiu es identificar 
aquesta situació i desconnectar dites fonts en el mínim temps possible. En el cas de que això no 
succeeixi,  els següents disturbis poden produir-se; pertorbacions de la qualitat de potència (PQ) 
(per exemple, freqüència i tensió fora del rang), un perill per a la seguretat del personal de la xarxa 
o bé reconnexions fora de fase. Aquesta és la raó per la qual la investigació vers els mètodes de 
protecció “anti-islanding” han despertat un gran interès. 
Essencialment, la millora substancial d’aquesta tesi rau en el fet que, en aquesta illa, no hi ha 
recursos energètics distribuïts, sinó grans motors d’inducció. Així, la xarxa elèctrica continua 
energitzada després de la desconnexió del interruptor a causa dels motors d’inducció, que actuen 
de forma transitòria com a generadors. L’illa comença amb l’obertura del interruptor i finalitza 
quan aquest tanca el circuit per restablir el subministrament elèctric. Aquesta operació de 
reconnexió ràpid es freqüent en xarxes de distribució per evitar operacions manuals en faltes 
temporals i generalment oscil· la entre 0,5 i 1s. Tenint en compte que generalment les illes tenen 
l'origen en presència de generació distribuïda , realment, la illa elèctrica objecte d’aquesta tesi és 
inesperada per l’operador de distribució. 
A causa del fenomen esmentat anteriorment, els objectius específics d'aquesta tesi es descriuen a 
continuació: 
1. El primer objectiu d'aquesta tesi se centra a desenvolupar un model adequat per la validació. 
Per fer una validació adequada del model, es compararan els resultats de les simulacions obtinguts 
amb aquest model amb els obtinguts de les mesures de camp. Així, un cop validat el model, es 
durà a terme una investigació completa sobre els factors més influents. 
2. El segon objectiu d'aquesta tesi entra dins de l'àmbit d'aplicació del PQ. Durant l’esmentada 
illa, s’observa una nova topologia de forat de tensió. En conseqüència, els esforços se centraran 
en modelar aquest nou tipus de forat. 
3. El tercer objectiu d'aquesta tesi s’emmarca en el punt de vista de proteccions. Un cop definida 
i caracteritzada l’illa, la necessitat d’identificar-la i prevenir-la esdevé la principal preocupació. 
D’aquesta manera, el tercer pilar de la tesi té com a objectiu la implementació d’una eina adequada 
per prevenir aquesta particular illa. A més, es compararà aquesta nova eina amb els actuals 
mètodes utilitzats per a identificar les illes en escenaris amb generació distribuïda. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table of contents 
 
Acknowledgements                                                                                                                          I 
List of Publications                                                                                                                                     III 
Abstract                                                                                                                                                       V 
Resum                                                                                                                                             VII 
  
1  Introduction, concept and objectives ..................................................................................... 1 
1.1 Power systems overview ..................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Power distribution networks ............................................................................................... 4 
1.2.1. DNs general structure and configurations ................................................................... 4 
1.2.2. DNs elements and systems applications.................................................................... 11 
1.3 Thesis background ............................................................................................................ 14 
1.4 Steps of the thesis .............................................................................................................. 15 
1.5 Thesis Objectives .............................................................................................................. 16 
1.6 Document structure ........................................................................................................... 16 
1.7 References ......................................................................................................................... 18 
2  State of the art ....................................................................................................................... 21 
2.1 Motor bus transfers ........................................................................................................... 21 
2.2 Islanding operations in DNs .............................................................................................. 23 
2.2.1 Overview .................................................................................................................... 23 
2.2.3 Intentional islanding operations ................................................................................. 23 
2.2.4 Unintentional islanding operations............................................................................. 25 
2.3 Power quality .................................................................................................................... 26 
2.3.1 PQ Fundamentals ....................................................................................................... 26 
2.3.2 PQ disturbances classification .................................................................................... 26 
2.3.3 Voltage sag features ................................................................................................... 28 
2.4 Islanding detection methods .............................................................................................. 30 
2.4.1 The need for detecting the islanding operations ......................................................... 30 
2.4.2 General classification ................................................................................................. 30 
2.4.3 Passive-based methods ............................................................................................... 31 
2.4.4 Active-based methods ................................................................................................ 32 
2.4.5 HIDM Overview ........................................................................................................ 32 
2.5 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 32 
2.6 References ......................................................................................................................... 33 
3  Voltage sags review ............................................................................................................... 39 
3.1 Voltage sags with constant magnitude .............................................................................. 39 
3.1.1 Voltage sag general classification .............................................................................. 39 
3.1.2 Voltage sags with abrupt recovery ............................................................................. 43 
3.1.3 Voltage sags with discrete recovery ........................................................................... 46 
3.1.4 Transformers influence on voltage sags ..................................................................... 52 
3.1.5 Effects of the type of grounding ................................................................................. 54 
3.1.6 Phase-angle jump ....................................................................................................... 58 
3.2 Voltage sags with a non-constant magnitude .................................................................... 59 
3.3 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 62 
3.4 References ......................................................................................................................... 62 
4  Islanding operation: Theoretical analysis ........................................................................... 65 
4.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 65 
4.2 Electrical network under investigation .............................................................................. 65 
4.3 System components modelling .......................................................................................... 67 
4.3.1 Introduction to modelling guidelines .......................................................................... 67 
4.3.2 Distribution lines ........................................................................................................ 67 
4.3.3 Transformers .............................................................................................................. 68 
4.3.4 Induction motors mathematical model ....................................................................... 68 
4.3.5 Protective devices ....................................................................................................... 76 
4.3.6 Load models ............................................................................................................... 77 
4.3.7 Three-phase Model adopted ....................................................................................... 80 
4.4 IM behaviour during the fault ........................................................................................... 80 
4.4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ 80 
4.4.2 Transient behaviour during the fault .......................................................................... 81 
4.4.3 Influence of the fault-type .......................................................................................... 85 
4.4.4 Clearing time influence .............................................................................................. 86 
4.5 Islanding operation ............................................................................................................ 86 
4.5.1 Overview .................................................................................................................... 86 
4.5.2 IM Mathematical model during the island ................................................................. 88 
4.5.3 Islanding influential factors ........................................................................................ 92 
4.6 Conclusions ....................................................................................................................... 92 
4.7 References ......................................................................................................................... 93 
5  Simulations ............................................................................................................................. 97 
5.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 97 
5.2 Hypothesis and considerations .......................................................................................... 98 
5.3 Effects of feeder loads and its load model......................................................................... 98 
5.3.1 Simulations for different load scenarios ..................................................................... 98 
 5.3.2 Load models impact ................................................................................................. 108 
5.4 Type of fault and clearing time influence ....................................................................... 108 
5.5 Reclosing time influence ................................................................................................. 113 
5.6 Impact of the load torque ................................................................................................ 114 
5.7 Permanent-faults ............................................................................................................. 116 
5.8 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 120 
6  Field measurements ............................................................................................................ 123 
6.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 123 
6.2 Event I ............................................................................................................................. 124 
6.3 Event II ............................................................................................................................ 128 
6.4 Event III .......................................................................................................................... 128 
6.5 Event IV .......................................................................................................................... 128 
6.6 Event V ........................................................................................................................... 132 
6.7 Event VI .......................................................................................................................... 132 
6.8 Event VII ......................................................................................................................... 137 
6.9 Summary of events .......................................................................................................... 137 
7  Model validation .................................................................................................................. 140 
7.1 General criteria ................................................................................................................ 140 
7.2 Validation of Event I ....................................................................................................... 141 
7.3 Validation of Event II...................................................................................................... 141 
7.4 Validation of Event III .................................................................................................... 147 
7.5 Validation of Event IV .................................................................................................... 147 
7.6 Validation of Event V ..................................................................................................... 147 
7.6 Modelling features discussion ......................................................................................... 148 
7.7 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 150 
8  Voltage sags during the island ........................................................................................... 153 
8.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 153 
8.2 Main features of the new voltage sag type ...................................................................... 153 
8.3 Novel voltage sag magnitude: Analytical expression ..................................................... 154 
8.4 Voltage sag duration and recovery .................................................................................. 155 
8.4.1 Voltage duration ....................................................................................................... 155 
8.4.2 Voltage recovery ...................................................................................................... 156 
8.5 Voltage sag magnitude: Simulation results ..................................................................... 156 
8.5.1 Overview .................................................................................................................. 156 
8.5.2 Simulation results ..................................................................................................... 157 
8.6 Voltage sag validation ..................................................................................................... 167 
8.7 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 167 
9  Islanding detection .............................................................................................................. 170 
9.1 Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 170 
9.2 Passive-based methods review ........................................................................................ 171 
9.3 HIDM features ................................................................................................................. 172 
9.3.1 Overview .................................................................................................................. 172 
9.3.2 Directional criterion ................................................................................................. 173 
9.3.3 Input, outputs and intermediate variables ................................................................. 174 
9.3.4 Architecture .............................................................................................................. 175 
9.3.5 Time constraints in islanding detection .................................................................... 180 
9.4 Simulations ...................................................................................................................... 180 
9.4.1 Overview .................................................................................................................. 180 
9.4.2 Tripping times for different feeder load scenarios ................................................... 181 
9.4.3 Tripping times for different types of faults .............................................................. 187 
9.4.4 Testing the NDZ capabilities of the HIDM .............................................................. 193 
9.5 Conclusions ..................................................................................................................... 200 
9.6 References ....................................................................................................................... 201 
10 General Conclusions and future work .............................................................................. 204 
10.1 General conclusions ...................................................................................................... 204 
10.2 Future work ................................................................................................................... 206 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 List of Tables 
 
Table 2.1: Power Quality disturbances summary........................................................................ 27 
Table 3.1: Voltage sags general classification ............................................................................ 40 
Table 3.2: Summary of the voltage sags general classification. ................................................. 40 
Table 3.3: Angles for voltage sags C, D, F and G....................................................................... 41 
Table 3.4: Symmetrical components of the voltage sags. ........................................................... 42 
Table 3.5: Voltage recovery for SLG and LL faults ................................................................... 44 
Table 3.6: Voltage recovery for LLG faults ................................................................................ 46 
Table 3.7: Voltage recovery for LLL and LLLG faults. ............................................................. 51 
Table 3.8: Influence of transformers winding connection .......................................................... 52 
Table 3.9: Transformers shift influence ...................................................................................... 54 
Table 4.1: Test system parameters .............................................................................................. 66 
Table 4.2: Induction motor data .................................................................................................. 76 
Table 4.3: Over-current relay parameters. .................................................................................. 77 
Table 4.4: Feeder A loads rated value ......................................................................................... 78 
Table 4.5: Voltage sags grouping................................................................................................ 86 
Table 5.1: Summary of the simulated scenarios for different feeder loads value ..................... 104 
Table 5.2: Parameters of the simulated faults. .......................................................................... 108 
Table 5.3: Summary of the simulation results to evaluate the fault influence. ......................... 112 
Table 5.4: Summary of values for different reclosing times. .................................................... 113 
Table 5.5: Summary of the measurements obtained from simulations. .................................... 114 
Table 5.6: Data of the simulated faults. .................................................................................... 116 
Table 6.1: A selected list of the real occurred events. ............................................................... 124 
Table 6.2: Summary of the main values of the recorded events. .............................................. 138 
Table 7.1: Parameters of the PLL1. ........................................................................................... 149 
Table 7.2: Parameters of the PLL2. ........................................................................................... 149 
Table 8.1: Summary of the voltage sag parameters for each simulated scenario...................... 149 
Table 8.2: List of the occurred events with the voltage sag magnitude coefficient .................. 149 
Table 9.1: Parameters used in the passive-based ID methods. .................................................. 173 
Table 9.2: State variables for ID. .............................................................................................. 175 
Table 9.3: Tripping times of subsection 9.4.2. .......................................................................... 182 
Table 9.4: Tripping times of subsection 9.4.3. .......................................................................... 188 
Table 9.5: Summary of the tripping times for islanding and non-islanding events. ................. 194 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 List of figures 
 
Figure 1.2: Power systems general structure with DGs. ............................................................... 4 
Figure 1.3: Primary distribution substations with single bus. ....................................................... 5 
Figure 1.4: Primary substations with single bus. .......................................................................... 6 
Figure 1.5: Substation with main bus transfer configuration. ....................................................... 7 
Figure 1.6: Substation with breaker-and-a-half configuration ...................................................... 7 
Figure 1.7. Substation with double-breaker-double-bus. .............................................................. 8 
Figure 1.8: Typical Distribution network with radial configuration. ............................................ 9 
Figure 1.9: Distribution network configuration with open-loop configuration. ............................ 9 
Figure 1.10: Distribution network scheme with DG units. ......................................................... 10 
Figure 1.11: Secondary distribution substation configurations. .................................................. 10 
Figure 2.1: Power system stability classification. ....................................................................... 25 
Figure 2.2: An example of voltage sag and voltage swell. ......................................................... 28 
Figure 2.3: Main characteristics of a voltage sag. ....................................................................... 30 
Figure 3.1: Test system with three voltage levels to represent sag types. ................................... 39 
Figure 3.2: Types of voltage recovery. Abrupt (Dashed line), Discrete (Solid line). ................. 43 
Figure 3.3: Voltage waveform of sags type B, C and D. ............................................................ 45 
Figure 3.4: Phasor representation of sags type B, C and D. ........................................................ 45 
Figure 3.5: Phasor representation of sags type E1-E2. ................................................................. 47 
Figure 3.6: Phasor representation of sags type F1-F2. ................................................................. 48 
Figure 3.7: Phasor representation of sags type G1-G2. ................................................................ 48 
Figure 3.8: Voltage waveform for a LLG fault at location I. ...................................................... 49 
Figure 3.9: Phase voltage waveform for sags type A1and A2. .................................................... 50 
Figure 3.10: Phase voltage waveform for sags type A3, A4 and A5. ........................................... 50 
Figure 3.11: Voltage sag phasor representation for a LLLG fault. (a) Sag A1, (b) Sag A2 and (c) 
Sag A3. ........................................................................................................................................ 52 
Figure 3.12: Phasor representation of the voltage sags considering transformer shifting. .......... 53 
Figure 3.13: Comparison between solid and resistance-grounded networks for a SLG. ............ 56 
Figure 3.14: Comparison between LL and LLG faults in resistance-based grounding grids. ..... 57 
Figure 3.15: Detailed comparison between the sags produced by LL and LLG faults. .............. 58 
Figure 3.16: Phase-angle jump comparison for different fault locations. ................................... 59 
Figure 3.17: Voltage sag for a three-phase fault considering induction motors contribution. .... 60 
Figure 3.18: Voltage sag due to transformer energisation. ......................................................... 61 
Figure 3.19: Voltage sag due to induction motor starting. .......................................................... 61 
Figure 4.1: One-line diagram of the test system under study. ..................................................... 66 
Figure 4.2: Induction machine model in the abc-reference frame .............................................. 69 
Figure 4.3: Electrical model of the induction machine in dq components. ................................. 73 
Figure 4.4: Electrical model of the induction machine in dq components in stator reference. ... 74 
Figure 4.5: Electrical model of the induction machine for steady-state analysis. ....................... 75 
Figure 4.6: Time-current curves of overcurrent relays. .............................................................. 77 
Figure 4.7: Load profile at PCC1 with the time of occurrence of some events. .......................... 79 
Figure 4.8: Three-phase Matlab/Simulink implementation of the test system. ........................... 80 
Figure 4.9: Single-line representation of the test system under study. ........................................ 81 
Figure 4.10: Equivalent circuit of the test system. ...................................................................... 82 
Figure 4.11: Thévenin equivalent seen by the IM stator. ............................................................ 82 
Figure 4.12: Thévenin equivalent seen by the IM magnetisation branch. .................................. 83 
Figure 4.13: Flowchart to obtain the transient behaviour of the IM during the voltage sag. ...... 84 
Figure 4.14: Phase-voltage comparison scenarios with and without IMs. .................................. 87 
Figure 4.15: Phase voltage comparison scenarios with and without IMs. .................................. 87 
Figure 4.16: Electromagnetic torque developed by the IM. ........................................................ 88 
Figure 4.17: Flowchart to obtain the transient behaviour of the IM during islanding................. 89 
Figure 4.18: Single-line diagram of reduced test system before islanding.................................. 91 
Figure 4.19: Single-line diagram of the reduced scheme of the system during islanding. .......... 91 
Figure 5.1: Voltage and current measured at PCC1. .................................................................... 99 
Figure 5.2: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario I. ........................... 100 
Figure 5.3: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario II. .......................... 100 
Figure 5.4: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario III. ......................... 101 
Figure 5.5: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario IV. ........................ 101 
Figure 5.6: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario V. .......................... 102 
Figure 5.7: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario VI. ........................ 102 
Figure 5.8: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario VII. ....................... 103 
Figure 5.9: Voltage and frequency during the island for all simulated scenarios. .................... 103 
Figure 5.10: IM mechanical speed comparison between scenarios II, III, IV and V. ............... 105 
Figure 5.11: Comparison between torques in scenarios II, III, IV and V. ................................ 105 
Figure 5.12: Active-power comparison between scenarios II, III, IV and V. ........................... 106 
Figure 5.13: Frequency and IM rotor speed in per unit comparison. ........................................ 106 
Figure 5.14: Voltage, active-power and reactive-power for the three type of load models. ..... 107 
Figure 5.15: Voltage and frequency for the three types of load models. .................................. 107 
Figure 5.16: Simulated scenarios with fixed clearing time. ...................................................... 109 
Figure 5.17: Voltage and frequency comparison of the simulated scenarios with fixed clearing 
time. ........................................................................................................................................... 109 
Figure 5.18: Voltage and frequency of scenario V. ................................................................... 110 
Figure 5.19: Voltage and frequency of scenario VI. ................................................................. 111 
Figure 5.20: Voltage and frequency of scenario VII. ................................................................ 111 
Figure 5.21: Voltage and frequency of scenario VIII. ............................................................... 112 
Figure 5.22: Voltage, IM speed and frequency during the IO for several reclosing times. ...... 113 
Figure 5.23: Voltage and frequency comparison between scenarios with different load torque 
values. ........................................................................................................................................ 115 
Figure 5.24: Speed and torque comparison between scenarios with different load torques. ..... 115 
Figure 5.25: Voltage, frequency and IM mechanical speed of permanent fault-scenario I. ...... 117 
Figure 5.26: Voltage, frequency and IM mechanical speed of permanent fault-scenario II. .... 117 
Figure 5.27: Voltage, frequency and IM mechanical speed of permanent fault-scenario III. ... 118 
Figure 5.28: Voltage, frequency and IM mechanical speed of permanent fault-scenario IV. ... 118 
Figure 5.29: Voltage, frequency and IM mechanical speed of permanent fault-scenario V. .... 119 
Figure 6.1: Event I – Measurements at PCC1 for a SLG fault at node 8. .................................. 125 
Figure 6.2: Event I - Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG fault at node 8. ................................... 126 
Figure 6.3: Event II - Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG between nodes 6 and 7. .................... 127 
Figure 6.4: Event III – Measurements at PCC2 for a Permanent fault at node 8. ...................... 129 
Figure 6.5: Event IV – Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG in a midpoint in Line 5. .................. 130 
Figure 6.6: Event V – Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG at node 7. ......................................... 131 
Figure 6.7: Event VI – Measurements at PCC1 for a SLG at Line L6. ...................................... 133 
Figure 6.8: Event VI – Measurements at node 9
 
for a SLG at Line L6. .................................... 134 
Figure 6.9: Event VI – Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG at node at line L6. .......................... 135 
Figure 6.10: Event VII – Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG at node at Node 5. ....................... 136 
Figure 7.1: Validation of Event I. .............................................................................................. 142 
Figure 7.2: Validation of Event II. ............................................................................................ 143 
Figure 7.3: Validation of Event III. ........................................................................................... 144 
Figure 7.4: Validation of Event IV. ........................................................................................... 145 
Figure 7.5: Validation of Event V. ............................................................................................ 146 
Figure 7.6: PLL Blocks of the Matlab model. ........................................................................... 148 
 Figure 8.1: Voltage sag analytical function for a given b parameter. ....................................... 155 
Figure 8.2: Comparison between the voltage sag analytical expression and simulation results.
 ................................................................................................................................................... 157 
Figure 8.3: Results obtained from Scenario IV of subsection 5.3.1 in Chapter 5. .................... 159 
Figure 8.4: Voltage sag magnitude analytical function and simulations of scenario IV. .......... 159 
Figure 8.5: Results obtained from Scenario V of subsection 5.3.1 in Chapter 5. ..................... 160 
Figure 8.6: Voltage sag magnitude analytical function and simulation of scenario V.............. 160 
Figure 8.7: Results obtained from Scenario VI of subsection 5.3.1 in Chapter 5. .................... 161 
Figure 8.8: Voltage sag magnitude analytical function and simulations of scenario VI. .......... 161 
Figure 8.9: Results obtained from Scenario VI of subsection 5.3.1 in Chapter 5. .................... 162 
Figure 8.10: Voltage sag magnitude analytical function and simulation of scenario VI. ......... 162 
Figure 8.11: Island caused by a LLL fault. ............................................................................... 164 
Figure 8.12: Island caused by a LLG fault. ............................................................................... 164 
Figure 8.13: Island caused by a LL fault. .................................................................................. 165 
Figure 8.14: Island caused by a LLLG fault. ............................................................................ 165 
Figure 8.15: Voltage sag magnitude analytical expression for different reclosing times. ........ 166 
Figure 9.1: Flowchart to compute the state variables and the pattern for islanding detection. . 173 
Figure 9.2: Graphical representation of the adopted directional protection. ............................. 174 
Figure 9.3: Seven-level HIDM. ................................................................................................. 176 
Figure 9.4: Matlab model with the proposed HIDM. ................................................................ 177 
Figure 9.5: Matlab implementation of the seven-level HIDM block. ....................................... 177 
Figure 9.6: Scheme of the UVP/OVP protection. ..................................................................... 178 
Figure 9.7: Scheme of the UFP/OFP protection. ...................................................................... 178 
Figure 9.8: Scheme of ROCOF protection. ............................................................................... 178 
Figure 9.9: Scheme for ROCOV protection. ............................................................................. 179 
Figure 9.10: ROCOP and ROCOQ protections. ....................................................................... 179 
Figure 9.11: Voltage and frequency from simulations of subsection 9.4.2............................... 182 
Figure 9.12: Tripping times for Case 1 of subsection 9.4.2. ..................................................... 183 
Figure 9.13: Tripping times for Case 2 of subsection 9.4.2. ..................................................... 183 
Figure 9.14: Tripping times for Case 3 of subsection 9.4.2. ..................................................... 184 
Figure 9.15: Tripping times for Case 4 of subsection 9.4.2. ..................................................... 184 
Figure 9.16: UVP/OVP and ROCOV protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.2. ......... 185 
Figure 9.17: UFP/OFP and ROCOF protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.2. ........... 185 
Figure 9.18: ROCOP and ROCOQ protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.2. ............. 186 
Figure 9.19: Directional criterion protection results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.2. ................. 186 
Figure 9.20: Voltage, mechanical speed and frequency from simulations of subsection 9.4.3. 188 
Figure 9.21: Tripping times for Case 1 of subsection 9.4.3. ..................................................... 189 
Figure 9.22: Tripping times for Case 2 of subsection 9.4.3. ..................................................... 189 
Figure 9.23: Tripping times for Case 3 of subsection 9.4.3 ...................................................... 190 
Figure 9.24: Tripping times for Case 4 of subsection 9.4.3. ..................................................... 190 
Figure 9.25: UVP/OVP and ROCOV protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.3. ......... 191 
Figure 9.26: UFP/OFP and ROCOF protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.3. ........... 191 
Figure 9.27: ROCOP and ROCOQ protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.3. ............. 192 
Figure 9.28: Directional criterion protection results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.3. ................. 192 
Figure 9.29: Tripping times for case 1 of subsection 9.4.4 ....................................................... 194 
Figure 9.30: Tripping times for case 2 of subsection 9.4.4. ...................................................... 195 
Figure 9.31: Tripping times for case 3 of subsection 9.4.4 ....................................................... 195 
Figure 9.32: Tripping times for case 4 of subsection 9.4.4. ...................................................... 196 
Figure 9.33: Tripping times for case 5 of subsection 9.4.4 ....................................................... 196 
Figure 9.34: Tripping times for case 6 of subsection 9.4.4. ...................................................... 197 
Figure 9.35: Tripping times for case 7 of subsection 9.4.4. ...................................................... 197 
Figure 9.36: Tripping times for case 8 of subsection 9.4.4. ...................................................... 198 
Figure 9.37: UVP/OVP and ROCOV protections results for case 2 of subsection 9.4.4. ......... 198 
Figure 9.38: UFP/OFP and ROCOF protections results for case 2 of subsection 9.4.4. ........... 199 
Figure 9.39: ROCOP and ROCOQ protections results for case 2 of subsection 9.4.4. ............. 199 
Figure 9.40: Directional criterion protection results for case 2 of subsection 9.4.4. ................. 200 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Nomenclature 
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DC Direct Current 
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SI Standard Inverse 
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NDZ Non-detection Zone 
H Inertia in seconds 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction, concept and objectives 
 
1.1 Power systems overview 
 
Conceptually, power systems can be defined as the set of elements required to supply electrical 
power to the costumers. As a whole, power systems can be seen as a chain where several agents 
take part of it and interact between them. To understand the present power systems structure, a 
brief recall regarding its beginnings becomes crucial. Indeed, the electrical networks have evolved 
tremendously from its beginning at the end of the XIX century. At first, the electrical networks 
were formed by power plants linked with the supply centres with low distances, fed through direct 
current (DC) at a voltage of 100 V with very low power in the range of hundreds of kW. Years 
later, with the invention of the alternating current (AC) and the implementation of power 
transformers, the electrical energy was transmitted through long distances, where the voltage 
increased to the hundreds of kV and the transmitted power increased to the MW. Thus, in 1922 
the first 245 kV transmission line was inaugurated, this voltage level has been increasing until 
today. In more or less extent, the electric energy systems have developed equally for all countries, 
converging towards a very similar structure and configuration [1.1]. However, each electrical 
network may have a particular configuration. 
As a rule of thumb, the aforementioned electrical chain is composed of electrical generation, a 
transmission system, distribution networks and lastly the costumers. Meanwhile, production 
centres have to produce the required amount of electrical energy required by the costumers, 
transmission and distribution networks are designed to connect both agents. Furthermore, these 
two magnitudes (i.e., the amount of generated and consumed energy) have to be properly 
balanced. Since generators produce electricity at low voltage levels in the range of few kV, this 
voltage has to be increased through a step-up transformer and after that, the latter is connected 
with the transmission system. The transmission networks is used interconnect the major part of 
the electricity generation plants with the major part of the distribution substations. Typically, the 
transmission system operates with a meshed configuration (i.e., with a closed-loop configuration), 
that is, the network is fed by more than once source. Therefore, HV substations can be supplied 
by different generation centres simultaneously. Commonly, HV substations are highly automated 
and are protected with a high degree of redundancy in order to assure high reliability. Detailed 
information about the full range of configurations in an HV substation, see [1.2-1.3]. In these 
substations, high-capacity power transformers are allocated so as to evacuate the high amount of 
energy. The operation and maintenance of the transmission system, as well as the coordination 
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between generation and consumption, is under the responsibility of the transmission operators 
(TSOs).  
The subsequent step in the electrical chain is the subtransmission system, which hangs from the 
previously mentioned transmission system at HV levels, and subtransmission systems can be seen 
as the connection between the HV substations with the distribution primary substations. Even 
though, presently is still not clear if these assets belong to the transmission network or instead, to 
the distribution networks. 
Distribution networks (DNs) hang from the previously mentioned subtransmission systems, 
which operate at lower levels. Although only two different voltage levels are theoretically defined 
(HV and LV levels), in practical engineering, the concept medium voltage (MV) is widely used. 
DNs encompasses two types of distribution systems, named primary and secondary distribution 
systems. The first distinction is aimed at connecting the subtransmission levels (e.g., Lines 
between 66 and 132 kV) with the secondary distribution system which operate at MV levels (e.g., 
between 11 and 25 kV). Therefore the transformers allocated at the primary substations operate 
between HV and MV (e.g., 132-66 / 11-25 kV). Afterwards, the so-called MV grid is connected 
through the LV networks at the secondary distribution substations where the voltage reduction 
takes place (e.g., step-down transformers of 25/0.4 kV are widely used). Costumers are the last 
step of the electrical chain and are supplied by the LV networks. Even though different 
configurations and voltage levels may vary depending on the country, commonly, low voltages 
are around 0.4 kV and its configuration is mainly radial. The main difference between LV 
networks rises in the type of grounding. In Section 1.2, the configurations and parts of these 
distribution networks (DNs) will be showed and briefly discussed. The DN is operated by the 
distribution operator (DSO), who is responsible for the grid planning, operation and its 
maintenance. Figure 1.1 shows the typical configuration of an electrical power system where the 
previously mentioned agents are depicted. As can be drawn from this Figure, the power flow is 
unidirectional and is all supplied by the transmission levels.  
Focusing on DNs, its degree of automation and observability used to be lower than the one 
implemented in the transmission systems. Nonetheless, in the recent years, due to the emerging 
challenges that DNs are facing such as the integration of dispersed generation or the increasing 
interest in the power quality, they are transitioning to full automated grids. On the other hand, the 
LV networks are less automated than the MV are, which makes them weaker. Nevertheless, they 
are also experiencing noticeable changes, especially due to the rapid proliferation of the rooftop 
PV generation and also due to the implementation of the smart meters [1.4-1.5]. Even though, as 
has been stated before, the huge amount of generated electricity is transmitted to the consumption 
centres through the HV transmission lines and its substations, this fact is changing recently with 
the proliferation of the so-called distributed generation (DG). These power plants are usually 
based on renewable energies (e.g., mini-hydraulic, photovoltaic or wind power), range between 
hundreds of kW to few MW and are connected to the different voltage levels of DNs. At the early 
beginnings, these resources were seen as a threat to the network, given the changes that these 
plants will rise, and indeed, these DG units have changed the way classical DNs were operated. 
Among the issues that have appeared, it is relevant to highlight the change in the protective 
coordination [1.8], and the reverse in the power flow [1.9]. 
On the other hand, it has been demonstrated that these DG units can provide valuable advantages 
such as losses reduction and voltage improvement [1.6-1.7]. As a consequence of this dispersed 
generation, the resulting electrical system is shown in Figure 1.2. As can be seen, the power 
system depicted in Figure 1.1 has suffered major changes.  
Costumers are the last step of the electrical chain, and the electrical loads represent them. 
Depending on the load profile, the following classification is done: (i) industrial, (ii) commercial 
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and (iii) residential. The first group, have a large rate of power and high load profile, the second 
group typically have a high rate of power and consumption per area (kW/m2 and kWh/m2) and 
lastly, the third group has a low rate of power and the rate of consumption is below the commercial 
one. The (i) group, depending on its power rate, can be either connected to the subtransmission 
grid or to the MV grid, the (ii) and (iii) are typically connected to the LV grid. In addition to the 
load profile classification, if the type of load voltage-dependence is considered, the following 
distinction can be done; (i) constant impedance loads, (ii) constant power loads and (iii) constant 
current loads. Lastly, it is worthwhile to note that, the previous loads have been assumed linear, 
nevertheless, with the appearance of the electronically-interfaced devices (i.e., devices fed 
through AC/DC converters) the non-linear loads are increasing. 
 
                 
                                                     Figure 1.1: Power systems general structure. 
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                                             Figure 1.1: Power systems general structure with DGs. 
 
1.2 Power distribution networks 
 
1.2.1. DNs general structure and configurations 
Distribution substations 
As stated in the previous subsection, distribution networks hang from the subtransmission levels 
and the step-down HV/MV transformers allocated at the substations reduce the voltage level 
between the subtransmission system and MV network. Therefore, once the DNs structures have 
been defined (i.e., primary and distribution systems), this section will list the most common types 
of substations configurations and its main features. In general, these substations are equipped with 
measurements devices, protective equipment (e.g., circuit breakers, switches, potential 
transformers, current transformers or surge arresters), communication devices and automation 
systems. Commonly, the substation configuration depends, to a large extent, on where they are 
located (i.e, rural, suburban or urban) and regardless of the type of configuration these substations 
can be fed by one, two or more lines and can have one, two or even three transformers in 
exceptional occasions. It is worthwhile to note that regardless of the type of substation, the MV 
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configuration (i.e., the secondary side of the transformer) may vary. The first type is composed 
by only one main bus and one transformer, the second is known as split bus and is formed by two 
transformers and the third is composed by a main bus and has a tie-switch which guarantees the 
continuity of supply in case one transformer fails. Thus, Figure 1.3a shows single transformer 
configuration and Figure 1.3b shows double transformer with split configuration. Thirdly, even 
though double MV bus is not the most common scheme, this configuration can be found 
especially in urban substations with large amount of clients and uninterruptible supplies. 
 
              
         a) Single MV bus                                                           b) Split configuration for MV bus 
                                      Figure 1.2: Primary distribution substations with single bus. 
 
The most common substations schemes for HV/MV voltage reduction, are listed down below: 
• Single bus 
• Sectionalized single bus 
• Main and bus transfer  
• Ring 
• Breaker-and-a-half 
• Double-breaker-double-bus 
For a more detailed explanation about these configurations and other substation configurations, 
see [1.2]. 
Single bus 
This substation configuration is the simplest one and is formed by one bus which connects the 
HV grid lines with the HV/MV transformer. The main disadvantage of this configuration is the 
low level of reliability where, in case a transformer or bus fails, it implies the loss of the whole 
electrical supply. The MV lines which hang from the substation will experience an interruption. 
Figure 1.4a show this configuration. Note, that this configuration can be fed with one or two HV 
lines and can allocate one or two transformers. 
Sectionalized single bus 
This configuration is the evolution of the previously described single bus substation. The main 
feature and advantage is the possibility of splitting the main bus, therefore, if in the substation a 
bus fault occurs, it can operate with one circuit breaker and one transformer, thus increasing the 
level of operations in case a fault occurs. Thus, by operating the central tie-switch, this type of 
structure improves reliability, enhances the single bus configuration and allows the isolation of 
the main bus for maintenance tasks. On the other hand, the cost is increased in regards to the 
single bus. Figure 1.4b shows this configuration. 
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                 a) Single bus                                                                      b) Sectionalized single bus 
                                             Figure 1.3: Primary substations with single bus. 
 
Main and bus transfer 
A main and a bus transfer configuration consists of two independent buses, where one acts as the 
main bus which is fed by the HV lines and, two switches and a circuit breaker (CB) protect the 
transformer. The main bus and the second bus are connected through the interconnection CB 
equipped with two switches. In case a circuit breaker has to be removed or put out of service, this 
can be accomplished by taking advantage of this bypass tie-switch. This configuration requires 
two switches for each HV line and each transformer, in Figure 1.5, an example of a double bus 
with bypass switch is depicted. Concerning the previous configuration, the main advantage is the 
reliability increasing, whereas the main disadvantage is that its cost is also increased. 
Ring 
Ring configuration is an extension of the sectionalised bus substation and is formed by 
interconnecting the two open ends with a CB. This configuration creates a loop where two 
switches and a CB protect each section. The main advantage of this configuration is that in the 
case of transformer or circuit breaker failure, this section can be isolated and the substation 
continues operating. In case a bus fault occurs, with this configuration, the two circuit breakers 
of the faulted side clears the fault without interrupting the power supply. Figure 1.6 shows this 
substation scheme. As for the sectionalised bus configuration, the main advantages of these 
substations are the high reliability in case of outages, and the flexibility to perform maintenance 
tasks. On the contrary, the cost increases due to the required number of switches and CBs. 
Breaker-and-a-half 
The breaker-and-a-half configuration is composed of two buses which are connected both CBs 
and switches. 
Chapter 1: Introduction, concept and objectives 
7 
            
                                    Figure 1.4: Substation with main bus transfer configuration. 
                                              
                                   Figure 1.5: Substation with breaker-and-a-half configuration 
 
Usually, for each high voltage line and transformer, there are two switches and one CB. In each 
side, three circuit breakers are allocated. Thereby, the reason why this substation is called breaker-
and-a-half is that each side (either HV line or transformer) has one CB and share the second one. 
This configuration provides high flexibility in case a CB has to be replaced and guarantees full 
protection during this task. Besides, bus faults do not produce any substation outage. The pros 
and cons of this configuration are the high flexibility, high reliability, the chance of remove either 
circuit breakers or bus for maintenance with no interruption, however, the cons are the high price 
and the protective coordination between circuit breakers (i.e., the shared circuit breaker which 
both high voltage line and the transformer). This configuration with two HV lines and two 
transformer positions is shown in Figure 1.6. 
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                                   Figure 1.6. Substation with double-breaker-double-bus. 
 
Double breaker-double bus 
This substation configuration is probably the most complex, essentially, because of the number 
of switches and CBs. As for the three previous configurations, this substation has two main buses 
which generally energised. For each circuit of the substation, there are two CBs, thereby, any of 
them can be removed without interrupting the electrical supply. Each branch between the two 
buses allocates either an HV line or a transformer position. Figure 1.7 shows this configuration 
with two HV lines and two transformers. Undoubtedly, among all the listed substations 
configurations, this is the one which provides more reliability, however, is the most expensive 
due to the number of switches and CBs. 
 
Primary distribution systems 
Primary distribution systems can be either single-feeder which means that there is only one MV 
line or a multi-feeder when several lines hang from the substation. As an example, a typical DN 
configuration is shown in Figure 1.8. In the latest, an open-loop configuration can be made if two 
or more feeders can be connected. However, Figure 1.9 shows the configuration of the feeders, 
where the normally open switch is closed. An essential factor to take into consideration in the 
open-loop configuration is the high reliability. Commonly, each feeder which hangs from the 
HV/MV is protected by a CB with an overcurrent function implemented, whereas fuses protect 
the lateral branches. Note however, that this configuration can be different if the grid contains 
DGs, as an example, see the network layout of Figure 1.10.  
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                          Figure 1.7: Typical Distribution network with radial configuration. 
 
 
 
                     Figure 1.8: Distribution network configuration with open-loop configuration.  
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                                     Figure 1.9: Distribution network scheme with DG units. 
Secondary distribution systems 
Secondary distribution systems are the part of the grid which hang from the MV/LV substations, 
and as stated before, its configuration will vary depending on how important is the load's power 
continuity. Accordingly, the major part of the LV grid is operated radially, while, for consumers 
where the power cannot be interrupted (e.g., hospitals, large factories, large buildings) a spot 
configuration is selected. In Figure 1.11a, the typical radial LV grid configuration is showed; 
meanwhile, a spot configuration is shown in Figure 1.11b. Fuses protect the LV feeders which 
hang from theses substations. 
 
                     a) Radial multi-feeder LV grid                                             b) Spot configuration of a LV grid 
                                          Figure 1.10: Secondary distribution substation configurations.  
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1.2.2. DNs elements and systems applications 
The elements that compose a DN can be classified into three main types; the inherent elements of 
the DN, which are focused on transmitting the power between primary and secondary substations. 
Distribution lines (i.e., they can be either over-head wires or cables) and transformers are the main 
components of this group. 
The second group of devices is focused on providing reliability and safety. This group includes 
elements such as relays, CBs, switches, sectionalizers, reclosers, fuses or surge arresters. Besides, 
the coordinated between those elements becomes crucial. Additionally, other elements such as 
voltage regulators, capacitor banks or inductances can be found along the DN to provide reactive 
support for voltage support. 
The third category of elements is focused on measurement, operation and grid monitoring. 
Measurement devices are, at the same time, composed by elements such as potential transformers, 
current transformers, power quality analysers and smart meters. The electrical measurements 
sensed by the previously mentioned tools are typically collected with a remote terminal unit 
(RTU) and transmitted to the monitoring systems taking advantage of a communication system 
(e.g., GSM, GRPS, or optic fibre). Finally, software systems such as SCADA or state estimators 
manage the data obtained from the obtained field measurements. The latter has aroused great 
interest during the last decade and have provided successful results to detect missoperations. 
Lines 
Lines are designed to transmit power along the grid. These lines can be either an overhead line or 
a cable depending on its configuration. Mainly, distribution lines along urban areas are typically 
composed of cables, whereas overhead lines are the most used type in suburban and rural areas. 
Meanwhile, overhead lines are based on aluminium; cable lines are insulated with polymers such 
as XLPE or EPR. A detailed modelling regarding lines in power systems is done in [1.10]. 
Furthermore, a comprehensive study of electrical lines modelling for transient studies can be 
found in [1.11].  
Transformers 
Transformers are one of the most critical elements of an electrical system and are used to adjust 
the voltage level to the desired value; thus, it can be used to increase or decrease (i.e., step-up and 
step-down transformers) the voltage level through its electromagnetic fields between windings. 
They transfer power through its windings without changing the frequency. Transformers can be 
categorised by the number of windings and its connection, the core configuration (e.g., three-limb 
core, five-limb core or three single-phase transformer), the transformation ratio, the power rating, 
its clock ratio between windings, and the type of cooling. ANSI/IEEE-Std. C57.12 provides useful 
data regarding transformers characteristics and tests [1.12]. The main characteristics of a 
transformer are supplied by the manufacturer and showed in the rating plate. Usually, the main 
features are as follows: its ratio between winding voltages, the rated apparent power, the short-
circuit impedance and its losses. In [1.13-1.14], a comprehensive evaluation of transformer 
models for transient studies is carried out. 
Circuit breaker 
A circuit breaker is a switching element designed to energise or de-energise a circuit; therefore, 
it can interrupt the electrical current. The circuit breaker is defined by its breaking capacity in 
steady-state as well as under fault conditions. This current interruption can be done to protect the 
grid against disturbances or to carry out maintenance tasks. Presently, several types of the circuit 
breakers are available, among them, SF6 CB, vacuum CB or oil CB. For a thorough analysis 
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regarding the types of CBs and its capabilities, see [1.15]. Overall, in MV networks, the breaking 
capacity during steady-state operation of these devices is around a maximum value of 800 A, 
while during short-circuit, the breaking capacity is approximately 20 kA. 
Relay 
The main goal of a relay is to drive the circuit breakers or other switching devices. This device 
performs the task of preventing abnormal situations in the grid (e.g., short-circuits, over-voltages, 
etc.). These devices have the capability of generating a trip and send it to the CB in case a 
threshold has been exceeded. The thresholds and settings of each relay depend on the desired 
protective function (e.g., over-current relays, voltage relays, frequency relays, etc.).  In general, 
radial distribution networks are equipped with overcurrent relays to protect the grid against short 
circuits or over-loads [1.16]. 
Nevertheless, depending on the type of grounding and the type of network (i.e., radial or meshed), 
this overcurrent protection has to be replaced by a more complex protective system. Particularly, 
in the presence of DG units, voltage and frequency relays are widely used. In the further sections, 
the main types of relays used in distribution networks will be assessed.  
Recloser 
A recloser is a protective device which is allocated along the grid and has the capability of 
interrupting currents. In case a fault occurs, it de-energise the circuit, and after a preset reclosing 
time, it attempts to re-energise it to restore the supply. If this operation is unsuccessful, few more 
reclosing operations are typically implemented (e.g., between three and four reclosing operations 
at different time rates is a commonly used procedure). If these attempts proved to be unsuccessful 
because the fault is permanent, the circuit remains opened isolating the faulted section. The 
breaking capability of these devices can be similar to those adopted in circuit breakers. It is 
essential to highlight that, reclosing function can also be implemented in a relay, see 
manufacturers data [1.17]. 
Sectionalizer 
Essentially, a sectionalizer is a protective device which acts as a slave of a master device, which 
can be either a circuit breaker or a recloser. Therefore, the principal goal of these devices is the 
fault location. A typical procedure implemented in sectionalizers for fault location and isolation 
in MV DNs is described as follows.  Firstly, it counts the number of faults and interruptions (i.e., 
a short-circuit and its subsequent CB opening). Secondly, and depending on the desired time, 
between two of the aforementioned reclosing operations, it orders the switch opening to isolate 
the faulty section. Note, however, that during normal operation, sectionalizers are capable of 
interrupting less current than circuit breakers. For instance, in MV networks, regardless of the 
voltage level, commonly the breaking capacity of sectionalizers during normal operation is 
between 200 and 600 A. These devices proved to be useful to locate and isolate the fault in DNs. 
Switch 
A switch is used to isolate a faulted section of an electrical network. Mainly, the difference 
between a CB and a switch is its breaking capacity. Meanwhile, the CB can interrupt high fault 
currents; this switch can only interrupt low current levels. As mentioned earlier, they are 
especially useful to isolate faults when the upstream CB has previously de-energised the circuit. 
Fuse 
Unlike the other protective devices such as CB, reclosers or sectionalizers, fuses are only designed 
for over-current protection. Fuses are formed by a piece of wire which melts when current exceeds 
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a particular threshold. The most common fuses curves can be seen in [1.18].  For reliability 
purposes, these protective devices are not recommended and are used to protect laterals and 
secondary branches in the MV distribution network. Indeed, based on a cost-effective solution, 
fuses are widely adopted in secondary distribution substations to protect LV lines. 
Potential transformer 
A potential transformer is used for measurement purposes, it usually is formed by a common core 
and its main aim is to adapt the voltage level of the grid to a low voltage level suitable for devices 
such as relays and meters. More detailed data of these transformers can be found in [1.19]. 
Current transformer 
Current transformers are used in measurement and protection purposes. Unlike potential 
transformers, these devices are used to reduce the current level that flows through the primary 
winding. These transformers have a ratio between the primary winding and the secondary 
winding. The primary winding is connected in series with the wires, and the secondary is 
connected to the protective relay or measurement unit. Presently, different topologies of current 
transformers are available; some of them are designed to avoid line de-energisation (e.g., open-
core CT). The relationship between primary and secondary is kept fixed. See manufacturer data 
in [1.20]. 
Power quality analyser 
As a general definition, a power quality analyser is aimed at measuring a wide range of parameters 
for power quality assessments. The most common power quality disturbances are as follows: 
voltage sags/swells, voltage interruptions, flicker, transient over-voltages, harmonics, voltage and 
current unbalances or even frequency deviations, an extensive analysis of power quality 
disturbances can be found in [1.21-1.22]. Presently, the use of these devices is gaining importance 
among utilities to record system disturbances. Depending on its accuracy, they can be classified 
as class A or B, see the measurements requirements in the standard UNE-EN 61000-4-30.  
Capacitor bank 
Capacitor banks are used to provide reactive power to the grid and help to improve the power 
factor of end-users. Even though three-phase capacitor banks are the most commonly adopted in 
DNs, single-phase capacitor banks may also be found in single-phase LV networks. Due to the 
power factor correction, they help to improve the voltage drop and losses. These devices usually 
are allocated in either the primary substations (i.e., at the MV bus of the substation) or at the 
secondary distribution systems (i.e., at the primary side of the MV/LV distribution transformer). 
A comprehensive investigation regarding the optimum allocation of capacitor banks in DNs can 
be found at [1.23]. 
Smart meter 
Smart meters are measurement devices and the main difference with regards the typical ones is 
its capability of transmitting the data through the distribution network wires. Indeed, the power 
line communication (PLC) system, is one of the most commonly adopted solution by DSOs. 
Additionally, they are prepared for bidirectional measurements and can register events such as 
power failure or detect over/under-voltages in steady-state. In the modern power systems, these 
devices are a valuable asset for the DSO to carry out other functionalities such as voltage control, 
demand-response, DG dispatching control or network losses evaluation (either technical or non-
technical). Lastly, in smart grids, these devices can be crucial to improve the current load shedding 
procedures. An excellent example of smart meters project can be seen in [1.22]. 
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Voltage regulators 
Voltage regulation can be done by using a transformer equipped with a tap changer of a specific 
apparent power capacity, which allows the user to modify the ratio by changing the number of 
turns. Usually, the addition or removal coils is done in the primary winding (i.e., the higher 
voltage winding). Thus, by switching the taps, the voltage drop can be reduced. 
In the recent years, as a result of the electronically-interfaced devices, the voltage control is done 
with several flexible alternating current transmission systems (FACTS) devices such as static var 
compensators (SVC) (it that can be either a capacitor or a reactor) or static synchronous 
compensator (STATCOM). These devices are electronically-interfaced capacitors or even 
reactors connected to the grid through a voltage source converter (VSC); thereby, the injection of 
reactive power can be controlled by its thyristors. For more information about this voltage 
compensation, see [1.24]. 
SCADA 
Conceptually SCADA (System control and data acquisition) systems are implemented for real-
time monitoring. This control can be implemented through a communication system which 
receives the signals (i.e., bus voltages, line currents, system frequency, circuit breakers state, etc.) 
from in-field measurement and protection devices. These data is sensed, collected and stored into 
a database. The stored data can be evaluated and classified by the SCADA main program and 
allows the DSO to analyse the state of the grid as well as evaluate prescribed events. SCADA 
systems are beneficial for DN dispatching tasks.  
State estimators 
State estimators have represented one of the most noteworthy achievements in the power systems 
control, especially during the recent years in the so-called smart grids. The input of this tool is the 
obtained data from the SCADA, which in turn, it has been collected from field measurements. 
The state estimators main goal is to detect ill-conditioned measurements and false alarms; thus, it 
estimates the grid from local measurements. For more detailed information regarding state 
estimators, see [1.25]. 
 
1.3 Thesis background 
 
DNs in rural areas are those who are more vulnerable and are more exposed to contingencies due 
to the environment and due to the low level of redundancy. Typically, DNs are operating in radial 
configuration and are protected by CBs and reclosers which are driven by over-current relays. 
Hence, if a fault occurs (e.g., it can be either short-circuits or over-loads), after the clearing time, 
the circuit is de-energised. As mentioned earlier, following this operation, in order to avoid 
manual operations and time-consuming posting of employees, the recloser will attempt to re-
energise the circuit on several occasions to restore the electrical supply. Therefore, the costumers 
located downstream of the faulted section are expected to experience a voltage sag before the 
fault is cleared, and a supply interruption once the CB has opened the circuit. However, if a source 
is acting in parallel with the main grid during the reclosing time, instead of an interruption, an 
islanding operation (IO) can occur. To date, these IOs were expected only in the presence of 
distributed generation (DG) units, which following the CB disconnection, they continue 
energising this portion of the network.  
However, unexpectedly, and IO was observed in a DN with no DG units. This fact, undeniably, 
raised a problem for the DSO accentuated by a considerable amount of consumers complaints. 
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Crucially, this was the starting point of the undertaken research. This being the case, the first steps 
focused on locating the source of this unexpected IO and analyse the occurred events which, given 
the situation, it was not a trivial issue. 
As a general matter, the background of this thesis lies in solving a major problem identified in a 
real DN located in Spain.  
 
1.4 Steps of the thesis 
 
As derived from the previous section, essentially, this thesis has been oriented at solving a real 
problem identified in a DN located in Spain. Although the main pillars of the thesis have been 
detailed in the abstract, this section will list a detailed point-by-point summary of the main stages. 
Particularly, during the research period, the following steps have been carried out: 
1. Carry out an in-depth analysis of the recorded field measurements. 
 Collect the data from relays. 
 Extract this data from Comtrade files. 
 Analyse of the origin of the events. 
 Determine the origin of this IO. 
 Classify each event depending on its duration and characteristics. 
2. Preliminary characterisation of the transient. 
 Characterise the main features of the islanding. 
 Accurately identify the different stages of the IO. Thus, considering the 
pre-fault, during-fault, the IO and the recovery process. 
 Preliminary discussion concerning the possible influential factors of this 
IO. 
 Study the possible effects of the IO into the grid and costumers. 
3. The development of the model  
 Evaluate the Matlab/Simulink capabilities for the transient simulation. 
 Analyse the main characteristics of the network components. 
 Select the most appropriate model for each grid component.  
 A comparison between the model and the real system was investigated. 
 The last step focused on load modelling. Given the fact that its pattern is 
random in time, to obtain successful results, the trial and error method 
had been used.  
4. Simulations with the implemented model 
 Once the model has been created, the first preliminary simulations were 
performed. 
 After preliminary attempts, a successful wide range of scenarios were 
simulated (See Chapter 5). 
 Analyse the obtained results from the simulations.  
 A comparison between the simulation results and those obtained from 
in-field results has been performed. From this comparison, the exact 
location of the faults occurred in the grid proved feasible. Given the fact 
that with voltage and current measurements in only two locations (PCC1 
and PCC2, See Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4) it is complicated to locate a fault. 
However, by making this comparison, this location is successfully 
obtained. 
 Simulate the IO with different feeder load scenarios. 
 Simulate the islanding operations by adding different load torque values. 
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 Simulation with different types of faults so as to observe its effects on 
the island. 
 Simulate several reclosing times with both permanent and non-
permanent faults. 
5. Model validation 
 Carry out a comparison between the real occurred events and simulation 
results, which is achieved by comparing both voltage and frequency 
measurements separately. 
 Test the accuracy of the developed model.  
6. Voltage sag assessment 
 A review of the main power quality disturbances. 
 A general survey of the voltage sags state of the art. 
 Establish the main features of the proposed voltage sag that is observed 
during the island. 
 Define the analytical expression that follows this voltage sag. 
 Validate the proposed analytical expression of the sag magnitude taking 
advantage of the real occurred events. 
7. Anti-islanding evaluation 
 A brief review of the currently available islanding detection (ID) 
methods. 
 Test the available methods for DG islanding detection. 
 Describe the principles of the proposed algorithm. 
 Demonstrate the efficiency of this method in ID as well as the 
incapability of the current ID methods for several particular scenarios. 
 Test the hybrid islanding detection method for both islanding and non-
islanding events. 
 
1.5 Thesis Objectives 
 
Fundamentally, the main goals of this thesis can be summarised in three main points, which are 
listed down below: 
 The first objective of this thesis is the development of the required model to validate the 
recorded field measurements where the islanding operation has been identified. 
 The second goal is the assessment of the voltage sags that occur during the islanding 
operation object of study.  
 The third goal of this thesis is the implementation of a suitable tool to prevent the 
islanding operation which has been previously evaluated, modelled and validated. 
 
1.6 Document structure 
 
This thesis is structured in 10 chapters, as follows: 
Chapter 2 
The second chapter describes the state of the art of each key issue of this thesis. Thus, the first 
part will describe state of the art in IOs, the main types and its principal features. The second part 
is aimed at introducing the main fundamentals of the power quality, which falls within the second 
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key issue of this thesis. Lastly, the third part makes a review of the currently available islanding 
detection methods and introduce the basic principle of the islanding detection criterion 
implemented in this thesis.  
Chapter 3 
The third chapter reviews the current literature about voltage sags. In this chapter, the voltage 
sags will be divided into two main types; the ones with constant magnitude (i.e., originated by 
short-circuits) and ones with non-constant magnitude (i.e., voltage sags originated by the 
contribution of induction motors, caused by motors starting or transformers energisation). 
Chapter 4 
The fourth chapter seeks to address the theoretical analysis of the IO. In this chapter, the following 
aspects are analysed; (i) the origin of the islanding operation and its contributory factors, (ii) the 
equations of the system before the fault, (iii) during the fault and, (iv) during the IO. Besides, this 
chapter describes the main features of the three-phase Matlab/Simulink implemented model. 
Mainly, this chapter describes the modelling guidelines followed to validate this transient. 
Chapter 5 
Chapter 5 provides the results obtained from simulations and describes the critical aspects of each 
group of simulations. Since each influential factor has grouped simulations, this Chapter will also 
be divided according to these factors. Therefore, this chapter is divided into four subparts 
according to every influential factor, which are the following; the feeder loads value and its model, 
the motor load torque, the type of fault that caused the IO and the reclosing time. 
Chapter 6 
This Chapter is principally focused on show and discuss the field measurements. For the sake of 
brevity, this part will only show and discuss seven events from the available events in the 
database. It is worthwhile to note that this selection of the recorded events, provides a sufficiently 
representative sample to characterise the IO object of study.  
Chapter 7 
This chapter compares the simulations obtained in Chapter 5 with the field measurements from 
the real occurred events.  The validation of this model transient will be carried out comparing 
both voltage and frequency separately. Additionally, an in-depth discussion regarding the 
appropriateness of the adopted model and its accuracy is presented. 
Chapter 8 
Chapter 8 assesses the voltage sag that occurs during the IO and details its main features. 
However, the crucial aspect of this Chapter is the characterisation of the non-constant magnitude 
of this sag. A validation between simulations and field measurements can fulfil the validity of the 
proposed voltage sag analytical expression.  
Chapter 9 
Chapter 9 is aimed at detailing the main characteristics of the new islanding detection tool that 
has been implemented to prevent the unintentional IO described in the previous Chapters. This 
tool has also been tested for both islanding and non-islanding events. 
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Chapter 10 
Lastly, Chapter 10 contains the main conclusions derived from this thesis as well as includes some 
suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 2 
State of the art 
 
2.1 Motor bus transfers 
 
The guiding principle of this thesis is the transient behaviour of the induction motor which 
following a disconnection, transiently, behaves as a generator. This transient has been object of 
study in the industry practice when a motor is transferred from one bus to another, see [2.1-2.3]. 
At the beginnings, what concerned most was the higher torques that occur during these bus 
transfers, in [2.3] a specific ratio (Volts per hertz) value of 1.33 has been established to achieve 
successful reclosing operations when carrying out these transfers. 
 Since these transfers were very fast (i.e., typically less than ten cycles), these studies considered 
that the mechanical motor speed remains constant during the process, which cannot be considered 
in the present study. 
Other works concerning motor bus transfers have been focused on developing several tools to 
prevent these undesired out-of-phase reclosing operations, see for instance, [2.4-2.5]. Particularly, 
in [2.5], the main goal is to estimate the angle and voltage magnitude of the motor bus before the 
other source is connected. 
In-depth research has been carried out by the IEEE Task Force, see the report in [2.6]. In motor 
bus transfers, two main type categories can be distinguished; closed transition or open transition, 
where the fundamental difference lies in the type the paralleling. Thus, the closing transition 
involves a brief paralleling between sources, whereas the open transition does not operate with 
both sources. Among the techniques in the closed transition, the hot-parallel transfer is the most 
common; meanwhile, within the open transition, the fast, residual and long-time procedures are 
widely implemented in the industry. Take into consideration that if the new source is not 
paralleled, the instant when the motor is disconnected is crucial.  The period between the motor 
disconnection and the other source connection, the motor is acting as a generator.  
Hot-Parallel transfer 
In this technique, the new source feeds the motor before for the old source is tripped to avoid 
supply interruption, and during a brief period of time (between 100 ms and 200 ms), both sources 
supply energy to the motor. The main advantage of this method is that no transients occur, 
however, due to the paralleling, if a fault occurs during this transfer, this can overstress the system 
components due to the rise in the short-circuit power. 
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Fast simultaneous transfer 
This technique belongs to the open transition method and is based on tripping the old source and 
reconnect the new one at the same instant. Due to the delay between both CBs, either a brief 
unintentional paralleling or brief islanding may occur depending on which breaker trips first. In 
this technique, the deviation between voltage, frequency and angle between sources used to be 
small since two stiff sources are reclosed. Among the unsupervised reclosing operations, this bus 
transfer technique is the fastest one. 
Fast sequential transfer 
The operating principle of this technique is very similar to the previous one, nevertheless, in this 
technique, the new source is tripped, and as soon as these CB has started the process (i.e., typically 
one or two cycles), the new source CB is connected. Thus, in this method, a supervised command 
is implemented to track the state of the CB of the first source. However, if the reclosing is 
unsupervised, several issues may occur, see the results obtained in [2.3]. On the other hand, if the 
process is supervised by a closed command, which can dynamically block the fast transfer just 
after the main source (i.e., the first one) is disconnected, even if a fault occurs during the process, 
a change in angle or voltage is detected.  
Residual transfer and long-time transfer 
This technique aims to wait until the motor bus voltage falls below a preset value, typically 0.25 
pu; therefore, the reclosing transient will be similar to the one experienced in a motor energisation. 
In this technique, the angle is not taken into consideration. This technique is the third faster among 
the open transition methodologies. The main advantage is that no commands or advanced tools 
are required to fulfil such a task. However, the main disadvantage of this reclosing procedure is 
the fact that the industrial process is almost stopped; therefore, the motors may need a restart. 
Note also, that depending on the motor inertia, the load torque and its type, voltage in the motor 
bus will decay slowly, which will make the process time-consuming. As an example, if no loads 
are connected to the same busbar, and the motors are rotating with low load torque, this process 
may take between seconds and a few minutes.  
In-phase transfer 
This technique offers the possibility of avoiding a fast transfer as well as avoid a supply 
interruption during a residual or even long time reclosing procedure. Thus, the command to 
reclose the CB and connect the motor bus to the new source waits until 0 degrees of phase 
coincidence regardless of the slip frequency or the voltage magnitude difference (i.e., the 
difference between the motor bus and the new source). Since the motor bus frequency is decaying 
following its de-energization, this technique requires advanced tools to measure the angle in both 
sides. Here, CBs are assumed to open in four-cycles, and a variance of one cycle can produce 
errors in the predicted angle. Therefore, due to the fact that CBs interrupt the alternating current 
(AC) at zero crossing, depending on the rate-of-change-of-frequency (ROCOF) in the busbar, a 
half cycle or even one cycle delay can produce an angular error. Fortunately, the angular 
difference that can occur during this process is assumed as an acceptable error, see [2.3]. A 
practical discussion regarding how to carry out as well as practical experiences of how to carry 
out such transfers is done in [2.6]. 
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2.2 Islanding operations in DNs 
 
2.2.1 Overview 
An islanding operation can be defined as a parallel operation between the main utility and an 
isolated area due to either a fault or a maintenance task. Several categories may be used to classify 
such operations; the first distinction is between intentional and unintentional; the second one is 
referred to long term and short term. When a part of the grid is isolated, the mismatch between 
the power delivered by the sources and the local loads that remain in the isolated part plays a 
pivotal role in the purpose of maintaining system stability within the islands [2.7]. According to 
IEEE Std. 1547 during unintentional islanding operations, distributed generation (DG) must be 
disconnected within 2 s for slight voltage and frequency deviations, and in 0.16 s for significant 
variations [2.8]. Several detailed studies have been carried out to prevent islanding operations in 
DNs in the presence of DG; see. Several authors have studied (intentional or unintentional) 
islanding operations under different contexts; see, for instance, [2.9-2.10]. 
 
2.2.3 Intentional islanding operations 
This type of IO has been object of study in several research articles [2.11-2.12], where the island 
is created utilising a multi-machine system and considering a wide range of generators. Mostly, 
these islands have been designed to maintain stability and avoid catastrophic blackouts for wide-
area power systems. Stability is a crucial issue in wide-area power systems, in [2.13], the power 
system stability definition and classification is done. Figure 2.1 shows the main categories and 
magnitudes that are analysed in power systems stability. From [2.13], it is quite clear that each 
contingency has to be analysed separately, however, it is also true that a large contingency in one 
magnitude can produce a collapse to another one. For instance, even though frequency and voltage 
stabilities are analysed separately, major disturbances in one variable may lead to another variable 
collapse and as a consequence, entail a major blackout, an excellent report can be found in [2.14]. 
As stated before, the main aim of the intentional islands is to avoid major blackouts, for example, 
in [2.15] the causes of several occurred blackouts are thoroughly investigated. The equilibrium 
between active-power generation and active-power loads has to be maintained and is a crucial 
indicator (minimum power imbalance), nonetheless, other factors such as generator coherency 
has to be also taken into account [2.16-2.17].  
Although the intentional islands have been thoroughly investigated for wide area, in the recent 
years the investigation of intentional islanding operations to avoid interruptions and enhance the 
distribution networks reliability is gaining prominence [2.18-2.19]. In these situations, the 
distributed generation allocated along the distribution networks is of utmost importance. 
That being said, a brief recall of the stability concerning the main magnitudes are detailed down 
below: 
Rotor angle stability 
The rotor angle stability is the generators ability to remain in synchronism after being affected 
by a disturbance. The equilibrium between the electromagnetic torque and mechanical torque is 
the main concern to maintain the generators in synchronism. During a disturbance, an imbalance 
between torques occur, thereby, depending on factors such as; generators inertia, the type of fault, 
the clearing time, and the severity of the disturbance itself, may lead generators to lose 
synchronism. Transient stability has been widely analysed in [2.20]. Recently, the proliferation 
of renewable energies such as solar farms or wind parks, have reignited a fruitful debate about 
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the effects of such generators into the traditional synchronous system, see [2.21-2.22]. Depending 
on the disturbance severity, we have the following classification: 
1. Small disturbances of angle stability (e.g., either inter-are or local oscillations). 
2. Transient stability (e.g., due to large disturbance). 
The first distinction has been assessed in [2.23], whereas the second type has been object of study 
in [2.24-2.25]. 
Frequency stability 
The frequency stability is the ability to maintain stable frequency following an imbalance between 
the amount of generation and load. Whereby, deviations between active power generation (PG) 
and active power loads (PL) can be absorbed by the kinetic energy stored in the rotor-synchronous 
generators with inertia constant (H) and the damping constant (D) respectively. In electrical power 
systems, a frequency deviation is highly linked with lack of generation reserve [2.26]. Depending 
on its duration, frequency disturbances can be either short term or long term. Crucially, a three-
stage procedure is established to address a frequency deviation, this procedure is detailed in 
chapter 9 of [2.13], and a brief resume is described as follows: 
• First control: In this group, little deviations are considered and normally the required 
times for taking actions is between 2 and 20 seconds. This control is not responsible of 
restoring the reference value of the frequency, the reference is kept constant. This 
response is based on local actions. 
• Second control is related to wide-area with a multi-machine system and involves the 
operation of the generation dispatching. The timing for this control is between 20 seconds 
and 2 minutes. The aim of this control is to keep the balance between generation and load. 
• The tertiary control is responsible of address large frequency deviations. This control can 
order an increase or decrease generation reference to all generation levels. Normally, this 
control, takes place when the first and the second failed to restore the system frequency.  
Furthermore, this control considers not only active-power readjusting but also voltage 
and reactive-power control. 
More details about wide-area frequency control in Spain can be found in [2.28].  
 
Voltage stability 
Voltage stability is highly linked with the reactive power, thus, imbalances in reactive power 
between generators and loads may evolve to voltage instability. It is seen in several studies that 
following a large disturbance, injections of reactive power (i.e., it can be either inductive or 
capacitive) helped the system to recover. As stated in the introduction, in some particular 
occasions, voltage instability can cause frequency excursions, see [2.29-2.30]. 
Depending on the severity of the occurred contingency and its duration, voltage stability can be 
classified in two categories; small disturbance and large disturbance. Commonly, small 
disturbances are related to insufficient damping of oscillations or even a little oscillation of the 
prime mover, especially if there is no governor or the excitation is constant system. Meanwhile, 
the largest disturbances are mainly due to short-circuits where the system is not capable of 
supplying the amount of reactive power, this assessment is done in [2.31].  
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                                            Figure 2.1: Power system stability classification. 
                                                   
2.2.4 Unintentional islanding operations 
Unlike the IOs evaluated in the previous section, this part is aimed at describing the ones that are 
not planned. Mainly, non-planned islanding operations occur at the distribution networks when 
the distributed generation (DG) units remain energising the grid after the main CB has opened the 
circuit. Typically, in order to prevent these islands and avoid protective misscoordinations, DSO 
codes compel the DG resources to trip if a fault occurs. 
Based on the previous premise, an essential aspect of any ID study is the capability of the 
protective devices to detect the island quickly; commonly, within 200 to 400 ms after the loss of 
mains have occurred [2.32]. The list of hurdles in case of failure to trip may include; PQ 
disturbances [2.33] (e.g., frequency and voltage out of range), a safety hazard for the network 
personnel, or a damaging effect due to the out-of-phase reclosing. The increasing demand for 
detecting IOs have led to implementing islanding detection (ID) methods in coordination with the 
electric power system protection. Since the survivability of these islands depends on the mismatch 
between generation and load, in cases with low imbalances, frequency and voltage will remain 
stable. Therefore, this fact makes the task of detecting the island more challenging. In Section 
2.3, a review of the available techniques to identify these undesirable operations is done. 
It is essential to highlight the fact that the IO that is assessed in the present thesis falls within this 
type (i.e., unintentional IO). As mentioned earlier, it occurs when the utility CB opens the circuit, 
and the induction motors act as generators energising the grid until this CB recloses to restore the 
supply (e.g., Typically between 0.5 and 1 s). 
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2.3 Power quality 
 
2.3.1 PQ Fundamentals 
Although the term Power Quality is widely used, several definitions can be found in the literature 
about this concept. Thus, the term power quality is defined by the IEEE in the std. 1100-2005 
[2.34] and IEC has also defined this concept in [2.35]. However, M.H.J Bollen [2.36], established 
the following definitions: 
 “The quality of voltage can be defined as the variation with regards its ideal form (in 
sinusoidal waveform and constant amplitude)” 
 “The quality of current can be defined as the variation with regards its ideal form (in 
sinusoidal waveform and constant amplitude)” 
 “The power quality encompasses both voltage and current quality” 
Having said all that, the quality of power is seen as a matter of reliability and quality in terms of 
the electrical power that is delivered to the customer. Each deviation from a pre-established value, 
which is understood as an acceptable, is considered a disturbance. 
Over the last decade, power quality (PQ) attracted the attention of the scientific community, while 
presently, monitoring PQ disturbances has become a crucial task for distribution operators 
(DSOs) being one of the issues of major concern. Since the DNs supply power to the costumers, 
monitoring the occurring events has become essential; therefore, the smart meters allocated at 
each customer node will play a pivotal role [2.37]. Regarding the measurement and monitoring 
of PQ disturbances, several standards have been published within the EN-61000 series; these 
standards fall within the electromagnetic compatibility field. Particularly, EN61000-4-30 defines 
how to measure PQ disturbances and makes a distinction in the measurement accuracy. A relevant 
summary and interpretation of these standards are given in References [2.38]. 
Furthermore, other research has been focused on how to identify the different type of disturbances 
from occurred events; for instance, see references [2.39-2.40]. Once PQ disturbances are detected, 
classifying them and compressing them into separate events is a challenging task and requires 
advanced tools; see references [2.41-2.42]. Some authors have considered fuzzy logic or neural 
networks to classify them [2.43], some others proceed based on clustering the data depending on 
its origin from offline and prescribed events, and lastly, certain studies have focused on real-time 
classification, which results in a successful classification; for instance, see reference [2.44]. 
It is understood that PQ is one of the major concerns for DSOs, and probabilistic studies have 
been carried out to evaluate the grid reliability with statistical and stochastic assessments. Such 
studies have concluded that protective devices and the weakness of the grid, as well as the type 
of loads, are crucial factors when carrying out PQ studies. Besides, with the growing interest in 
distributed generation (DG) and smart grids, their influence on the PQ field is currently under 
investigation, see [2.45-2.46]. 
 
2.3.2 PQ disturbances classification 
Before a classification is done, four parameters such as; frequency, amplitude, waveform and 
symmetry can serve as reference frames for the following classification. All PQ disturbances are 
summarized in the standard EN-50160, where current disturbances are not considered. This 
standard defines disturbances as two types: (i) continuous phenomena (e.g., long-time 
disturbances in the range between ms and minutes), such as voltage drops, voltage swells or 
frequency oscillations; and (ii) short-duration disturbances such as voltage interruptions, voltage  
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                                      Table 2.1: Power Quality disturbances summary. 
Disturbance Category Subcategory Duration Amplitude 
Transients Surge 50 ns -1 ms     - 
Transients Oscillating 0.3 ms – 50 ms     - 
Short duration disturbances Interruptions 10 ms – 1 m    <0.1 pu 
Short duration disturbances Voltage sags* 10 ms – 1 m 0.1 - 0.9 pu 
Short duration disturbances Voltage swells* 10 ms – 1 m 1.0 - 1.8 pu 
Long duration disturbances Long interruptions Steady-state    0   pu 
Long duration disturbances Under-voltages Steady-state 0.1 - 0.9 pu 
Long duration disturbances Over-voltages Steady-state 1.1 - 1.2 pu 
Voltage unbalance      - Steady-state 0.5 - 2  % 
Waveform distortion DC component Steady-state   0 - 0.1 % 
Waveform distortion Harmonics Steady-state   0 - 20 % 
Waveform distortion Interharmonics Steady-state   0 - 2.0 % 
Waveform distortion Notches Steady-state      - 
Waveform distortion Noise Steady-state    0 - 1 % 
Flicker      -   Flashing      - 
Frequency deviation      -   < 10 s   +/- 10 Hz 
* See an example of both sag and swell in Figure 2.2 
sags, voltage swells, and over-voltage transients (e.g., short-term disturbances in the range 
between μs to ms). These disturbances are also summarised in Table 2.1.  
Among all PQ disturbances, voltage sags have been the object of study for many years. At first, 
voltage sags were assumed to be rectangular. Afterwards, it was demonstrated that this was not 
strictly true, and the type of recovery, as well as the phase-angle-jump, played a significant role 
[2.47]. It is relevant to highlight the characterisation done by M.H.J. Bollen in [2.48]. 
Furthermore, immunity tests and studies of electrical devices’ behaviour towards voltage sags 
have been thoroughly analyzed in Reference [2.50], where the effects of the voltage sags are 
evaluated. In this direction, several standards have been published; for instance, EN 61000-3-2 
(limits for harmonic current emissions, less than 16 A), EN-61000-4-34 (immunity test for high 
current equipment, more than 16 A), and voltage sags with statistical results are summarized in 
IEC-61000-2-8. Considering that electrical device sensitivity is an aspect of utmost importance, 
immunity tests for voltage sags and interruptions are still under study. 
Even though standard indices for reliability such as standard average interruption frequency index 
(SAIFI), standard average interruption duration index (SAIDI) or the reliability curves published 
by the information technology industry council (ITIC) have been defined, each country has its 
own regulations regarding the number of interruptions or their duration [2.51]. To deal with 
voltage sags effects, well-known equipment such as dynamic voltage restorers or uninterruptible 
power supply devices are used [2.52]. 
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Mainly, the origin of voltage sags in DNs and transmission networks (TNs) are faults; given their 
random nature in time and location, their magnitude, type and recovery can change along the grid. 
A fault in the system can produce either a voltage sag or an interruption, depending on where the 
fault originates; that is, depending on the type of network and configuration which is feeding the 
fault. Thereby, if several lines are feeding the fault, and if we assume that each one has its own 
CB, the faulted line/section will experience an interruption, whereas the adjacent section will 
experience a voltage sag. 
 
                                          Figure 2.2: An example of voltage sag and voltage swell.                                   
 
2.3.3 Voltage sag features 
Since voltage sags are a short-duration reduction of the root-mean-square (RMS) voltage, it can 
be said that their characterisation depends on (i) their magnitude (i.e, voltage characteristic), (ii) 
their duration, (iii) their type, (iv) the type of recovery, (v) the phase-angle-jump, and (v) their 
origin. Nevertheless, the origin of the voltage sag will, in fact, dictate its type and its recovery. 
Moreover, voltage sags can change their type and become evolutionary voltage sags because the 
fault conditions can change (i.e., faults can evolve from one type of fault to another during the 
same event). Other parameters such as the point-on-wave in both the initiation and the recovery 
have been the object of study in Reference [2.53]. Besides this, an interesting analysis is done by 
Bastos et al. in Reference [2.54]. 
On the other hand, the data extracted from a measured sag are gained from the sag type 
characteristic voltage (i.e., the complex voltage) and by the positive-negative factor as published 
in References [2.55]. Particularly, according to Reference [2.56], there is a need to compress the 
three-phase voltage sag event into a single event, which is still under study by the IEEE project 
group P1159.2. Furthermore, a two-type contribution has been made in Reference [2.57]. To 
obtain the main characteristics from a measured voltage sag, relevant methods are available in the 
literature, among which are the following: 
1. Complex voltage: This method uses symmetrical components to evaluate the type of sag; 
thus, comparing the angle between the definite sequence and the negative sequence, the 
sag type is obtained. The voltage characteristic is computed with the complex sum and 
difference of the positive and negative sequence-voltage. 
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2. RMS voltage: These algorithms use the RMS voltage as input; thus, the computation of 
the six RMS values of the phase-to-phase and phase-to-neutral voltages is proposed. 
Therefore, the voltage characteristic, the voltage sag type and the positive-negative factor 
are extracted from these six voltage time-domain values. 
3. Advanced features: Within this group, a considerable number of studies have been 
published, and the main aim is to extract features from the voltage waveform considering 
a wide range of measurements and classify them with an algorithm that helps to compress 
the data. From all studies, the most appropriate methods are summarised in Reference 
[2.58]. Furthermore, Cai et al. in Reference [2.59] developed a mapping strategy for 
multiple disturbances.  
In Reference [2.60], the authors focus on voltage sag characterisation; a general distinction is 
made considering balanced and unbalanced voltage sags originating from faults (i.e., short-
circuits). Nonetheless, in this study, other sources of voltage sags, such as induction or 
synchronous motors during their starting process, are considered. Moreover, further classification 
is included in Reference [2.48], where the voltage sag produced during transformer energisation 
is evaluated. 
Previously, in faults originated by short-circuits, between the fault inception and the fault 
recovery, the voltage characteristic has been considered constant, and therefore the voltage sag 
has been considered rectangular; see Figure 1. However, this voltage characteristic may not be 
constant during the voltage sag and non-rectangular voltage sags may occur; for instance, see 
Figure 3 of Reference [2.48]. One reason for this voltage characteristic increasing or decreasing 
during the fault could be that the impedance seen from the source changes during the disturbance. 
Another cause for a decrease in the residual voltage during a non-rectangular voltage sag can 
occur in the presence of IMs. In such a way, immediately following a fault, the IMs tend to 
contribute towards the fault (e.g., roughly one or two cycles) so that the drawn current decreases 
in time and the voltage value also decreases; this phenomenon is thoroughly detailed in Reference 
[2.61]. 
To summarize, the studied sources of voltage sags are listed as follows: 
 Short-circuits (constant retained voltage); 
 Motors start—either synchronous or induction motors (non-constant retained voltage); 
 Transformer energization (non-constant retained voltage); 
 Short-circuits in the presence of IMs (non-constant retained voltage); 
This subsection will show the main characteristics of voltage sags graphically in order to compare 
these parameters with the proposed voltage sag of the subsequent Section 8 where a novel voltage 
sag topology will be presented. Although the voltage sag representation of Figure 1 is not 
innovative, this figure and its analysis are necessary to highlight the improvement made with the 
proposed voltage sag as the object of study. 
In Figure 2.3, the three principal magnitudes are shown in different plots. The first plot depicts 
the phase voltage waveform of the faulted phase. In this waveform, the beginning and the end of 
the fault can be observed as well as the point-on-wave in both the initiation and clearing (these 
two points are within two circles in the voltage waveform). The retained voltage—that is, the 
magnitude of the voltage sag—is shown in the second plot of Figure 2.3, and lastly, the phase-
angle-jump is observable in the third plot of the same figure. For this particular event, the duration 
is 300 ms, and it originated due to a single-line-to-ground fault (SLG), which belongs to voltage 
sag type A in the characterization done by M.H.J Bollen in [2.36], the retained voltage is 0.12 pu, 
and the phase-angle-jump is −30 degrees, which means that the grid is predominantly inductive. 
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Figure 2.3: Main characteristics of a voltage sag.                
 
2.4 Islanding detection methods 
 
2.4.1 The need for detecting the islanding operations 
As has been pointed out previously, if a source continues energising a portion of the electrical 
grid after CB has cleared a fault and it is acting in parallel with the main grid, this is known an 
IO. The DSO intends to avoid these scenarios. If this IO is not identified, the following issues can 
occur: (i) the power quality during the island is not guaranteed, (ii) the out-of-phase reclosing due 
to the mismatch between the frequency and voltage magnitude between sources (i.e., the main 
grid and the island), (iii) the protective misscoordination because the DG can continue feeding a 
permanent fault following the CB action and lastly, (iv) the grid remains energised which becomes 
a significant hazard for the personnel. Due to the mentioned previous issues, there is a need to 
detect the islanding operations and disconnect these sources as soon as possible. That is the reason 
why utilities compel to disconnect the DG in case any disturbance occurs. The subsequent 
subsection defines the general classification concerning ID methods. Note that the currently 
available methods are only posed for scenarios with DG, which differs from the present case 
where large induction motors cause the IO. 
2.4.2 General classification 
As exposed above, the need to identify these IO, fostered the implementation of the so-called ID 
methods, which are targeted at tripping the sources responsible for such IO. Generally, ID 
methods can be classified into three main groups: (i) passive-based methods, (ii) active-based 
methods, and (iii) communication-based methods. 
The first group is based on local measurements. The priority is to prevent false-triggering 
operations. The most challenging situation arises when the relation between the power of the 
source and the power load demand is near balanced. The principal protective functions that are 
involved in these methods are fundamentally: the rate-of-change of frequency protection 
(ROCOF), the rate-of-change of voltage (ROCOV), under/over voltage (UVP/OVP), under/over 
frequency (UFP/OFP), the rate-of-change of active and reactive power (ROCOP/ROCOQ), the 
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vector surge  (VS) relay, and the harmonic distortion deviation; these methods have been 
implemented in the following works [2.62-2.64]. 
The second group is aimed at detecting IO by injecting signals into the system (e.g. from the DN 
substation to the target islanded source). This technique has generated successful results; see, for 
instance, [2.65]. The weakest aspect of these methods falls in the complexity of the required 
equipment and its impact on the grid PQ. 
The third group uses several technologies (e.g., optic-fibre, power line communications, GPRS, 
etc.) to communicate the substation-feeder CB with the interconnection CB located at the PCC of 
the target DG. If communications are feasible, it is an excellent option to consider. Moreover, it 
is widely extended in practical industry applications. 
 
2.4.3 Passive-based methods 
This section reviews the main principles of some passive-based ID methods. It is essential to 
mention that this topic has been the subject of many other research studies; see for instance [2.66-
2.67]. In general, the main disadvantage of these methods is observed when the amount of 
generation and load are close, because the system can remain stable, therefore frequency and do 
not exceed the acceptable thresholds. 
Under/Over Frequency (81U/81O) 
Frequency values are usually captured every cycle, at voltage zero-crossing. The classical 
frequency thresholds for a 50 Hz system are 50.5 Hz for over-frequency values and 49.75 Hz for 
under-frequency values. As a rule of thumb, relays generate a trip signal with a delay after any of 
these thresholds has been exceeded. Both under/over frequency protection can be implemented 
using either a time curve or a fixed time. The tripping time can be adjusted between 0.16 s for the 
highest deviation, and 300 s for the minimum deviation [2.68]. For deviations beyond 95% of 
rated the frequency, a 0.16 s fixed time delay is used. Slight frequency deviations in transmission 
levels may involve frequency nuisance tripping with this method.  
Under/Over Voltage (27/59) 
Voltages are measured to obtain the RMS value of the phase-to-ground voltages. Commonly used 
voltage thresholds are set to 1.2 pu for over-voltages and 0.8 pu for under-voltages. Voltage 
deviation protection can be set using either a time curve or a fixed time. Typically, the delay is 
set to 100 ms for both over- and under-voltage protection. Nonetheless, for voltages between 1.1 
pu and 1.2 pu, the time delay is set to 500 ms. A succinct assessment concerning voltage curves 
for ID detection is presented in [2.69]. 
ROCOF (81R)/ROCOV 
ROCOF and ROCOV are methods based on the derivative with respect to time of respectively 
frequency and voltage measurements. Usually, df/dt is measured over a few cycles, generally 
between 2 and 50, and its value is sent to a low-pass filter to remove the high-frequency 
harmonics. A value of 1.2 Hz/s is seen as an inadmissible frequency rate of change. Nevertheless, 
the value typically ranges from 0.1 to 3.5 Hz/s; see, for instance, [2.70-2.71]. A minimum voltage 
supervision is also implemented in ROCOF relays, commonly 0.85 pu. 
Although measurements are available for a minimum of four cycles, false tripping could occur if 
only four cycles were selected. Typically, 7-cycle supervision is considered; for a 50 Hz power 
frequency, this is a time delay of 140 ms, a widely used setting in ROCOF relays. Voltage 
derivative will be similarly computed as for the ROCOF relay. A typical rate-of-change of 250 
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V/s is used, with a time delay of 100 ms; however, as for the ROCOF, a 140-ms delay will be 
used in the present work for this derivative. 
ROCOP/ROCOQ (32R) 
The rate-of-change in both active and reactive powers is a reasonable indicator for islanding 
detection, considering that, except for a balanced situation, it competes favourably for a quick IO 
detection. 
To sum up, in this subsection, the most common magnitudes used in the passive-based methods 
have been defined, however, other parameters are also used, see for instance [2.72]. 
 
2.4.4 Active-based methods 
These methods are based on the injection of a signal at the substation once the main CB has 
opened, in order to indicate that the CB located at the PCC of the DG has to be tripped. These 
techniques have high feasibility in detecting islanding operations; nevertheless, these methods 
jeopardise the power quality of the grid because of the harmonic and sub-harmonic components. 
A widely known method is the power line communication (PLC), where the signal is transmitted 
through the power wires. On the other hand, other techniques such as ripple control, waveform 
shift technique or waveform distortion techniques have been previously used as active methods. 
Additionally, it has to be highlighted that successful results were achieved by applying these 
methods in the presence of synchronous-based DGs in [2.73-2.74].  
 
2.4.5 HIDM Overview 
Once the currently available methods for ID for DG units have been described, it seems 
appropriate that a new tool is required to prevent the IO object of study. Since the IO object of 
study is not caused by DG but due to large induction motors, a comprehensive evaluation 
regarding which of the parameters mentioned above would be useful to identify such IO. As has 
been stated above, the passive-based ID methods can lead to missoperations in near balanced 
islands. Thus, the same situation may occur for the present case if voltage and frequency remain 
within the thresholds, which evidence that another criterion is required. Therefore, this thesis 
proposes a hybrid tool which merges some of the previously defined parameters used in passive-
based ID with an additional directional criterion to assure absolute efficiency in detecting IO. 
Note that some of the passive-based methods cause untimely tripping due to events that are not 
likely to provoke an islanding operation (e.g., faults in MV neighbour feeders, induction motor 
starting, capacitors switching, faults at the transmission network or even frequency excursions). 
The hybrid islanding detection method has been created to prevent both islanding and non-
islanding methods. This islanding detection tool will be evaluated in detail in the subsequent 
Chapter 9. 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
 
To conclude this Chapter, it is worth pointing that the transient behaviour of the motor during 
these bus transfers, provides a general idea about the transient object of study in this thesis. 
Nonetheless, this research has gone beyond. Indeed, the islanding operation caused into the DN 
and its effects have not been evaluated yet. On the other hand, the motor bus transfers techniques 
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defined in this section establishes a starting point for our research as well as help the reader in 
understanding the islanding operation explored in this thesis.  
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Chapter 3 
Voltage sags review 
 
3.1 Voltage sags with constant magnitude 
 
3.1.1 Voltage sag general classification 
Voltage sags with a constant magnitude (i.e., voltage sags originated by short-circuits) have been 
thoroughly analysed and can be classified as in [3.1]. As a general distinction, voltage sags can 
be divided into symmetrical (i.e., sag magnitude is equal the three-phases and the angle between 
them is 120 degrees) or asymmetrical (i.e., the voltage reduction is not equal for all phases and 
the angle is no longer 120 degrees). Symmetrical sags are usually originated due to three-phase 
faults (LLL) or three-phase-to-ground faults (LLLG) and the asymmetrical ones, are originated 
by single-line-to-ground (SLG), two-phase (LL) or two-phase-to-ground faults (LLG). Each type 
of fault causes a particular voltage sag, however, the voltage sag is propagated along the grid and 
due to the transformer windings connection, the type of sag changes. Thence, the type of sag 
expected on a particular bus depends on the type of fault where it is originated as well as on the 
windings connection of the transformer between the fault and this bus, see Table 3.1.  
                                   
                            Figure 3.1: Test system with three voltage levels to represent sag types. 
The voltage sag classification into seven types is done according to Figure 3.1, where the test 
system used to define this voltage sag topologies is shown. Furthermore, in Table 3.2, this seven 
type of voltage sags are summarised where the fault that originated the sag, the temporal 
expression and the phasor expressions are deduced.  
From table 3.2, it should be noted that the angles α1, α2, α3, α4 depend on the transformer windings 
connection, and can be computed as follows in Table 3.3. 
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                                               Table 3.1: Voltage sags general classification  
Type of fault  
   Location of the voltage sag 
          I            II            III  
LLL          A            A             A 
LLLG          A            A             A 
SLG          B            C             D 
LLG          E             F             G 
LL          C            D             C 
                               *Table obtained from M.H.J Bollen in [3.2]. 
 
                                  Table 3.2: Summary of the voltage sags general classification. 
Sag 
Type  
Fault 
origin  
                             Voltage sag  
                        temporal expression 
         Phasor  
       expression 
Type A
 
LLL 
LLLG 
 
0
0
120
120
2· · ·sin( )
2· · ·sin( )
2· · ·sin( )
a a
b a
c a
V V h t
V V h t
V V h t
ω α
ω α
ω α
−
+
= +
= +
= +
 
·
1 3
· ·
2 2
1 3
· ·
2 2
a
b
c
V V h
V V h j V
V V h j V
=
= − −
= − +
  
Type B SLG 
             
0
0
120
120
2· · ·sin( )
2· ·sin( )
2· ·sin( )
a a
b a
c a
V V h t
V V t
V V t
ω α
ω α
ω α
−
+
= +
= +
= +
 
·
1 3
·
2 2
1 3
·
2 2
a
b
c
V V h
V V j V
V V j V
=
= − −
= − +
  
Type C 
  LL 
SLG*       
 
0
1
0
1
2
120
2
120
2· ·sin( )
1 3·2· ·sin( )
2
1 3·2· ·sin( )
2
a a
b a
b a
V V t
hV V t
hV V t
α
α
ω α
ω α
ω α
− −
+ +
= +
+
= +
+
= +
 
1 3
· ·
2 2
1 3
· ·
2 2
a
b
c
V V
V V j hV
V V j hV
=
= − −
= − +
 
Type D
 
  LL* 
SLG**      
 
0
0
2
120 2
2
120 2
2· ·sin( )
32· ·sin( )
2
32· ·sin( )
2
a a
b a
b a
V V t
hV V t
hV V t
α
α
ω α
ω α
ω α
− −
+ +
= +
+
= +
+
= +
 
         
·
1 3
· · ·
2 2
1 3
· · ·
2 2
a
b
c
V V h
V V h j V h
V V h j V h
=
= − −
= − +
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Type E
 
LLG 
 
0
0
120
120
2· ·sin( )
2· · ·sin( )
2· · ·sin( )
a a
b a
c a
V V t
V V h t
V V h t
ω α
ω α
ω α
−
+
= +
= +
= +
 
1 3
· · ·
2 2
1 3
· · ·
2 2
a
b
c
V V
V V h j hV
V V h j hV
=
= − −
= − +
 
Type F
 
     
LLG*     
 
0
3
0
3
2
120
2
120
2· · ·sin( )
12· ·sin( )
3
12· ·sin( )
3
a a
b a
c a
V V h t
h hV t
h hV t
α
α
ω α
ω α
ω α
− −
− −
= +
+ +
= +
+ +
= +
 
·
1 2
· · ·
2 12
1 2
· · ·
2 12
a
b
c
V V h
hV V h j V
hV V h j V
=
+
= − −
+
= − +
 
Type G
 
LLG** 
0
4
0
4
2
120
2
120
22· · ·sin( )
3
1 72· ·sin( )
3
1 72· ·sin( )
3
a a
b a
c a
hV V t
h hV t
h hV t
α
α
ω α
ω α
ω α
− −
− −
+
= +
+ +
= +
+ +
= +
 
2
·
3
2 3
· · ·
6 2
2 3
· · ·
6 2
a
b
c
hV V
hV V j hV
hV V j hV
+
=
+
= − −
+
= − − +
 
* Sag obtained after one Dy transformer 
** Sag obtained after two Dy transformers 
 
                                             Table 3.3: Angles for voltage sags C, D, F and G 
Type of Sag                Angle 
Type C 1 arctan( 3· )
3
h piα = − +   
Type D 2 arctan( )
63
h pi
α = −
 
Type F 3
3·
arctan( )
2 6
h
h
pi
α = −
+
 
Type G 4
3· 3·
arctan( )
2 3
h
h
pi
α = +
+
 
                               *Table obtained from M.H.J Bollen in [3.3] 
By observing voltage sags Type C and D, one can conclude that both sags can be caused by either 
a SLG or a LL fault due to the transformer effects (e.g., Dy in this case). The type of transformer 
and its clock ratio will be assessed in the following subsection. The phasor expressions in Table 
3.2 can be also expressed in terms of its symmetrical components. Based on this transformation, 
Table 3.4 will summarise the direct, inverse and zero components of each type of sag. It must be  
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                                         Table 3.4: Symmetrical components of the voltage sags. 
Sag 
Type  
Fault 
origin  
                                         Symmetrical components 
 Zero sequence              Direct sequence            Inverse sequence        
Type A
 
LLL 
or 
LLLG 
 
   
0 1 20 · 0V V hV V= = =
  
Type B SLG 
 
0 1 2
1 2 1
· · ·
3 3 3
h h hV V V V V V− + −= − = − = −  
Type C 
LL 
or 
SLG*        
 
0 1 2
1 10 · ·
2 2
h hV V V V V+ −= = =  
Type D
 
LL* 
or 
SLG**       
 
0 1 2
1 10 · ·
2 2
h hV V V V V+ −= = = −  
Type E
 
LLG 
 
0 1 2
1 1 2 1
· · ·
3 3 3
h h hV V V V V V− + −= = =  
Type F
 
   
LLG*     
 
 
0 1 2
1 2· 10 · ·
3 3
h hV V V V V+ −= = = −  
Type G
 
LLG** 
 
0 1 2
1 2· 10 · ·
3 3
h hV V V V V+ −= = =  
* Sag obtained after one Dy transformer 
** Sag obtained after two Dy transformers 
 
noted that these expressions are crucial to understand how these voltage sags are propagated along 
the grid.  
Following the previous general classification which has considered the type of fault and the 
influence of the transformers winding connection, the voltage sag recovery has to be evaluated. 
Since the short-circuit currents originate a voltage sag during a fault and these currents are cleared 
by a protective device following a certain period (i.e., the clearing time), the recovery has to take 
into consideration the shift between currents and voltages. The instant when the fault current zero-
crossing takes place will dictate the beginning of the recovery process, and the grid thévenin angle 
will play a significant role in this recovery. Indeed, this angle indicates the shift between voltage 
and current (i.e., it can be considered as the grid cos φ). Depending on the type fault as well as on 
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the Thévenin angle of the grid where the fault occurs, the voltage sag recovery will take place in 
one, two or three stages. Thévenin angle depends on the X/R ratio of the grid, for example, if the 
grid is purely inductive this would mean that fault current lags 90o the pre-fault voltage, 
meanwhile if resistance increases (i.e., as occur in DNs) this angle will vary. The point on wave 
of the voltage recovery after a voltage dip due to a fault is ψ or ψ +180o. Since the CB clears the 
fault at the current zero-crossing, the recovery can occur either at t = 0 s plus the angle or half-
cycle after this, plus the angle. Besides, depending on where the fault occurs (i.e., at the 
transmission system or DN), this angle will inevitably vary; for distribution networks, this value 
is typically between 40o and 60o whereas in transmission networks, it is between 70o and 80o. 
If the voltage sag recovers at the same instant, this would mean that the sag is abrupt, on the 
contrary, if the recovery takes place with different stages, the voltage sag is considered discrete. 
To observe the differences between these two types of recovery, see Figure 3.2. In that figure, the 
CB clearing times are showed, tcl1 belongs to the first zero-crossing, tcl2 to the zero-crossing of 
the second fault current and lastly, tcl3 is the clearing time of the last fault current. Particularly, 
the recovery shown in Figure 3.2, belongs the voltage recovery due to a three-phase-to-ground 
fault. Note that depending on ψ, these instants correspond to a specific moment on the voltage 
waveform, for example, if the grid is mainly inductive, the zero-crossing corresponds to voltage 
maximum value. Each fault has a different thévenin angle, and therefore, the type of voltage sag 
recovery is obtained by considering the angles difference between faults. Crucially, a useful 
summary of the voltage sags recovery is done by A. Rolan et al. in [3.4-3.5]. 
                          
                       Figure 3.2: Types of voltage recovery. Abrupt (Dashed line), Discrete (Solid line). 
According to the previous explanation, in this section, the stages and the total recovery time will 
be shown separately for each type of fault for a solidly grounded system. Nonetheless, it has to 
be  underlined that the DN object of study in this thesis is a resistance-grounded network. The 
particularities of such grounding will be evaluated in the next subsections.  
 
3.1.2 Voltage sags with abrupt recovery 
As has been previously introduced, the abrupt voltage sags are those where all faulted phases 
recover at the same instant. In this category, the voltage sags originated by either SLG faults or 
LL faults are included.  
SLG and LL faults 
Voltage sags type B are due to SLG faults and the voltage recovery process is abrupt with the 
point-on-wave in the faulted phase equal to the angle of the fault current (ψ1). Equation (3.1) 
shows the temporal expresions of the voltage recovery. 
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Voltage sags type C are due to LL faults or SLG faults after a Dy transformer, and the recovery 
takes place at the same instant, see eq. (3.2). If the voltage sag type C has been caused by an SLG 
after a Dy transformer, equation (3.1) has to be rewritten as (3.3).  
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  (3.3)  
where ω is the synchronous speed of the grid, ψ1 the Thevenin angle for an SLG fault and ψ2 the 
Thevenin angle for a LL fault. Since a voltage sag type D is produced by either a LL fault after 
one Dy transformer or an SLG after two Dy transformers, the termporal equations for the voltage 
sag recovery are defined in (3.4). 
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where k = 1 for an SLG fault and k = 2 for a LL fault. 
Table 3.5 summarises the point-on-wave angle of the recovery process for both SLG and LL 
faults.  
                                          Table 3.5: Voltage recovery for SLG and LL faults. 
Sag Type  Point-on-wave of voltage recovery 
Type B 
         θA = ψ1 
         θB = ψ1-120o 
         θC = ψ1+120o 
Type C 
         θA = ψ2+90o        
         θB = ψ2-30o 
         θC = ψ2-150o 
Type D 
         θA = ψk 
         θB = ψk-120o 
         θC = ψk+120o 
 
In this subsection, the voltage sag types B, C and D have been characterised. As can be deduced 
from Table 3.5, the recovery takes place at the same instant for all phases. Therefore, these voltage 
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recovery of these voltage sags is considered abrupt. The voltage waveforms of these voltage sags 
will be depicted in Figure 3.3. The first plot of this Figure shows the sag at location I (Type B) 
the second plot shows the sag at location II (Type C) and the third plot the sag at location III 
(Type D). It can be seen that these types of sags recover abruptly at t = 0.404 s.  
Figure 3.4 shows the phasor representation of the originated voltage sags at the different locations 
depicted in Figure 3.1 due to a SLG fault at location I. Thus, 3.4(a) represents voltage sag type B 
at location I, 3.4(b) represents voltage sag type C and, 3.4(c) depicts the voltage sag type D at 
location III. In this figure, phase-voltages are plotted as follows: Va (blue-solid line), Vb (Yellow-
solid line) and Vc (solid-purple line). 
For this particular case, location I is the HV system at 120 kV, location II belongs to the MV grid 
at 25 kV and location III is the LV grid at 0.4 kV. 
 
                                          Figure 3.3: Voltage waveform of sags type B, C and D. 
 
            
                                     Figure 3.4: Phasor representation of sags type B, C and D. 
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3.1.3 Voltage sags with discrete recovery 
LLG faults 
To clear a two-phase-to-ground fault, two steps will be needed, and therefore, the voltage recovery 
will take place in two stages. Once the first fault current is cleared, this fault evolves to a SLG 
fault. If we consider a LLG fault between phases b and c to the ground and let’s assume 0o as a 
reference, the CB has four possible clearance sequences during a cycle. Firstly, fault in phase b is 
cleared at 0o and phase c at 120o. The second likely sequence clears the fault current in phase c at 
120o and phase b is cleared half cycle after, that is, 180o. The third possible sequence clears phase 
b at 180o and phase c 120o after (300o). Lastly, the fourth option can occur at phase c at 300o and 
phase b at the end of the cycle (360o). Even though the current angle between the LLG and SLG 
has been neglected, this difference should be considered to obtain an accurate time recovery. If 
we consider this difference, the main consequence is that more degrees will be added to the second 
clearing (i.e., the time between the first clearing and the full recovery will be extended few 
degrees). Table 3.6 presents the recovery cases that may occur for a LLG, considering the test 
system defined in Figure 3.1.  
                                                    Table 3.6: Voltage recovery for LLG faults. 
Sag 
Type  
Point-on-wave of  
voltage first recovery 
Intermediate stage and 
duration 
Point-on-wave of  
Voltage second recovery 
Type E1 
         θA = ψ1+120o 
         θB = ψ3 
         θC = ψ3-120o 
Bc         120o+ ψ1- ψ3 
 
 
         θA = ψ1-120o 
         θB = ψ1+120o 
         θC = ψ1 
Type E2 
         θA = ψ3-120o        
         θB = ψ3+120o 
         θC = ψ3 
Bb              60o+ ψ1- ψ3          θA = ψ1-60o 
         θB = ψ1+180o 
         θC = ψ1+60o 
Type F1 
         θA = ψ3-150o 
         θB = ψ3+90o 
         θC = ψ3-30o 
Cc           120o+ ψ1- ψ3 
 
 
         θA = ψ1-30o 
         θB = ψ1-150o 
         θC = ψ1+90o 
Type F2 
         θA = ψ3+150o 
         θB = ψ3+30o 
         θC = ψ3-90o 
Cb             60o+ ψ1- ψ3          θA = ψ1-150o 
         θB = ψ1+90o 
         θC = ψ1-30o 
Type G1 
         θA = ψ3+120o 
         θB = ψ3 
         θC = ψ3-120o 
Dc           120o+ ψ1- ψ3          θA = ψ1-120o 
         θB = ψ1+120o 
         θC = ψ1 
Type G2 
         θA = ψ3-120o 
         θB = ψ3+120o 
         θC = ψ3 
Db              60o+ ψ1- ψ3          θA = ψ1-60o 
         θB = ψ1+180o 
         θC = ψ1+60o 
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It is relevant to mention that the recovery instants that appear in Table 3.6 have considered the 
fact that the CB clears the second fault current (i.e., the SLG fault current) at the first chance after 
the first clearance. This might not be the case if the CB clears the fault half-cycle later; therefore, 
in such case, 180o will be added in both intermediate stages and the final recovery will be 
prolonged. In the intermediate stage, ψ1 and ψ3 belong the fault current angles of the SLG and 
LLG fault current respectively and subindexs b and c indicate that the voltage sag due to the SLG 
that occurs in the intermediate stage is symmetrical with respect to phase b or c. The phasor 
representation will clearly see this last consideration in the next subsection. 
Thus, if phase b is cleared first, the intermediate stage involves phase c-to-ground fault, therefore, 
a voltage sag type E1 is obtained in bus I (EA- BC), a voltage sag F1 occur in bus II (FA- CC) and, a 
voltage sag G1 in bus III (GA- DC). On the other hand, if phase c is cleared first, this causes phase 
b-to-ground fault and, as a consequence, voltage sag type E2 is obtained in bus I (EA- BB), a voltage 
sag F2 in bus II (FA- CB) and, a voltage sag G2 in bus III (GA- DB). 
The phasor representation for the discrete recovery for voltage sags originated by LLG faults is 
showed in the following figures 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. In this figures, the intermediate stage between 
the first clearing and the full recovery is described. Accordingly, Figure 3.5(a) shows the phasor 
representation of sag E1 and Figure 3.5(b) sag E2. Figure 3.6(a) shows the phasor representation 
of sag F1 and Figure 3.6(b) sag F2 and lastly, Figure 3.7(a) shows the phasor representation of sag 
G1 and Figure 3.7(b) sag G2.  
The waveform of the previously mentioned voltage sags, which are originated due to LLG faults 
are plotted in figure 3.8. In this figure, it can be seen that, as stated before, the recovery of this 
sags takes place in two stages ( the first recovery at t = 0.401 s and the second at t = 0.407 s ). For 
this particular voltage sag, the second cleared phase after phase b is c; therefore these sags are E2 
(the first plot), F2 (the second plot) and, G2 (the third plot) respectively. The plotted voltages in 
Figure 3.6 have the same colours as in Figure 3.1 of the previous subsection. 
To sum up, in this subsection the following types of sags have been obtained: E1, E2, F1, F2, G1 and 
G2. 
 
                                 
                                           Figure 3.5: Phasor representation of sags type E1-E2. 
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                                                 Figure 3.6: Phasor representation of sags type F1-F2. 
 
                                      
                                                 Figure 3.7: Phasor representation of sags type G1-G2. 
 
LLL and LLLG faults 
These types of faults are balanced faults since the current magnitude and its originated voltage 
sag magnitude is equal for the three phases and angles between phases are 1200. 
Both LLL and LLLG faults cause voltage sags type A. However, LLL three involves three fault 
currents, whereas LLLG four current faults, and as a consequence, the voltage sag recovery will 
be different. The voltage recovery of each type of fault is described down below. 
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                                  Figure 3.8: Voltage waveform for a LLG fault at location I. 
 
• Three-phase fault 
Once the first current of a LLL fault has been cleared, this fault evolves to a LL fault which, as 
has been described in the previous subsection, will be cleared at the same instant. Hence, LLL 
faults will be cleared in two steps. If the first clearing is in phase a (i.e., the first chance of the 
CB), the remaining LL fault between phases b and c is cleared in one step. At location I the voltage 
sag will evolve to a sag type C after the first clearing, whereas, at location II the voltage sag will 
evolve to a sag type D and thus, two voltage sags named A1 and A2 are obtained. The first plot of 
figure 3.9 depicts the voltage waveform of sag A1 which occurs at location I, and the second plot 
shows sag A2 which occurs at location II. From 3.9 it has been demonstrated that the voltage sag 
recovery is discrete and it takes place with two steps (the first at t = 0.401s and the second at t = 
0.406 s). 
• Three-phase-to-ground 
Once the first current of an LLLG fault is cleared, this fault evolves to an LLG fault which, as has 
been described in the previous subsection, will be cleared in two stages due to the remaining SLG 
after the latter clearing. As a consequence, LLLG faults will be cleared in three steps. If phase a 
is the first cleared phase (the first chance of the CB), the remaining LLG fault between phases b 
and c and ground is cleared in two steps. The duration of each intermediate stage between clearing 
instants is 600, therefore, three voltage sags are obtained, named A3, A4 and A5. These three 
topologies are detected at different locations; the first type results in A-E-B (location I at Figure 
3.1), the second A-F-C (location II at Figure 3.1) and A-G-D (location III at Figure 3.1). 
The first plot of figure 3.10 depicts the voltage waveform of sag A3 which occurs at location I, the 
second plot shows sag A4 which is observed at location II, and the third plot shows A5 which is 
observed at location III. 
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                                        Figure 3.9: Phase voltage waveform for sags type A1and A2. 
 
                                Figure 3.10: Phase voltage waveform for sags type A3, A4 and A5. 
 
The first recovery takes place at t = 0.401 s, the second at t = 0.404 and the third at t = 0.408 s, as 
expected, this means that there are two intermediate stages and three steps to full recovery. 
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                                   Table 3.7: Voltage recovery for LLL and LLLG faults. 
Sag 
Type  
   First 
recovery 
Intermediate  
stage 1  
Second 
recovery  
Intermediate 
stage 2  
Third 
recovery 
Type 
A1 
         θA = ψ4 
         θB = ψ4-120o 
         θC = ψ4+120o 
Ca     60o+ ψ2- ψ4 
 
 
θA = ψ2+90o 
θB = ψ2-30o 
θC = ψ2-150o 
 
 
 
Type 
A2 
         θA = ψ4+90o       
         θB = ψ4-30o 
         θC = ψ4-150o 
Da         60o+ ψ2- ψ4 θA = ψ2+180o 
θB = ψ2+60o 
θC = ψ2-60o 
  
Type 
A3 
         θA = ψ4 
         θB = ψ4-120o 
         θC = ψ4+120o 
Ea      60o+ ψ3- ψ4 
 
 
θA = ψ3+60o 
θB = ψ3-60o 
θC = ψ3+180o 
Bb    60o+ ψ1- ψ3 
 
 
θA = ψ1+120o 
θB = ψ1 
θC = ψ1-120o 
Type 
A4 
         θA = ψ4+90o       
         θB = ψ4-30o 
         θC = ψ4-150o 
Fa        60o+ ψ3- ψ4 θA = ψ3+150o 
θB = ψ3+30o 
θC = ψ3-90o 
Cb    60o+ ψ1- ψ3 θA = ψ1-150o 
θB = ψ1+90o 
θC = ψ1-30o 
Type 
A5 
         θA = ψ4 
         θB = ψ4-120o 
         θC = ψ4+120o 
Ga     60o+ ψ3- ψ4 θA = ψ3+60o 
θB = ψ3-60o 
θC = ψ3+180o 
Dc     60o+ ψ1- ψ3 θA = ψ1+120o 
θB = ψ1 
θC = ψ1-120o  
      
 
Figure 3.10 depicts the discrete voltage sags that are originated due to LLLG faults. Thus, the first 
plot shows the originated sag at location I (type A3), the second plot the sag at location II (type 
A3) and the third plot the sag at location III (type A5). 
The evolution of this voltage sags during the recovery has been detailed in table 3.7. Nevertheless, 
the phasor representation for all stages will be shown in the following figure 3.11. In this Figure 
(a) represents the evolution A3-E2-B, (b) A4-F2-C and, (c) A5-G2-D. 
As a main accomplishment of this subsection, the voltage sags A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5 have been 
obtained. 
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Figure 3.11: Voltage sag phasor representation for a LLLG fault. (a) Sag A1, (b) Sag A2 and (c) Sag A3. 
 
3.1.4 Transformers influence on voltage sags 
When performing a voltage sag assessment to study the behaviour of electrical devices due to 
such disturbances, one can either consider the transformer influence or dismiss its one. If this 
effect is taken into consideration, two factors such as transformer windings connection and the 
shift between primary and secondary windings (i.e., the clock ratio) are of interest. Since several 
transformer configurations remove the voltage zero sequence component, the type of sag also 
changes. To observe the effects of the windings connection, Table 3.8 will show the changes in 
the voltage sag type due to transformer windings connection. By observing that table, the 
wye/wye (grounded at both sides) transformer connection is the only configuration that has no 
change in voltage sag type. Since the zero-sequence is removed by transformers with a winding 
connected in delta or zig-zag, the voltage sags that have a zero-sequence component (i.e., sag type 
B and sag type E) evolves to other types of sags after a Dy transformer. On the contrary, voltage 
sags with no zero-sequence components (Type C, D, F and G) only change with Dy transformers. 
 
                                        Table 3.8: Influence of transformers winding connection. 
Transformer 
connection  
 
Type A 
                       Sag at the primary side 
Type B        Type C           Type D      Type E         Type F      Type G 
YNyn     A     B C D     E F               G 
Yy, Dd, Dz     A     D                   C                   D                 G                  F               G 
Yd, Dy, Yz     A     C                   D                   C                  F                  G               F 
*Table obtained from M.H.J Bollen in [3.1]. 
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On the other hand, regardless of the type of windings connection, the shift introduced by the 
transformer between the primary and secondary voltages influences the voltage angle taken as a 
reference. By observing the temporal expression defined in the second column of Table 3.2, it can 
be seen that all cases consider the phase a as a reference and if this angle is shifted, this reference 
will change as well. Table 3.9 summarises, for a Dy transformer, the most commonly used shift 
ratios and its effects in voltage sag characterisation. This shift between windings is expressed in 
degrees and is defined as the product by the shift index (known for electrical engineers as clock 
ratio) multiplied by 300. This shifting between angles has been considered in the present 
subsection for an SLG fault at location I of Fig. 3.1. However, this reasoning can be similarly 
applied to other types of faults. 
To clearly observe what has been deduced in Table 3.9, Fig. 3.12 shows the transformer shifting 
effects for three types of faults (SLG, LLG and LLL). The test used to define the voltage sag 
topologies (i.e., Fig. 3.1) is also used here with two Dy transformers with different shift ratios, 
the first is a Dy11 and the second is a Dy1.  
 
 
 
           Figure 3.12: Phasor representation of the voltage sags considering transformer shifting. 
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                                              Table 3.9: Transformers shift influence. 
Location I  
Sag type/αa1 
Shift 
index 
          Location II 
          Sag type/ αa2 
Shift 
index 
Location III 
Sag type/ αa3 
Type B/ αa        1 Type C/ αa1-300      11 Type C/ αa1 = α2+300 
Type B/ αa        3 Type C/ αa1-900       9 Type C/ αa1 = α2+900 
Type B/ αa        5 Type C/ αa1-1500       7 Type C/ αa1 = α2+1500 
Type B/ αa        7 Type C/ αa1-2100 = αa1+1500       5 Type C/ αa1 = α2-1500 
Type B/ αa        9 Type C/ αa1-2700 = αa1+900       3 Type C/ αa1 = α2-900 
Type B/ αa       11 Type C/ αa1-3300 = αa1+300       1 Type C/ αa1 = α2-300 
 
3.1.5 Effects of the type of grounding 
Conceptually, the system grounding is the process of establishing a connection from one wire of 
the system to earth. Typically, in electrical power systems, the grounding is carried out through 
power transformers. Depending on the transformer type of windings connection, the system can 
be connected to ground in either one way or another and, the resulting fault currents will be 
different. Therefore, since voltage sags are caused by faults, the type of grounding will also affect.  
The most common types of power systems grounding can be: (i) solidly grounded, (ii) impedance-
based grounding, which can be either a pure resistance, a reactor (e.g., the Petersen coil), or a 
combination of both [3.6] and, (iii) ungrounded [3.7-3.8]. In the latter case, the system is uniquely 
connected to earth thought the capacitance of the cable. It is important to note that the voltage 
sags detailed in the previous subsections have been simulated in a solidly grounded system. 
Considering the fact that the electrical network under investigation in this thesis is grounded with 
a derived neutral via a zig-zag transformer with a series resistance, the influence of the resistance-
based grounding in voltage sags will be further discussed.  It should be noted that a thorough 
explanation regarding reactance-grounding and other configurations is done in the following 
studies [3.8-3.9]. 
Crucially, the ratio between the zero-sequence reactance and the direct-sequence reactance X0/X1 
and the ratio between the zero-sequence resistance and direct-sequence reactance R0/X1, depend 
on the type of grounding. Thereby, these ratios will influence the phase-voltages during the fault.  
Resistance-grounded systems 
This type of grounding is typically used to limit the earth fault current to a particular value. The 
wye connection of a transformer or an artificial derived neutral from a zig-zag transformer, 
generally are used to add an impedance. This impedance can be purely resistive, a reactor or a 
mixed combination impedance. Depending on the voltage level, the type of grounding can change, 
and consequently, its fault currents. 
The voltage sag magnitude expected at the point of common coupling (PCC) between the source 
(or its equivalent infeeder) and the impedance to the fault, can be expressed as a voltage divider 
such that: 
                                                     *
feeder
sag source
feeder source
ZV V
Z Z
=
+
                                                    (3.5) 
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where Zfeeder represents the impedance between PCC and the fault and has this notation in order 
not to confuse it with the impedance fault (i.e., resistance fault). In (1) it is assumed that the pre-
fault voltage is 1 pu, there are no pre-fault currents before the event, and the three-phase fault is 
solid. To show the influence of the grounding in the voltages during an earth-fault, the 
symmetrical components for the unbalanced faults such as SLG and LLG faults will be detailed 
down below. Since LLLG fault is balanced and only has direct-sequence component, voltages 
during the fault are not affected by the grounding connection of generators or transformers. 
• SLG 
During an SLG fault, the three-phase system can be decoupled into the direct, inverse and zero 
sequence components, see the Fortescue transform in [3.3]. Considering the voltage divider 
expressed in (1), now it can be rewritten for the three sequences. Thus, the direct, inverse and 
zero sequence voltages at the point of common coupling (PCC) are as follows: 
                     
(0 ) (1) ( 2) ( 0) ( 2 )
( 0 ) (1) ( 2) ( 0 ) ( 2 ) (1)
( 2 )
( 0) (1) ( 2 ) (1) ( 0)
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=
+ + + + +
                     (3.6) 
Taking advantage of the Fortescue transform, the phase-to-neutral voltages during the fault can 
be expressed as (3.7): 
                     
(1) ( 2) (0)
(1) ( 2) (0) (0) (1) ( 2) (0)
(1) (2 ) (0)
(1) (2) (0) (0 )
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2
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Z Z
aZ a Z ZV a
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+
+ +
= −
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       (3.7) 
In a solidly-grounded network, the three-sequence source impedances and variables in the 
numerator are canceled, therefore, these voltages can be rewritten as in (3.8): 
                                    
(1)
(1) (2) (0)
(1)
2
3
( ) 3
3
source
a
feeder feeder feeder
source
b
c
ZV Z Z Z Z
V a
V a
= −
+ +
+
=
=
                                             (3.8) 
Nonetheless, in an impedance-based system, Z0 is no longer equal to Z1 and Z2, (the two latter can 
be considered equal for both source and feeder) and the numerator is not cancelled. Therefore, 
the voltages during the voltage sag are expressed as in (3.9): 
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                          (3.9) 
It can be seen that during a fault, between the first phase and ground, the voltage sag for the 
faulted phase is the same as in (3.8). However, the voltage for the non-faulted phases changes 
because the numerator is no longer cancelled. This voltage drop can be related to the difference 
between direct and zero impedances. Since in a resistance-grounded system Z0 ≥ Z1, the non-
faulted phases will experience, as commented before, a voltage swell. This over-voltage for the 
phase-to-ground voltages that is produced during the fault has to be at most the rated RMS value 
of the line voltage, see references [3.7-3.9]. 
 
               Figure 3.13: Comparison between solid and resistance-grounded networks for a SLG. 
 
The second plot of Figure 3.13 shows an SLG in a resistance-based MV network, where both 
voltage sag and swells can be observed. On the other hand, the first plot shows that for an SLG 
in a solidly-grounded system, no swells occur. Besides, the more significant is the difference 
between these two impedances, the lower is the voltage drop during the sag, even for a zero-
resistance fault. 
• LLG 
Similarly, as calculated for the SLG fault, the voltages during this type of fault can be decoupled 
into direct, inverse and zero sequences. Voltages at the PCC during the fault are computed as the 
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voltage divider of (1), but applied to the LLG fault (for a solidly-grounded system) are expressed 
as (3.10): 
(0) (2) (0) (2) (1)
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Now, symmetrical voltage components can be converted into phase-to-neutral voltages through 
the Fortescue transform. During an LLG fault, the phase-voltage of the faulted phases is the same 
and the non-faulted phase remains equal for a solid grounded system, nevertheless, as for the 
SLG, as the Z0 ≥ Z1, the non-faulted phase experience a voltage swell. 
 
 
            Figure 3.14: Comparison between LL and LLG faults in resistance-based grounding grids. 
                   
It has to be underlined that the effects of either a LL or LLG faults in a resistance-based grounded 
system produce the same voltage sag, therefore, after a Dy transformer, the voltage sag will be 
also the same. To observe such effect, Figure 3.14 shows the three-phase voltages for both LL 
and LLG faults in a resistance-grounded system like the one object of study (see the test system 
under investigation in Figure 4.1 of the next Chapter 4). In the first plot of Figure 3.14, the 
resulting phase voltages for a LL fault at the MV network are depicted, and the second plot shows 
the voltage sag at the LV level (i.e, after a Dy transformer). The third plot of this Figure shows 
the voltage sag originated due to an LLG at the MV network, while the four shows the voltage 
sag at the LV side (after a Dy transformer). By comparing the second and fourth plots of Fig. 
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3.14, it can be seen that in a resistance-grounded network, both LL and LLG produce the same 
sag after a Dy transformer (Sag type D).  
To observe such effect, Figure 3.15 shows the three-phase voltages at the LV network for both 
LLG (Solid lines) and LL (dashed lines) at the MV network. It is worth mentioning that the only 
difference between sags is observable in the recovery because as mentioned earlier, the LLG 
recovery differs from the LL. 
 
                    Figure 3.15: Detailed comparison between the sags produced by LL and LLG faults. 
 
3.1.6 Phase-angle jump 
During a fault, the involved phases experience an angle shift, and this angle depends on the 
Thévenin angle of the grid. It has to be noted that, depending on the ratio between X/R, which 
can be seen as the power factor of the fault, this angle jump will vary. Typically, the angle jump 
is not considered in HV networks because the grid is mainly inductive and X/R is between 7 and 
10, however, in distribution networks, where this ratio is higher, this shift has to be taken into 
consideration. As a matter of fact, this angle has been used to compute the voltage sag recovery 
in the previous section. Whereas in DNs it is roughly between 450 and 600 (or even lower for high-
resistance faults), in transmission networks, it is close to the 800. 
Figure 3.13 shows the phase angle jump for faults at different locations, where the effects of the 
different impedance on the phase-angle-jump can be seen. The purple line represents a fault at the 
beginning of an MV feeder (i.e., at the HV/MV substation) meanwhile, the red line belongs to a 
fault at a midpoint in the MV feeder. By comparing purple and red lines, the change in the phase-
angle jump due to change in the thévenin impedance can be noticed. On the other hand, if the 
resistance of the Thévenin impedance is increased, the angle jump is also affected, see for instance 
blue and green lines. In fact, blue and green lines are the obtained phase-angle jumps for faults at 
MV lateral branches where the cross-section of the wires is small and consequently, the relation 
X/R is low. 
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                               Figure 3.16: Phase-angle jump comparison for different fault locations. 
 
3.2 Voltage sags with a non-constant magnitude 
 
The previous subsection has reviewed the voltage sags caused by faults, which show a constant 
magnitude during the whole event. Nonetheless, this subsection focuses on analysing those sags 
where the voltage is not constant during the event (i.e., voltage recovers or decreases during the 
event). The latter type of sags, are not caused by faults but due to transients such as induction 
machine starting, transformer energisation, or sudden load connections. Additionally, a particular 
type of sag with a non-constant magnitude can be observed when an induction motors fault 
contribution is considered. This effect is discussed M.H.J Bollen in [3.10]. To illustrate such 
effect, Figure 3.17a shows an example of the voltage sag produced when an IM contributes to a 
three-phase fault. In that Figure, the symmetrical voltage sag (Type A) is plotted. 
Nevertheless, to properly observe the voltage variation due to the contribution of the motor, in 
Figure 3.17b, the voltage sag is enlarged. In this figure, the decrease in the voltage magnitude 
during the event can be observed. This voltage reduction during the voltage sag is due to the brief 
IM contribution towards the fault, which starts at t = 1.62 s, and in 2 cycles, the current starts to 
decrease. In this case, the voltage variation due to this effect is ΔV = 125 V. 
Figure 3.18 depicts the voltage sag produced when a transformer is energized. Due to the current 
drawn by the transformer, transiently, the voltage drops to 0.94 pu. As can be seen, the voltage 
magnitude is not constant; it reaches a minimum value at t = 0.82 and starts to increase until t = 
1s when the voltage sag is absolutely recovered. This voltage sag is unbalanced due to the current 
unbalance during this energisation. By observing the third plot of Figure 4, the high content of 
harmonics of the current waveform can be seen; these harmonics are a direct consequence of the 
transformer core saturation [3.11]. 
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Figure 3.19 shows the voltage sag produced by IMs starting; in this case, a group of 4 IMs of 160 
kW have been simulated. It can be seen that the duration of the event is 500 ms, the voltage depth 
is 0.96 pu, and the voltage sag is balanced. Nevertheless, it is easy to observe that its magnitude 
is not constant during the event. The first plot depicts the RMS phase voltage; the second 
represents the RMS current, while the third shows the current waveform. 
 
 
                                                                         (a) 
 
                                                                          (b) 
            Figure 3.17: Voltage sag for a three-phase fault considering induction motors contribution. 
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                                           Figure 3.18: Voltage sag due to transformer energisation. 
 
 
                                           Figure 3.19: Voltage sag due to induction motor starting. 
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3.3 Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has made a general review regarding the main features of the voltage sags. Thus, 
voltage sags have been divided into two major groups; the ones with a constant magnitude (i.e., 
the ones caused by faults), and the ones with a non-constant magnitude. After this principal 
classification, the next distinction is done regarding its symmetry (i.e., symmetrical and non-
symmetrical voltage sags). The subsequent distinction considers its recovery; on the one hand, 
we have the ones which recover in one stage (abrupt sags) whereas the others, recover with several 
steps (discrete sags). Each type of fault has been detailed separately to observe the originated 
voltage sags for each event. 
Secondly, the effects of the transformer in voltage sags have been considered in subsection 3.1.4, 
where it has been observed that considering the shift introduced becomes crucial to determine the 
type of sag transmitted along the grid. 
Thirdly, the influence of the type of grounding has also been assessed in subsection 3.1.5. Many 
studies considered the voltage sags are originated in transmission networks where the connection 
is commonly solidly-grounded. However, in this section, other topologies such as the resistance-
based grounding and its effects into voltage sags have been studied. Crucially, it has been 
demonstrated that while in a solidly-grounded system LL and LLG faults cause a different sag 
(Sag type C or E), in resistance-grounded systems both LLG and LL faults cause the same voltage 
sag (E).  
Additionally, the phase-angle-jump is discussed for several fault locations, and the effects of this 
shift have been evidenced, especially, in distribution networks where X/R is weak. 
To summarise, in this section the following 14 topologies of voltage sags have been obtained: A1, 
A2, A3, A4, A5, B, C, D, E1, E2, F1, F2, G1 and, G2. This classification is essential to assess the 
during-fault behaviour of the IM in the subsequent Chapter 4. Additionally, in this section, sags 
with constant and non-constant magnitude have been evaluated, which allows the reader to 
understand the new voltage sag topology presented in the subsequent Chapter 9. 
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Chapter 4 
Islanding operation: Theoretical analysis 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The central pillar of this thesis is the assessment of the IO that occurs in a DN. Conceptually, IO 
can be defined as an abnormal operation that occurs when a portion of the grid is isolated from 
the main grid due to a protective device operation but, even so, this grid portion remains energised. 
In this chapter, an in-depth analysis of the IO operation that occurs following a CB operation in 
the presence of large induction motors will be carried out. In this Chapter, the modelling 
guidelines used to assess the IO are provided. The mathematical equations of each element of the 
model are analysed and a broad discussion is done to evaluate the feasibility of each selected 
element. Indeed, the model defined in this Chapter is a crucial means in order to achieve a 
successful validation of the transient under study.  
In consideration of the above, the main goals of this Chapter can be summarised as follows: 
1. Describe the main features of each test system component used in the model. This description 
can be found in section 4.2 and section 4.3. 
2. The stages of the whole event are detailed separately. 
 Firstly, the pre-fault conditions are evaluated (i.e., steady-state analysis of the system) in 
section 4.3. The obtained pre-fault results are required to initialise the transient behaviour 
of the subsequent section. 
 Secondly, the induction motors behaviour during the fault before the CB operation are 
analysed in section 4.4. The results obtained in this section will be used to initialise the 
islanding operation evaluated in the next section. 
 The IO is explored in section 4.5. 
Lastly, to conclude this Chapter, the main conclusions are summarised in section 4.6. 
 
4.2 Electrical network under investigation 
 
The system where measurements have been recorded is a real DN, which is operating radially 
with an infeeder from a transmission system at 120 kV, 50 Hz. The single-line diagram of the 
system is depicted in Figure 4.1. As shown in the figure, the substation wye/delta transformer 
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supplies three medium voltage (MV) feeders; Feeder 2 and sub-feeders A and B form the system 
analysed in this work. Feeders 1 and 3 are not detailed, because they are not relevant to the task 
due to its radial configuration and also because feeder 1 is the one where the unintentional IO 
object of study occurs. The end-users are supplied at a low voltage (LV) of 0.4 kV through their 
MV/LV Dyn 11 transformers. The MV system is grounded via a zig-zag transformer with a 
resistance of 23 Ω that limits the fault current to 630 A. The short circuit capacity at the 120 kV 
busbar is 1000 MVA. The main system parameters and the IMs data, are detailed in Table 4.1. 
 
                                        Figure 4.1: One-line diagram of the test system under study. 
 
                                                            Table 4.0.1: Test system parameters. 
Transformers 
 
Vp/Vs (kV) S 
(MVA) 
ε (%) Lm/Rm (H/kΩ) 
Substation transformer TR1 120/25 kV 10 10.4 78 ; 313 
Distribution transformers 
TR2 25/0.4 kV 1 6 180 ; 370 
TR3 25/0.4 kV 0.63 5.1 350 ; 480 
TR4 25/0.4 kV 0.4 4.3 404 ; 694 
TR5 25/0.4 kV 0.25 4.1 811 ; 1666 
Distribution Lines 
Lines Nodes Length 
(km) 
Parameters: Z1 /Z0 (Ω/km) ; C0 
(μF/km) 
Loadbility (A) 
L1 2 – 4 5 0.306+j0.405/0.38+j1.62 300 
L2 4 – 3 3.3 1.07+j0.441/1.3+j1.76, 120 
L3 4 – 6 4.3 0.306+j0.405/0.38+j1.62 300 
L4 6 – 5 4 1.07+j0.441/1.3+j1.76 120 
L5 6 – 7 2.5 0.306+j0.405/0.38+j1.62 300 
L6 7 – 8 2 0.306+j0.405/0.38+j1.62 300 
L7 8 – 9 7 0.687+j0.416/0.8+j1.66 200 
L8 2 – 10 3.8 0.127+j0.114/0.17+j0.45 ; 0.229 389 
L9 10 -11 4.43 0.208+j0.123/0.278+j0.492 ; 0.192 320 
L10 11 -12 4 0.687+j0.416/0.8+j1.66 200 
L11 12 -13 3.3 0.687+j0.416/0.8+j1.66 200 
L12 1-2 0.28 0.306+j0.405/0.38+j1.62 300 
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4.3 System components modelling 
 
4.3.1 Introduction to modelling guidelines 
This section aims to discuss how to model the main test system elements: lines, transformers, 
loads, IMs, and protective devices. A crucial aspect to consider in order to accurately assessing 
the transient behaviour of the test system is the range of frequencies with which transients are 
generated. Other factors that may significantly affect the simulation results are the load profiles, 
the voltage/frequency-dependence of loads, or protective device settings. The guidelines followed 
when implementing the test system model are summarized hereunder: 
• The saturation effect is considered in transformers for modelling purposes, so as to fulfil the 
maximum accuracy. 
• Transmission line impedance, for each particular section, is assumed to be equal for the three 
phases. 
• Very low load unbalances are assumed. Accordingly, a single line diagram power flow would 
be precise enough to establish the initial conditions of the transient. 
• IM is modelled as saturable because of the stator current increase, following circuit breaker 
(CB) disconnection. 
• Widely known IEC-IEEE curves of protective devices are considered. 
 
4.3.2 Distribution lines 
Transmission and distribution lines representation can be based on distributed or lumped 
parameters. A precise way to model a transmission line is with distributed parameters at a specific 
range of frequency. An extensive literature about transmission lines is available; particularly this 
matter was deeply discussed in [4.1]. In the particular case of insulated cables, the shunt 
capacitance has to be considered. Hence, any transmission line can be represented by a four-
terminal ABCD network. The initial and final buses are named r and s respectively. Accordingly, 
the equation is defined: 
                                                                      
s r
s r
V A B V
I C D I
     
=     
     
                                                            (4.1) 
where V is the bus voltage, I the line current, subscripts r and s are referred to the buses r and s 
respectively. For transient studies, a detailed representation of transmission lines has been 
extensively studied in [4.2]. The frequency dependence in transmission line modelling is 
discussed in [4.3, 4.4]. In the case of over-head distribution lines where the admittance values can 
be neglected, the term B corresponds to the series impedance. However, despite this, in the present 
study to achieve higher precision, the pi section will be used. Although the central part of the 
system under study is composed of overhead lines, a non-negligible portion is formed of 
underground cables; a thorough evaluation regarding cables is done in [4.5]. Thereby, modelling 
overhead lines as pi section line at a 50 Hz will suffice in our study. Due to the underground 
cables, the zero sequence component of the shunt capacitance has to be taken into consideration. 
Direct and inverse sequence values of the series impedance will be assumed equal. The line 
parameters of the test system have been previously summarised in Table 4.1. 
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4.3.3 Transformers 
Transformers are one of the most critical elements of an electrical system and are used to adjust 
the voltage level to the desired value; thus, it can be used to increase or decrease (i.e., step-up and 
step-down transformers) the voltage level through its electromagnetic fields between windings. 
They transfer power through its windings without changing the frequency. Transformers can be 
categorised by the number of windings and its connection, the number of phases (e.g., three-limb 
core, five-limb core or three single-phase transformer), the transformation ratio, the power rating, 
its clock ratio between windings, and the type of cooling. Furthermore, depending on its use, 
several transformers can be used, for instance, power distribution transformers, grounding 
transformers, measurement transformers; either potential or current transformers, phase-shifting 
transformers or even shell transformers. ANSI/IEEE-Std. C57.12 provides useful data regarding 
transformers characteristics and tests [4.6]. 
    The magnetic field in the air gap is considered as nonlinear and depending on the transient 
object of study, take into account the saturation effects is crucial [4.7]. Therefore, in the present 
study, transformers will be modelled as saturable. Even though taking into consideration the 
frequency-dependence is required in transformer transients, and this dependence will not be 
considered in the present modelling due to the low-frequency range of the transient object of 
study.  
    Thus, the saturation effect curve that has been used in our model for a three-limb three-phase 
transformer belongs to the power systems toolbox library of Matlab/Simulink, and describes the 
following generic polynomial curve: 
                                               
2 3
0 1 2 3
n
m nI A A A A Aλ λ λ λ= + + + + +…                                       (4.2) 
 
where the generic coefficients expressed in (4.2) are different depending on each transformer 
power rating as well as depending on its configuration. In-depth research regarding transformer 
modelling for low and mid-frequencies are detailed in [4.8-4.10]. In [4.11] a practical saturation 
estimation from recorded inrush currents waveform is developed. 
In this study, the transformer tap changer will not be considered under the assumption that the 
transformer ratio between primary and secondary will remain constant during the whole transient. 
Particularly, in our model there are three types of transformers; (i) HV/LV transformer which is 
wye/delta winding connection (Substation transformer), (ii) MV/LV transformers which are 
delta/wye winding connection and (iii) grounding zig-zag transformer via artificially derived 
neutral, which allows the system to be resistance grounded. Transformers direct and inverse 
impedances will be assumed to be equal; the zero sequence impedances will be considered in (iii) 
and neglected in (i) and (ii) transformers regarding its winding connection. Transformer 
parameters are provided in Table 4.1. 
 
4.3.4 Induction motors mathematical model 
Introduction to modelling 
The induction machine (IM) modelling will depend on the level of accuracy required as well as 
on the type of study that is going to be carried out. As a general classification, there are two types 
of models to evaluate the induction machines, the fifth-order model which is composed by four 
electrical equations plus the mechanical equation and the reduced third-order model composed 
by two electrical equations plus the mechanical one. The latter is derived from the fifth-order 
model, considering stator fluxes derivative to zero. It should be noted that both models are derived 
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from the seventh-order induction model composed by six electrical equations (i.e., model in the 
abc reference frame), plus one mechanical. The selected model depends on the purpose of the 
study, for instance, in wide-area power systems stability studies, the third-order model due to the 
fact that it considers negligible the dynamics stator transients, see [4.12, 4.13]. By considering 
the third-order model, the complexity of the system is notably reduced, nonetheless, to study the 
behaviour of the induction motor during transients, the fifth-order is more appropriate.  
The necessity of transforming these set of equations is due to the angle between the magnetic axes 
of the stator phase a, and rotor winding phase a, which constitutes a time-varying set of 
differential equations. To overcome such drawback, the induction equations are converted 
through a transformation into time-invariant differential equations, and the equations are 
transformed from the three-axis system into a two-axis system. The most used transform is the 
one developed by Park. Nevertheless, other important transformations are available like KU 
transform or αβ transform, for a detailed explanation of the possible transformations, take a look 
at [4.14-4.16]. 
Prior to machine modelling, the following assumptions have been considered: 
• The machine is considered symmetrical (i.e., both windings are equals, and its magnetic axes 
are shifted 1200). 
• The distribution of the magnetic field is considered senoidal. 
• The air gap between the rotor and stator is smooth. 
• The machine model considers magnetic saturation. 
• The connection of the motor is connected through an isolated wye, it has no neutral connector 
and consequently, zero-sequence components can be neglected. 
• The machine is single-cage and rotor windings are short-circuited. 
Transient state model of the IM  
In Figure 4.2 the representation of the induction machine is depicted, in this figure, it can be seen 
that the currents have a positive sign, thus indicating the motor mode. Once the motor becomes 
generator following the CB, the sign of these currents will be negative. Indeed, acting as a motor, 
currents are entering to the windings. 
 
                                  
                               Figure 4.2: Induction machine model in the abc-reference frame. 
Vs-a
θm
Is-a+
-
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The induction motor model is given by (4.3): 
                                                               
dV Ri
dt
φ
= +                                                               (4.3) 
The set of electrical equations of the single-cage induction machine which define its transient 
behaviour (expressed in the abc reference frame) are detailed down below:  
                                                         
·
·
·
·
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                                                        (4.4) 
where V is voltage, i current, R is resistance, ϕ flux linkage, and subindexes r and s are referred 
to stator and rotor respectively. The set of Eqs. (4.4), can now be expressed in matrix form as 
(4.5): 
                                                    
0 0
·
0 0 0
s s s s
r r r
V R i d
R i dt
φ
φ
       
= +       
       
                                            (4.5) 
where stator voltages (rotor voltage is set to zero due to the rotor winding is short-circuited) and 
currents vector are expressed as a three-dimension vector, resistances are expressed as a six-
dimension matrix. The flux linkages can be expressed with the matrix form of (4.6): 
                                         ( )· ·ss sr sm
rs rr r
M M i
M i
M M i
φ θ    = =    
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                                                       (4.6) 
The inductances of the linkages matrix for stator and rotor can be expressed as in (4.7): 
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                                        (4.7) 
where ls and lr are the self-inductances of both stator and rotor, ms and mr are the mutual 
inductances between stator windings and rotor windings respectively. The mutual inductance 
between stator and rotor windings is expressed as m. 
The mutual inductance (magnetizing) matrix is expressed as in (4.8): 
Note that the term MRS is the transposed of matrix MRS. 
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The six-dimension flux linkages vector is related to the six-dimension currents vector as: 
     
2 41 1
cos cos( ) cos( )
3 32 2
1 1 4 2
cos( ) cos cos( )
2 2 3 3
1 1 2 4
cos( ) cos( ) cos
2 2 3 3
4 2
cos cos( ) cos( )
3 3
cos(
m m ms s s
s s s m m msa
sb
s s s m m m
sc
ra
m m m
rb
rc
m
m m ml m m
m l m m m m
m m l m m m
m m m
m
pi piθ θ θ
pi piθ θ θφ
φ pi piθ θ θφ
φ pi piθ θ θφ
φ θ
+ +− −
− − + + 
 
 
− − + + 
= 
  + +
 
 
 
1 1
2 2
2 4 1 1) cos cos( )
3 3 2 2
1 14 2
cos( ) cos( ) cos
2 23 3
sa
sb
sc
ra
r r r
rb
rc
m m r r r
r r rm m m
i
i
i
il m m
i
im m m l m
m m lm m m
pi piθ θ
pi piθ θ θ
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  − −
  
  
 + + − − 
 
 
− −+ +  
    (4.9) 
A non-dimensional factor k factor is used to compute inductances between stator and rotor 
windings (m), magnetising inductance between stator windings (ms) and the magnetising 
inductance between rotor windings (mr). This factor has been analysed in electric machinery 
research and can be computed as: 
                                                                
0· · ·
4
r lk µ piδ=                                                                 (4.10) 
where r is the equivalent radius of the air gap, is the μ0 vacuum permeability, l is the length of the 
air gap and δ is the thickness of the air gap. 
The electromagnetic torque developed by the machine can be expressed in terms of the magnetic 
energy as (4.11): 
                                             · ·
Tmag sr
em s r
m m
W Mi i
θ θ
∂ ∂Γ = =
∂ ∂
            (4.11) 
The equations of the induction machine can be summarised as in (4.12): 
                                             
· · · ·m
m
em load t
m
m
dM diV R i i M
dt dt
dJ
dt
d
dt
ω
ω
θ
ω
= + +
Γ − Γ =
=
                                                          (4.12) 
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where Γload  is the mechanical load coupled with the rotor shaft and Jt is the total moment of inertia 
composed by the inertia of the load and the motor. The rotor output power can be expressed in 
terms of the space vectors of rotor voltage and current as follows: 
                         { }* * * *rP Re · Re ( )rr r r r r r s m r rdV i R i i i j idt
φ
ω ω φ= − −  = + + − 
 
                       (4.13) 
where ωs is the synchronous angular speed, ωs is the mechanical angular speed. The first term of 
(4.13) represents the rotor losses, the second is the magnetic energy variation and the third is the 
electromagnetic power developed by the machine. 
Park’s transformation 
By applying the Park’s transformation to the abc-reference equations of (4.14), the fifth-order 
model plus two mechanical equations can be obtained in (4.14): 
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        (4.14) 
Considering eq. (4.11), the electromagnetic torque developed by the IM can be obtained in dq 
components as (4.15): 
                                   
0 0 0
· 0 0 ·
0 0
( ) ( )Tem s M r rd sq rq sd
M
t i i M i i i i
 
 
− −
 
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                                      (4.15) 
Figure 4.3 shows the representation of the induction motor in two electrical circuits (i.e., direct 
and quadrature). The inductances Ls-M and Lr-M depicted in Figure 4.3 can be computed as in 
(4.16): 
                                                      
1 3( )
2 2
1 3( )
2 2
s s s
r r r
L M l m m
L M l m m
− = + −
− = + −
                                              (4.16) 
Considering that the rotor windings is electrically reduced into the stator winding (ms = mr = m), 
it can be seen that the stator and rotor leakage inductances are as follows: 
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1 3( )
2 2
1 3( )
2 2
s s s s sd
r r r r rd
L M l m m l m L
L M l m m l m L
− = + − = − =
− = + − = − =
 (4.17) 
            
                      Figure 4.3: Electrical model of the induction machine in dq components.          
Note that in this representation, the rotor mechanical speed has been multiplied by the IM pole 
pairs () and ωψ depends on the selected reference. The most commonly used references are: (i) 
synchronous reference, (ii) stator reference and (iii) rotor reference. These references are 
expressed down below in (4.18): 
                                   
. ( )
. 0
.
s s
s
s m
Synchronous ref t dt
Stator ref
Rotor ref
ψ ω
ψ
ψ θ
→ =
→ =
→ =℘
∫
                                              (4.18) 
The synchronous reference is used in case ωs is constant, this expression depends on the 
synchronous speed (2πf) where f is the system frequency (which is assumed constant in steady-
state). In the present thesis, given the natural tendency of the IM to decelerate following the CB 
opening, and given the fact that the frequency of the island decreases with time, the stator 
reference will be used. Consequently, the set of Eqs. (4.14) is now converted, thus obtaining 
(4.19): 
Ls-MRs Lr-M-ωψ·φsq -(ωψ-ωm)φrq
+
-
Vsd
Isd
Ird
Rs
Ls-MRs Lr-M
M
ωψ·φsd (ωψ-ωm)φrd
+
-
Vsq
Isq
Irq
Rs
Direct component
Quadrature component
M
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Considering stator reference, Figure 4.3 is now converted into Figure 4.4. 
                 
              Figure 4.4: Electrical model of the induction machine in dq components in stator reference. 
Lastly, the transformed stator voltages, rotor currents and stator currents from dq components into 
abc components with fixed stator reference are obtained applying the Park’s anti-transformation: 
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Steady-state model of the IM  
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M
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Obtain the model equations in steady-state becomes crucial to initialise a transient behaviour. 
Since a steady-state model considers the derivatives zero, the equations of the transient behaviour 
in the previous subsection will be used to obtain the steady-state model. If the machine is fed 
through a symmetric system of voltages (only the direct-sequence component of the voltage is 
considered), phase-voltages take this form: 
                                                
0
0
120
sc 120
2 sin( )
2 sin( )
2 sin( )
sa s
sb s
s
V V t
V V t
V V t
ω ϕ
ω ϕ
ω ϕ
−
+
= +
= +
= +
                                                           (4.21) 
If the machine is considered under steady-state (i.e., derivatives are set to zero), the set of 
equations expressed in dq components of (4.19), are now expressed as in (4.22):                                          
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                                             (4.22) 
The active and reactive-power drawn by the machine acting as a motor in dq components are 
defined in (4.23): 
                                                
· ·
· ·
sd sd sq sq
sq sd sd sq
P v i v i
Q v i v i−
= +
=
                                                                     (4.23) 
The equations to compute both active and reactive powers in steady-state and considering abc 
reference frame are expressed in (4.24): 
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               (4.24) 
In (4.24) subindex (2) is referred to inverse-sequence component, therefore, if there  is only direct 
sequence component for stator voltages and currents, the active and reactive powers drawn by the 
induction machine can be computed as 3VI*. The single-line diagram of the IM electrical model 
is depicted in the following Figure 4.5. 
            
                       Figure 4.5: Electrical model of the induction machine for steady-state analysis. 
 
XsdRs Xrd
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+
-
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where Xsd is the stator leakage reactance, Xrd is the rotor leakage reactance, XM is the magnetizing 
reactance, and S is the slip between the synchronous speed and the rotor mechanical speed. These 
reactances are computed as (4.25): 
                                          ; ;
m sd m rd m
s r
X X X X XM L L
ω ω ω
+ +
= = =                                         (4.25) 
In this subsection, the fifth-order mathematical model of the IM to study the transient behaviour 
as well as the simplified model to assess steady-state have been obtained. The mathematical model 
of the IM for transients will be used in stator reference and considering the dq components of the 
Park’s transform as in (4.19) and represented by Figure 4.4. Secondly, the IM model in steady 
state is given by (4.22) and represented by Figure 4.5. 
The initial point of operation of an IM can be defined utilizing the torque-speed curve provided 
by the manufacturer. As stated above, the initial values in steady-state will be of interest to 
evaluate the transient behaviour of the IM during the voltage sag originated by the fault. 
The data of the IMs used in the simulations is summarised in Table 4.2. 
                                                                  Table 4.2: Induction motor data. 
Internal parameters Values Rated parameters    Values 
Ls 0.0078  H                 P 160  kW 
Lr 0.0078  H                    1 
Rr 0.0077  Ω                 f   50  Hz 
Rs 0.0137  Ω                V  400 V 
Lm 0.0076  H                       J  2.9  kgm2 
 
4.3.5 Protective devices 
Protective devices can have a significant impact on IO. Certainly, the protection devices settings 
affect the duration of this IO. This section characterises the protective devices implemented in the 
model. Relay settings and its characteristic curves are critical factors to consider when designing 
the protective coordination between devices. Overcurrent protection is commonly used in radial 
DNs because of its simplicity for selectivity purposes. Therefore, the protections accounted here 
are 50/51 (phase-overcurrent) and 50/51N (neutral overcurrent), respectively. Note that the 
clearing time depends upon these curves and its settings. 
Although a source working in parallel with the grid misscoordinates the protective equipment due 
to the change in the short-circuit current sensed by the main relays [4.17] which can cause serious 
issues, the main concern for DSOs is still being the IOs. A general overview of protections in 
distribution networks in the presence of DG sources has been analysed in [4.18]. As mentioned 
several times in the document, in this model, there are not DG but large IMs. As a consequence, 
we will only consider the main characteristics of overcurrent relays, its features are detailed down 
below. In case a curve is selected, its input is the line current of the three phases, and for the 
neutral calculation, it is computed as the vector sum of each one. On the other hand, the output is 
the clearing time composed of the operation time and pick up time. The most common used curves 
are; standard inverse (SI), very inverse (VI) or extremely inverse (EI) as can be seen in Figure 
4.6. The operation time T of phase overcurrent is defined by equation (4.26): 
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The operation time T0 for earth overcurrent is then calculated as follows; 
                                                          
0
0
0
0
( )
1
n
n
t K
T I
I
I I⋅
⋅
=
 
− 
> 
                                                                (4.27) 
where factors K and K0 are adjustable and typically ranged between 0.05 and 1.6, I is the picked 
up current by the relay, In is the rated current controlled by the relay, that is, the load current 
during regular operation, I> is an acceptable overload factor, and n a factor to distinguish between 
relay curves. Particularly, n is 0.02 for SI, 1 for VI and 2 for EI, t is a factor which also depends 
on the curve, for SI is 0.14, for VI is 13.5 and for EI is 80. For ground faults, I0 is the sum vector 
of the three picked up currents sensed by the relay, I0> is the factor between 0.1 and 0.8. 
Selectivity tasks define the time constraint. CB modelling is not unique because of some physical 
factors are involved (e.g., SF6, oil or air insulation), a thorough study of CB characterisation can 
be found in [4.19]. Lastly, several preset reclosing operations are implemented into the relay, 
which are aimed at restoring the electrical supply after its tripping. Commonly, between three and 
four reclosing are used, where the first reclosing is typically fast, between 0.5 and 1 s. This fast 
reclosing plays a pivotal role because it defines the IO duration. The implemented settings in the 
relay located at the PCC1 are summarised in Table 4.3. 
                                                              Table 4.3: Over-current relay parameters. 
ANSI code k n    t Ithreshold (A)      Iof      ANSI Curve 
 
     50   0.05   0.02 0.14   100     1.25     Standard inverse 
 
     50n   0.05    2  80    20      -     Extremely inverse 
 
                         
                              
                                        Figure 4.6: Time-current curves of overcurrent relays. 
4.3.6 Load models 
Load modelling has been evaluated for stability studies, for instance, see [4.20-4.22]. Other 
studies, such as [4.23], developed a method to estimate different load models from measurements. 
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In [4.24], the composite load models voltage and frequency dependence are evaluated, thereby, 
from this analysis, the equations for both active (4.28) and reactive (4.29) powers are derived: 
                                              · (1 · )
kpv
n n
P V kpf f
P V
 
= + ∆ 
 
                                                              (4.28) 
                                                · (1 · )
kpv
n n
Q V kpf fQ V
 
= + ∆ 
 
                                                             (4.29) 
 
where Pn and Qn are the initial active and reactive powers, V is the initial value of voltage, Vn is 
the adjusted voltage, P
 
and Q the active and reactive power with the adjusted voltage, Δf is the 
difference between the rated frequency (50 Hz) and the adjusted frequency, kpv is the exponential 
factor that varies from 0 to 2 depending on the load type, and kpf is the frequency sensitivity 
factor. It is relevant to point out the fact that in (4.28- 4.29), not only the voltage dependence is 
considered, but also the frequency dependence. Since a deviation in the supply frequency affects 
the power drawn by loads, this dependence has to be considered as a frequency sensitivity [4.25, 
4.26]. Even though in this study frequency deviations occur during islanding, the loads are 
considered mainly resistive; therefore, they are not affected by this frequency deviation. Although 
there is not sufficient evidence (or field measurements) to select a given model, the model selected 
for each load provides a close enough simulation result to that obtained from measurements.  
Crucially, the appropriateness of the selected load models is evidenced in section 3 if one takes a 
look into the pre-fault values in column 9 and 10 of Table 4.4, feeder loads power is mainly active. 
Therefore, in the current implemented model, loads are only considered voltage dependents. 
Thence, the available three-phase dynamic load model of the specialised power systems toolbox 
library of Matlab is used [4.27]. Both active and reactive powers are defined by the following 
equations (4.30 - 4.31): 
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                                                                     (4.31) 
where P0 and Q0 are the active and reactive powers at the initial voltage Vo, P(s) and Q(s) are the 
active and reactive powers a the adjusted voltage V, np and nq are constants to model the three 
type of loads (i.e., if n = 0 the load is modelled as constant power if n = 1 the load is modelled as 
constant current and if n = 1 the load is modelled as constant impedance) and tp and tq are time 
constants. The rated power and the load models for each LV feeder loads are summarised in Table 
4.3. Note, however, that the active and reactive at the time the fault occurs, does not have to meet 
this value due to the random pattern of costumers. In such a way, Figure 4.7 shows the real load 
profile for a half month in order to observe its effect on the survivability of the islanding events. 
During the period of the load profile depicted in this figure (between 15-01-16 and 30-01-16), 
four events were recorded. These events are highlighted in red circles. 
 
                                                            Table 4.4: Feeder A loads rated value 
Load Node 
 Rated Voltage 
        (V) 
     Rated P/Q 
    (kW/kVAr) 
   Load model* 
Node 15
 
400 30/4 Constant power 
Node 16
 
400 100/20 Constant impedance 
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Node 17
 
400 300/45 Constant impedance 
Node 18
 
400 600/-157 Induction motors 
Node 19
 
400 100/10 Constant impedance 
Node 20
 
400 30/4 Constant current 
Node 21 400 25/10 Constant impedance 
Node 22 400 200/80 Constant impedance 
Node 23 400 40/18 Constant impedance 
* The load model type listed in the table is model type implemented in Matlab/Simulink. Although there is 
not sufficient evidence (or field measurements) to select a given model, the model selected for each load 
provides a close enough simulation result to that obtained from measurements. 
 
                                Figure 4.7: Load profile at PCC1 with the time of occurrence of some events. 
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                          Figure 4.8: Three-phase Matlab/Simulink implementation of the test system. 
 
4.3.7 Three-phase Model adopted 
The test system model has been implemented in the MATLAB/Simulink environment using the 
specialised power systems toolbox library [4.28]. The three-phase model shown in Fig. 4.8 has 
been implemented in a computer with a processor of 3.6 GHz 8-core Intel i7 and 8 GB of RAM. 
The simulation has been conducted in a discrete mode with a fixed sample time of 50·µs, a solver 
based on the Dormand-Prince eight-order (RK8) method and a simulation time for all scenarios 
of 2.5 s. 
4.4 IM behaviour during the fault 
 
4.4.1 Introduction 
The grid is feeding the induction machine when it is acting as a motor and its mechanical speed 
and torque define its point of operation. This point of operation is of utmost importance to 
determine the IM behaviour in steady stated and consequently, to initialise the transient state. In 
the previous Chapter 3, the general expression for all type voltage sags was obtained, resulting in 
a classification of 14 types of sags. In that chapter, it was demonstrated that depending on the 
type of network, some particularities have to be considered when assessing voltage sags. The 
procedure of this subsection is as follows: 
 Define the initial conditions to initialise the transient state and provide the set of equations 
which dictate the behaviour of the IM during the fault, see subsection 4.4.2. 
 Given the particular type of DN and the IM windings connection, the voltage sags that 
can occur at IM terminals can be reduced from the 14 sag types obtained in Chapter 3. 
The main aim is to reduce the number of voltage sags to be studied. This discussion is 
done in subsection 4.4.3. 
 Assess the influence of the clearing time in this process. (see subsection 4.4.4) 
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It is worth highlighting that the results of this transient state will influence the next stage (i.e., the 
island). Thus, the initial conditions for the IO will be given by the results obtained in this transient 
state. 
 
4.4.2 Transient behaviour during the fault 
Initial variables 
To obtain the values of the IM variables during the voltage sag (i.e., stator and rotor currents, 
mechanical speed and torque), the point of operation of the IM before the disturbance occurs is 
of paramount importance. Thus, in Figure 4.17, the procedure to obtain such point is described. 
It is worth mentioning that, although L. Guasch in [4.29] assessed the influence of voltage sags 
towards the IMs, it did not consider the IM as a bus in the electrical network. Instead, in the 
present study, the IM is viewed as a bus of the electrical grid, where the impedance seen by the 
IM is represented by its Thévenin equivalent (considering the main source, feeder impedances 
and feeder loads). The single-line diagram of this system is depicted in Figure 4.9, where Feeder 
1 and 3 are not represented because the islanding process only occurs in Feeder 2. Note that by 
considering this Thévenin equivalent, the voltage across the IM stator before the fault and its point 
of operation, can be accurately determined.  
As can be seen in 4.13, the first stage of the flowchart has two groups of inputs; the first is the IM 
data, including the type of torque and its value. Secondly, the grid parameters are introduced. 
From the first group of data, the IM internal parameters (i.e., Rr, Rs, LRD, LSD, M, ) can be 
obtained. On the other hand, taking advantage of the second group of data, the Thévenin 
equivalent of the grid seen by the IM terminals (i.e., Vth, Zth) can be determined. In Figure 4.9, the 
electrical loads are represented as shunt admittances framed in colours (e.g., green, yellow and 
purple), the step-down transformer is blue framed and, the IM is red framed. 
 
                                Figure 4.9: Single-line representation of the test system under study. 
where Xgrid is the grid reactance ( this term includes the reactance of the grid and the reactance of 
the HV/MV transformer),  Zcc is the short-circuit impedance of the step-down transformer through 
which the IM is connected to the MV grid, ZL1 and ZL2 are the impedances of two MV lines, and 
Yload represents the shunt admittance of loads.  
Assuming negligible the voltage drop in the MV lines due to its short length, electrical loads can 
be grouped into one bus. Thus, this approximation will contain all feeder loads that remain within 
the island aggregated at the same bus. Considering this assumption, the scheme of 4.9 can be 
expressed as in Figure 4.10. 
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                                           Figure 4.10: Equivalent circuit of the test system. 
 
The thévenin equivalent seen by the stator windings is depicted in the following Figure 4.11. 
             
                                      Figure 4.11: Thévenin equivalent seen by the IM stator. 
 
The expression of the Thévenin equivalent seen by the IM is computed as follows: 
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                       (4.32) 
This Thévenin equivalent is designed as th1. 
Another Thévenin is now represented, this one is the equivalent seen by the IM magnetisation 
branch, expressed as th2 and showed in Figure 4.12. 
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                          Figure 4.12: Thévenin equivalent seen by the IM magnetisation branch. 
The expression of this second Thévenin equivalent seen by the IM magnetisation branch is 
depicted in Fig. 4.12 and computed as in (4.33): 
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                                                (4.33) 
The second stage of the flowchart in 4.13 uses the parameters obtained in the first stage to obtain 
the IM in steady-state (i.e., ird, irq, isd, isq, Γem, ωm) and the Thévenin equivalent and is obtained by 
applying equations (4.22-4.23). The subindex (0) is referred to as initial values.  
The IM point of operation to initialise the transient state (i.e., initial conditions) has been obtained 
in the previously described stages. Therefore, the next step focuses on obtaining the voltages 
across the IM during the fault. By using the voltage divider of Eq. (4.34), the voltage sag across 
the IM stator is obtained. Afterwards, the stator voltages in the abc reference frame variables are 
converted into dq components as in (4.35).  
Lastly, the transient state of the IM during the voltage sag is obtained by introducing these stator 
voltages into the set of differential equations in stator reference of (4.36). Note that the dq 
components of the stator voltage will depend on the type of fault and its location. 
                      A novel assessment of unintentional islanding operations in distribution networks 
84 
 
          Figure 4.13: Flowchart to obtain the transient behaviour of the IM during the voltage sag. 
The dynamic model to study the IM transient state is described by the following set of equations, 
where the input are the stator voltages ( Vsd and Vsq) and the output, the stator and rotor currents, 
the rotor speed and rotor angle (isd , isq, irq,, irq, ωm, and θm). The voltage sag across the IM stator 
terminals (in abc components) is obtained from the voltage divider as in (4.34): 
                                             
_ _
feeder
s abc source abc
feeder source
ZV V
Z Z
=
+
                                                         (4.34) 
Since abc components can be converted into symmetrical components (with the Fortescue 
transform), similarly, the voltage sag at the IM stator terminals in abc components can be 
converted into the dq voltage components as follows: 
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Given the stator voltages as an input, by solving the set of equations in (4.36), the transient 
behaviour during the voltage sag is obtained. 
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The set of differential equations of (4.36) with six equations and six unknown variables can be 
solved with numerical methods such as the Runge-Kutta-Fehlberg method, see [4.30]. As 
mentioned earlier, the initial values to start the iterative process are the ones obtained in the 
steady-state model, see parameters and Eqs. (4.22-4.23). 
 
4.4.3 Influence of the fault-type 
Introduction 
In Chapter 3, a list of 14 types of voltage sags have been defined. However, some of them can be 
caused for faults upstream the CB of Feeder A (located at PCC1) which cannot cause an IO. 
Thereby, in this section, only the voltage sags originated by faults which imply the opening of the 
CB in Feeder A (i.e., faults located downstream of this CB) will be considered. Since this thesis 
is evaluating the IO that occurs in Feeder A, either faults at neighbour MV feeders or the HV 
system do not cause an IO. Hence, the following assumptions are summarised down below: 
1. Voltage sags originated at the HV transmission system are not considered. 
2. Since the LV grids are typically protected with fuses, there are no reclosing operations 
3. The type of network under study is resistance-grounded via a zig-zag transformer. 
4. Only the effects of one transformer will be considered (i.e., the step-down MV/LV 
transformer). 
5. Other voltage sags due to IM starting or transformer energisation are dismissed because they 
do not imply the operation of the CB located at PCC1. 
Voltage sags grouping 
Considering the above assumptions, the following casuistry is taken into consideration: 
 A SLG fault at the MV grid causes a voltage sag type B, and given the step-down transformer 
windings connection, a voltage sag type C is expected at the LV side. The voltage sag type B 
will not be considered at the IM terminals because faults at the LV grid are not considered. 
 Either a LL or LLG fault at the MV grid causes a voltage sag Type D (see Figs. 3.14 and 3.15 
of Chapter 3). Even though the voltage sag produced is the same, the recovery is slightly 
different. Therefore, these two types of faults will be considered.  
 A LLL fault at the MV grid cause a voltage sag type A2 at the LV grid. 
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 An LLLG fault at the MV grid cause a voltage sag type A4 at the LV grid. 
Table 4.5 shows a summary of the faults originated at the MV grid which have been considered. 
The third column of this Table shows the voltage sag at the LV network after a Dy transformer. 
                                                            Table 4.5: Voltage sags grouping. 
Fault  
   Location of the voltage sag 
        I (MV)                II (LV) 
SLG          B                             C             
LLG          E                              D           
LL          E                              D           
LLL          A1                            A2             
LLLG          A3                            A4            
 
4.4.4 Clearing time influence 
As stated in the modelling section 4.3.5, the clearing time is dictated by the relay settings. The 
process that takes place when a fault occurs is described further on. The first cycles (typically 
between 4 and 6) after the fault occurrence, the IMs contribute towards the fault. Along with this 
contribution, it experiences a deceleration which is prolonged during the sag. After that, once the 
voltage sag recovers, the machine reaccelerate [4.31], and return to the initial point of operation. 
However, for large clearing times, the voltage sags will force the IM to stall. In [4.32], an 
analytical expression is provided to compute the critical voltage sag clearing time. 
The influence of voltage sags into induction motors have been the object of study in several 
studies, among them, L. Guasch et at. in [4.33]. On the other hand, the behaviour of the double-
fed-induction machine during voltage sags (both symmetrical and non-symmetrical) in wind 
power applications has been investigated by A. Rolan in [4.35]. On the other hand, interesting 
research is carried out by F. Córcoles et al. in [4.36-4.37] where the voltage sags are assessed. In 
these three works, the IM deceleration during the voltage sag has been considered negligible 
(below 1%) due to the brief duration of the sag (e.g., around 60 ms). Nonetheless, in distribution 
networks, the clearing times can be longer (e.g., see [4.38]). Frequently, faults at the MV grid 
exceed this duration (e.g., an average value may be around 200 ms). As a consequence, the speed 
derivative during the voltage sag cannot be assumed zero in the present thesis.  
 
4.5 Islanding operation 
 
4.5.1 Overview 
The current section is divided into two parts; the first gives a brief overview of the islanding 
process and presents the mathematical model of the IM during the island. The second one is aimed 
at describing the principal influential factors into the IO. 
To emphasise the importance of this phenomenon, as an example, Fig. 4.14 shows the simulated 
three-phase voltages of two scenarios; one scenario with IMs (solid lines) and another one 
replacing the IMs (dashed lines) with a static load of the same rated power. By carefully observing 
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this Figure between the fault clearing (t = 0.9 s) and the CB reclosing (t = 1.4 s), one can notive 
that the IMs are energising the isolated feeder A once its CB has opened. On the other hand, when 
the IMs are replaced with static loads, as expected, an interruption occurs.  
Furthermore, to provide more evidence that following the CB the IM is energising the DN and 
acting as a generator, Figure 4.15 plots the active-power recorded at the PCC2 where IMs are 
connected. In this figure, it can be seen that before the fault appears (t = 0.8 s) the induction 
machine is acting as a motor (i.e., the measured active power is positive), but once the fault is 
cleared, the power becomes negative. This fact undeniably demonstrates that the IMs are 
transiently acting as generators. 
       
                          Figure 4.14: Phase-voltage comparison scenarios with and without IMs. 
       
                               Figure 4.15: Phase voltage comparison scenarios with and without IMs. 
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4.5.2 IM Mathematical model during the island 
As seen in the previous subsections 4.4.2 to 4.4.4, during the fault, the IM tend to decelerate. This 
deceleration depends on the severity of the originated voltage sag (i.e., magnitude and duration). 
Once the CB clears the fault, the motor is disconnected from the grid, and due to its inertia, 
transiently act as a generator. The initial kinetic energy before the IO begins (i.e., the speed once 
the voltage sag has recovered) is as follows: 
                                                  _ _
21
2
TKin initial pre islandingE J ω=                                                   (4.37)  
where EKin_initial is the initial kinetic energy before the CB opening, JT the total moment of inertia 
(considering the rotor inertia and mechanical load), and ωpre_islanding is the mechanical speed before 
the island is formed. Following the CB opening, due to the lack of supply, the equilibrium between 
torques is broken, the IM speed derivative becomes negative and, thereby, only the dynamic 
torque (i.e. the torque due to the non-zero derivative of the rotor speed) drives the machine. Hence, 
the mechanical equation in (4.36) can now be rewritten as (4.38): 
                                                             ( ) mload T dJ
dt
ω
− Γ =                                                                 (4.38) 
 
Before the fault, the electromagnetic torque of the IM acting as a motor is by convention positive. 
This fact can be observed before the fault occurs (before t = 0.8 s) in Figure 4.16. During the 
voltage sag, the torque is oscillatory (between t = 0.8 s and t= 0.9 s). Once the main CB has opened 
(at t = 0.9 s), the dynamic torque drives the machine; its speed derivative and electromagnetic 
torque are both negative when acting as a generator (between t = 0.9 s and t = 1.4 s). Note that 
the high torque that occurs once the CB recloses (t = 1.4 s) is due to the out-of-phase reclosing. 
This reclosing transient can be more or less severe depending on the voltage amplitude and 
frequency difference between sources (i.e., the main grid and the island). 
       
                                       Figure 4.16: Electromagnetic torque developed by the IM. 
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The procedure to obtain the transient behaviour of the IM during the IO is detailed in Figure 4.17. 
The first stage provides the initial values for the IO, which are obtained from the previous section 
where the transient state during the voltage sag has been evaluated. 
To assess the IO, the reduced grid scheme of Figure 4.10 will be used, where all feeder loads have 
been grouped in one bus. 
                                
                  Figure 4.17: Flowchart to obtain the transient behaviour of the IM during islanding. 
As can be seen in Fig. 4.10, the variables of interest for the IO are (isd, ird, Vsd, ωm, θm, Vload). Since 
there is no noticeable load unbalance during the islanding, only d-component is considered, and 
the q-component of stator voltages, rotor currents and stator currents is set to zero. By solving the 
set of six differential equations with six unknown variables in (4.39), the transient state of the IM 
during the island is obtained.  
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As mentioned earlier in subsection 4.3.6, if a voltage-dependence load model is considered, three 
types of load models can be used. Therefore, the term Zload of (4.39), can be computed as a mix 
of the aforementioned three load models: 
                            
2
( ) ( ) ( )load loadload load load
load load cnt load
V VZ R jX
P jQ I= + + ++                                 (4.40) 
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The voltages and currents are now rewritten by separating stator and rotor components: 
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                                (4.41) 
where ω can be computed as 2πf, being f  the frequency of the system and, ωr the rotor speed. If 
the rotor resistance is neglected, the time derivative of the rotor flux linkage with respect to time 
can be obtained as follows: 
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               (4.42) 
Once the CB has opened, the remnant magnetic flux at the rotor forces the IM to behave as a 
generator, see [4.39]. Therefore, the rotor flux derivative with respect to time is deduced from 
(4.42), which depends on the rotor initial magnetic flux (ϕr_0) as well as on the rotor mechanical 
speed ωr. The relationship between current and magnetic fluxes are expressed with the following 
matrix equation: 
                                                ·
s ss sr s
r rs rr r
M M i
M M i
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φ
     
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                                                             (4.43) 
If the stator flux is set to zero due to the lack of external supply, the remnant magnetic rotor flux 
can be computed as: 
                                     ( )
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                     (4.44) 
Indeed, the induced voltage across the IM magnetisation branch is due to this remnant magnetic 
flux available at the rotor winding at the time the fault occurs, which in turn, is maintained by the 
rotor speed while the rotor it is driven by the transient dynamic torque. When the motor is acting 
as a generator, this voltage can be represented as a voltage behind a transient reactance. If the IM 
stator resistance is neglected, this voltage can be computed with the following equation: 
                                                  
( )( · · )· rsr j tr r r
rr
ME j e
M
ω ωω φ − −=                                                        (4.45) 
The voltage behind the transient reactance ( imrE δ∠ ) can be defined as a sinusoidal and balanced, 
and the frequency of this voltage is determined by the IM rotor speed (ωr). Thereby, a slip can be 
defined between the frequency of the island and the frequency of the main grid. To observe the 
relationship between the IM rotor angle, its mechanical speed and the frequency of the island, see 
Eq. (4.50). The voltage at the IM terminals during the island (Vsd) is obtained by solving the set 
of differential equations (4.39-4.40). However, it can alternatively be computed as the voltage 
behind the transient reactance plus the voltage drop across the stator winding, see equation (4.46). 
                                                         ·s s s rV jX i E= +                                                                  (4.46) 
where Xs is the stator leakage reactance. 
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The reduced test system shown in Figure 4.10, was used to represent the system before and during 
the fault. However, once the CB has opened, the system is represented by Figure 4.18. In this 
Figure, the rotor winding plus the magnetisation branch are being replaced by the equivalent 
source behind the transient reactance (if stator and rotor resistances are both neglected). In case 
no load is connected with the stator, the voltage at the IM main terminals is the same as the one 
obtained across the magnetisation branch, however, if the load is connected to the IM terminals, 
a certain voltage drop takes place across the stator inductance. 
 
                            Figure 4.18: Single-line diagram of reduced test system before islanding. 
Once the CB has opened the circuit, the impedance of the line ZL1 can be neglected because no 
current is flowing through this impedance, and therefore, the single-line diagram of the system 
during the island is depicted in Figure 4.19. As mentioned earlier, the amount of feeder loads in 
the island are grouped into one bus and expressed with the term Zload. 
 
           Figure 4.19: Single-line diagram of the reduced scheme of the system during islanding. 
where Xsd is the stator leakage reactance, Zcc is the short-circuit impedance of the MV/HV 
transformer, ZL1  is the line impedance and Zload represents load impedance (i.e., the sum of all 
feeder loads grouped in one bus).  
Alternatively, the IM speed derivative during the islanding can be computed by using the classical 
stability equation. Thus, if it is assumed that the IM is under no-load torque at the time the fault 
occurs (i.e., that there is no mechanical load coupled to the rotor shaft) and considering that there 
is no damping effect while acting as generator, the balance during the island is given by: 
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= −
                                                                       (4.47) 
                                                          0
im
im im
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δ
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                                                                     (4.48) 
where ωim is the IM angular speed, ωim0 is IM initial angular speed, δim is the IM rotor angle, Pm 
is the mechanical power developed by the IM when acting as a generator, Peload is the power drawn 
by the feeder loads, and Him is the inertia constant of the IM expressed in seconds.  
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The variation over time of the IM rotor angle during the island (i.e., between ti and tf) is related to 
the frequency during islanding as follows: 
                                               
1
2
tf tf
im m island
ti ti
dt f dtδ ω
pi
∆ = ∆ = ∆∫ ∫                                                     (4.50)  
where fisland is the frequency during the island and δim is the IM rotor angle. 
As for the impedance load calculation (i.e., the term Zload of (4.40)), if we consider voltage-
dependence load models, the term Peload has to be also divided into three different terms. The 
power drawn by the loads in the island are divided into term P1 which is assumed to be the sum 
of all constant impedance loads, P2 represents the sum of all constant current loads and, P3 is the 
sum of all constant power loads. Whereby, the term Peload has the following expression: 
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                                                      (4.51) 
where ΔV represents the voltage variation, P1, P2, P3 are the sum of all constant impedance, 
constant current and constant power, which individually are computed as follows: 
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Note that in equation (4.47), the active-power losses term has been neglected due to the short MV 
line lenghts. 
 
4.5.3 Islanding influential factors 
As can be appreciated from the previous equations in subsection 4.5.2, the rotor magnetic flux at 
the precise moment when the island is initiated (i.e., remnant magnetic flux), is of utmost 
importance to assess the IO. Based on the mathematical evaluation of the previous subsections, 
the influential factors of this IO are listed down below: 
 The type and value of the load torque coupled with the IM rotor shaft.  
 The IM inertia. 
 The IM point of operation in steady-state. 
 The type of fault that originated the IO. 
 The duration of the IO.  
 
4.6 Conclusions 
 
In general terms, this chapter has described the theoretical analysis of the IO and the main 
influential factors have been identified. 
Firstly, the single-line diagram of the test system under investigation have been defined in 
subsection 4.2. In it, the data of the network such as the type of grounding, the number of 
transformers and its rated capacity and line impedances are provided. After that, the description 
of the model is done in section 4.3. Particularly, each element of the model is detailed in a separate 
subsection (e.g., transformers, transmission lines, CBs, IMs and load models). The three-phase 
implemented model in Matlab/Simulink is shown in 4.3.7. 
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Secondly, once the system components have been described, the mathematical model of the IM 
before the island can be established. Thus, the IM modelling is analysed in both steady-state (i.e., 
non-linear set of equations (4.22-4.23) to obtain pre-fault point of operation) and transient state 
(i.e., the set of differential equations in (4.36)). Hence, subsection 4.4 analyses the transient 
behaviour of the IM during the fault, which proved to be crucial for the islanding evaluation. To 
successfully perform this analysis, the pre-fault IM point of operation and grid parameters are of 
utmost importance.  
The procedure to obtain the transient behaviour of the IM during the fault is depicted in Figure 
4.13. Besides, in this subsection, a reduced group of sags is proposed in order to reduce the 
number of scenarios to be evaluated. Thus, only the faults that occur in the MV network are of 
interest, and as a consequence, the voltage sags originated by events that do not imply a CB 
operation are dismissed. Among these events, we can find voltage sags due to faults at HV 
transmission system, voltage sags due to IM starting in the same feeder or faults in neighbour MV 
feeders. Accordingly, in this section, only five voltage sag types are analysed instead of the full 
list of fourteen types defined in Chapter 3. 
Thirdly, the IO is assessed in subsection 4.5. The procedure to obtain the variables during the IO 
is shown in Figure 4.17. The main variables of the system during the island are obtained by 
solving the set of differential equations (4.39-4.40), where the initial conditions are the ones 
obtained after the voltage sag recovery (i.e., the end of the voltages sag, see the previous section 
4.4). 
To sum up, this Chapter has defined the model used to represent the IO and has provided the 
mathematical equations of each element individually. The dependability of the analytical 
expressions detailed in this Chapter will be demonstrated in the subsequent Chapters 5, 6 and 7 
(i.e., simulations, Field measurements and Model validation). Furthermore, to support the 
feasibility of the analytical analysis of this Chapter, three Figures have been provided (4.14-4.16). 
In these Figures, the feasibility of this IO is demonstrated by making a comparison between one 
scenario with IMs and another one without them.  
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Chapter 5 
Simulations 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The main goal of this section is to perform simulations considering a wide range of scenarios to 
test the impact of the previously mentioned factors into the IO. To this end, the three-phase 
Matlab/Simulink model described in Subsection 4.3.7 will be used. It should be stated that some 
additional hypothesis have been assumed during the simulations, see the details in section 5.2. 
For the sake of clarity, each subsection shows and discusses the simulation results for every 
influential factor. 
The main parts of this chapter can be listed as follows: 
 The first section is aimed at analysing the influence of the feeder loads into the IO. Besides, 
the impact of the type of load models into the IO is also investigated. All the results, as 
well as its discussion, can be found in section 5.3. 
 Secondly, the impact of the type of fault that originated the IO and its clearing time is 
analysed. Given the fact that in the previous subsection only SLG faults have been 
considered, this subsection explores the effects of the rest of faults into the IO. The 
simulation results and a thorough discussion can be found in section 5.4. 
 Different reclosing times are investigated in section 5.5. 
 In section 5.6, the simulations results for different load torques are provided. 
 Section 5.7 analyses the islanding operations in case of permanent faults. The previous 
sections considered that faults were cleared together with the CB operation (i.e., temporary 
faults), instead, this section will study the permanent ones. This fact means that even with 
the CB opening, the fault remains applied, and therefore, the IM continues feeding the 
fault during the island. 
Finally, the main conclusions obtained from the simulations results will be summarised in section 
5.8. 
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5.2 Hypothesis and considerations 
 
Since the simulations are analysed for each influential factor separately, the considered hypothesis 
will also be provided separately. Hence, the assumptions are detailed down below: 
 
• Hypothesis for simulations of section 5.3. 
1. The reclosing time is set to 0.5 s for all simulated scenarios. 
2. A SLG fault at node 7 with a fault resistance of 1 Ω is simulated for all scenarios. 
Consequently, for this resistance fault and location, the obtained fault current is 466 A 
(RMS current value). The fault is cleared within 100 ms, due to the fixed time 
implemented in the relay. This clearing time includes the sensing time (one-cycle), plus 
the CB mechanical time (40 ms).  
3. The IM is under no-load torque at the time the fault occurs. 
4. The CB clears the fault satisfactorily. 
• Hypothesis for simulations of section 5.4. 
1. The IM is under no-load torque at the time the fault occurs. 
2. Reclosing time is set to 0.5 s. 
3. The CB clears the fault satisfactorily. 
4. The total feeder loads are set to 80 kW(constant impedance). 
• Hypothesis for simulations of section 5.5. 
1. A SLG fault at node 7 with a fault resistance of 1 Ω is simulated for all scenarios. 
Consequently, for this resistance fault and location, the obtained fault current is 466 A 
(RMS current value). The fault is cleared within 100 ms, due to the fixed time 
implemented in the relay. This clearing time includes the sensing time (one-cycle), plus 
the CB mechanical time (40 ms).  
2. The IM is under no-load torque at the time the fault occurs. 
3. The total amount of feeder loads is set to 500 kW(400 cnt. impedance, 50 cnt. current and 
50 cnt. power). 
• Hypothesis for simulations of section 5.6. 
1. The reclosing time is set to 0.5 s for all simulated scenarios. 
2.  A SLG fault at node 7 with a fault resistance of 1 Ω is simulated for all scenarios. 
Consequently, for this resistance fault and location, the obtained fault current is 466 A. 
The fault is cleared within 100 ms, due to the fixed time implemented in the relay. This 
clearing time includes the sensing time (one-cycle), plus the CB mechanical time (40 ms). 
3. The CB clears the fault satisfactorily. 
4. A constant torque model is considered. 
5. The reclosing is set to 0.5 s. 
6. The total amount of feeder loads is set to 100 kW(80 cnt. impedance and 20 cnt. current). 
• Hypothesis for simulations of section 5.7. 
1. The reclosing time is set to 0.5 s for all simulated scenarios. 
2. Feeder loads are set to 80 kW(constant impedance). 
3. The IM is under no-load torque at the time the fault occurs. 
 
 
5.3 Effects of feeder loads and its load model 
 
5.3.1 Simulations for different load scenarios  
In this section, seven simulated scenarios will be analysed and discussed. Each particular scenario 
considers one value of active-power, which in turn, is the sum of all loads connected to the LV 
buses. Besides, this value corresponds at a given instant of the daily load profile (e.g., see the half 
month load profile obtained from the grid under study in Figure 4.7 of subsection 4.3.6). The 
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power values used for such simulation have been selected in order to represent the influence of 
the feeder loads on the IO considering a realistic load profile. Although faults have a random 
occurrence and the power drawn by loads at that time may vary, the simulated scenarios provide 
a sufficient casuistry to accurately evaluate its effect into the IO.  
As underlined in the previous section 5.2, the fault conditions (i.e., the type of fault, its location 
and resistance fault value) that originated the CB opening are the same. Therefore, voltage and 
current measurements at PCC1 will be only shown ones. Particularly, the first plot of Fig. 5.1 
displays the phase voltage, meanwhile the second plot shows the current. Note that, the voltage 
measurement is done upstream the CB. Each scenario is analysed separately, where the voltage 
at PCC2 and the frequency of the island are shown in separate plots for each Figure. 
Lastly, Table 5.1 summarises the main features of the simulated scenarios. These results are 
graphically plotted in Figure 5.8, where the first plot shows the voltages and the frequency is 
shown in the second plot.  
Since in the previous events only voltage and frequency have been shown, additionally, a 
selection of events is made to show the IM mechanical variables during the island. This selection 
of scenarios is aimed at reducing the number of plots to show in this Chapter. Thus, from the 
seven simulated events, the mechanical parameters are only shown for scenarios (II, III, IV and 
V). In Figures 5.9 to 5.11, the IM parameters such as the mechanical rotor speed (ωm), the 
electromagnetic torque (Te) and the active-power (Pe) are displayed respectively. 
 
 
                                           Figure 5.1: Voltage and current measured at PCC1. 
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Scenario I 
 
                     Figure 5.2: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario I. 
 
Scenario II 
 
                    Figure 5.3: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario II. 
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Scenario III 
 
                       Figure 5.4: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario III. 
 
Scenario IV 
 
                     Figure 5.5: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario IV. 
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Scenario V 
 
                     Figure 5.6: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario V. 
 
Scenario VI 
 
                      Figure 5.7: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario VI. 
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Scenario VII 
 
                     Figure 5.8: Voltage and frequency measurements obtained from scenario VII. 
 
 
 
                        Figure 5.9: Voltage and frequency during the island for all simulated scenarios. 
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Summary of scenarios 
Figure 5.8 compares the voltages and frequency results obtained from simulations. In it, the 
voltage measured at PCC2 (only one phase) and the frequency of the island are depicted. By 
observing this Figure, the effect of the active-power loads that remain within the island is 
remarkable. From these simulations it can be also highlighted that in case the power drawn by the 
loads in the island is low at the instant the fault occurs, voltages remain stable meanwhile the 
frequency shows a slight drop.  
On the contrary, a large amount of power drawn by loads forces the machine to a more significant 
deceleration and consequently, it causes a substantial decrease in voltage and frequency. 
Besides, this selection has been done to perform a better analysis of the mechanical parameters in 
one plot. From Figure 5.10, it can be seen that, as expected, the rotor speed decreases during the 
IO. On the other hand, Figures 5.11 and 5.12 highlight that both active power and torque are 
positive before the fault and becomes negative during islanding. The pre-fault power measured at 
PCC2 belongs to the load placed at bus 18 plus the IM losses.  
Lastly, Table 5.1 summarises the parameters obtained from the performed simulations. 
 
                   Table 5.1: Summary of the simulated scenarios for different feeder loads value. 
Scenario 
   P 
(kW)  
 V* 
(kV) 
 f* 
(Hz) 
ωm
* 
(rpm) 
   Colour 
(Figure 
5.8) 
 
I 60 13.7 44 1315 Black  
II 80 13 42.4 1268.3 Purple  
III 100 12.4 40.9 1224.4 Yellow  
IV
 
150 11.1 37.9 1134.5 Green  
V 200 9.8 34.9 1041.8 Blue  
VI 300 8.31 30.3 903 Red  
VII 500 6.19 23.4 696 Orange  
                             * Values obtained one cycle before CB reclosing 
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                       Figure 5.10: IM mechanical speed comparison between scenarios II, III, IV and V. 
 
 
                               Figure 5.11: Comparison between torques in scenarios II, III, IV and V.  
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                           Figure 5.12: Active-power comparison between scenarios II, III, IV and V. 
 
                                 Figure 5.13: Frequency and IM rotor speed in per unit comparison. 
To provide more evidence that following the CB disconnection the IM is acting as a generator 
and also demonstrate that the IM rotor speed dictates the frequency during the IO, Figure 5.13 
shows the comparison between the frequency and mechanical speed in per unit. By observing that 
Figure, before the fault occurs, as expected, the IM rotor speed is slightly below the synchronous 
due to the low slip when the motor is under no-load torque (before t = 0.8s). Once the fault takes 
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place, due to the voltage sag, the speed is slightly reduced (between t = 0.8 s and t = 0.9 s), and 
during the island (between t = 0.9 s and t = 1.4 s), the mechanical speed matches the synchronous 
one. 
 
               Figure 5.14: Voltage, active-power and reactive-power for the three type of load models. 
 
 
                            Figure 5.15: Voltage and frequency for the three types of load models. 
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5.3.2 Load models impact 
As has been seen in the previous subsection, the number of loads within the island plays a pivotal 
role in this study. Furthermore, this subsection will demonstrate that depending on the selected 
type of load model (i.e., consider the voltage-dependence in load models), frequency and voltage 
during islanding will vary. Thus, Figure 5.14 show voltage (first plot), active-power (second plot) 
and reactive-power (third plot) in per unit measured at node 15 for the three types of load models 
when considering voltage-dependence (i.e., cnt. impedance, cnt. current and cnt. power). 
Theoretically, a constant power load model is the one that has to cause a high deceleration in the 
IM since the power delivered by the IM decreases with time. On the contrary, constant impedance 
and constant current load models, due to a decrease in power with the voltage drop, may cause 
less deceleration. By taking a look at Figure 5.15, this fact has been demonstrated. The highest 
voltage and frequency drop during the island occurs for a constant power load model, and the 
lesser drop occurs for constant impedance load model.  
 
5.4 Type of fault and clearing time influence 
 
Since the IO object of study is originated by a fault and the subsequent CB clearing, the main aim 
of this section is to study the effects of this type of fault into it. Depending on the type of fault 
and the clearing time, the IM behaviour during the fault will be different, and as a consequence, 
the islanding initial conditions will also change. Accordingly, this subsection will show eight 
scenarios. These scenarios will test all types of faults at different locations and different clearing 
times. Scenarios I, II, III and IV belong to a fixed clearing time, however, scenarios V, VI, VII, 
VIII belong to simulations where the clearing time depends on the fault current and the selected 
curves.The reason why some scenarios have a fixed clearing time (100 ms) is that a fixed time is 
implemented in the relay, which trips in case fault current exceeds a certain threshold. The phase 
voltages and the frequency of the island are both measured at PCC2. The simulated scenarios are 
plotted in Figure 5.16. The first column shows the phase voltage while the second the frequency 
value. To make a clear comparison between the simulated scenarios, Figure 5.17 merges the 
obtained voltages and frequencies of 5.16 into two plots. 
                                               Table 5.2: Parameters of the simulated faults. 
Scenario 
Fault 
location 
 
Type 
fault 
  Rf 
 (Ω) 
 Fault   
current* 
   (A) 
Clearing time 
       (ms) 
I Node 7 SLG 1 460 100 
II Node 7 LL 1 1560 100 
III Node 7 LLLG 1 1890 100 
IV
 
Node 7 LLLG 10 967 100 
V Node 5 LLL 5 1021 175 
VI Node 5 LLG 5 899 197 
VII Node 9 LL 5 624 240 
VIII Node 9 LLLG 5 726 216 
              * RMS Current measured in PCC1 
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                                       Figure 5.16: Simulated scenarios with fixed clearing time. 
 
             Figure 5.17: Voltage and frequency comparison between scenarios with fixed clearing time. 
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From both 5.16 and 5.17, it can be seen that, undeniably, the type of fault have a noticeable impact 
in the IO. On the one hand, in scenario III, for a LLLG fault with a Rf of 1 Ω, the motor stalls and 
cannot recover after the CB clearing, meanwhile in scenario IV, at the same fault location but 
increasing Rf to 10 Ω, the motor decelerates during the fault and reaccelerates once the fault is 
cleared. By observing scenario III, it can be seen that depending on the type of fault and its 
severity, voltage and frequency will collapse.  
Crucially, the larger post-fault reacceleration in scenario IV causes a frequency increasing above 
50 Hz at the beginning of the island and also makes that during the island this value is slightly 
higher in comparison with scenarios I and II.  
On the other hand, it is observed that for SLG faults, the voltage during the island is higher in 
comparison with the rest of faults (see scenarios II and IV). It is seen that the faults which cause 
the higher deceleration during the fault are the LLL or LLLG faults with large clearing times. 
From these results, the conclusion that can be drawn is clear, the higher is the speed drop during 
the fault (i.e., during the voltage sag) the higher is the reacceleration once the CB clears the fault 
(i.e., the beginning of the island). Therefore, this fact will be traduced in a frequency increasing 
during the island.  
The results for the simulated scenarios V, VI, VII and VIII (Figures 5.19 to 5.21) where the 
clearing time is not fixed, are showed down below. In these Figures, the phase voltage measured 
at PCC2 and the frequency island is showed. 
 
 
                                               Figure 5.18: Voltage and frequency of scenario V. 
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                                               Figure 5.19: Voltage and frequency of scenario VI. 
 
 
                                               Figure 5.20: Voltage and frequency of scenario VII. 
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                                               Figure 5.21: Voltage and frequency of scenario VIII. 
                      Table 5.3: Summary of the simulation results to evaluate the fault influence. 
Scenario 
   P 
(kW)  
 V* 
(kV) 
 f* 
(Hz) 
ωm
* 
(rpm) 
Clearing time  
(ms) 
I 80 10.9 45.1 1349 100 
II 80 12.1 40.5 1210 100 
III 80 - - - 100 
IV
 
80 11.8 45.4 1359 100 
V 80 8.49 44.7 1341 175 
VI 80 11.8 43.6 1307 197 
VII 80 12.5 44.2 1324 240 
VIII 80 12.3 46.6 1394 216 
                             * Values obtained one cycle before CB reclosing. 
 
Summary of scenarios 
This subsection has shown the influence of the type of fault and the clearing time into the IO. A 
summary of the discrete values of the islanding (i.e., voltage, frequency and mechanical speed) 
one-cycle before the CB reclosing takes place are listed in Table 5.3. From that table, it has been 
demonstrated that the larger is the fault duration, the larger is frequency during the island due to 
the IM reacceleration. This phenomenon is especially significant for LLL and LLLG faults 
provided that the motor does not stall, which only takes place for the severest faults. The proof 
that the rotor of the IM dictates the frequency during the island is evidenced by comparing both 
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values in per unit. As an example, by observing Table 5.3 values, for scenario VIII the frequency 
before the CB reclosing in per unit (46.6/50 Hz) is 0.932 pu and the mechanical speed (1394/1500 
rpm) is 0.93 pu. In the same way, this comparison can be made for all simulated scenarios.  
 
5.5 Reclosing time influence 
 
The simulations for different reclosing times have been performed according to the previously 
described hypothesis in section 5.2. The main parameters obtained for the five simulated times 
are displayed in Figure 5.22. From this Figure, it can be extracted that, as expected, the larger the 
reclosing time, the more significant is the voltage and frequency drop during the island. Moreover, 
the discrete values from figure 5.22 and the principal data of the simulations is summarized in 
table 5.4. 
 
                Figure 5.22: Voltage, IM speed and frequency during the IO for several reclosing times. 
                                    Table 5.4: Summary of values for different reclosing times. 
Scenario 
   P 
(kW)  
 V* 
(kV) 
 f* 
(Hz) 
ωm
* 
(rpm) 
Clearing time  
(ms) 
   Colour 
 (in Figure 5.21) 
I 500 6.1 27.8 834 100 Blue 
II 500 4.9 24.1 720 100 Yellow 
III 500 3.4 20.6 623 100 Purple 
IV
 
500 3 19.5 596 100 Pink 
IV
 
500 2.3 17.6 534 100 Green 
       * Values obtained one cycle before CB reclosing. 
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5.6 Impact of the load torque 
 
The main objective of this section is to analyse the extent to which the load torque coupled with 
the IM rotor shaft the can influence the IO. Thus, this section will show several scenarios that 
have been simulated with different torque values. Note that the speed-dependence torque model 
has not been considered here. Instead, the value of the torque is kept fixed during the whole 
simulation scenario. The simulated scenarios can be ordered by size from no load to the full-load 
torque. Table 5.5 shows the discrete values obtained from the simulations measurements.  
                            Table 5.5: Summary of the measurements obtained from simulations. 
Scenario 
Load 
torque 
(Nm)  
 V* 
(kV) 
   f* 
(Hz) 
 ωm
 * 
(rpm) 
 Colour 
(In Figure 5.22) 
I 0 13 42.6 1275.8 Purple 
II 150 10.3 35.6 1064 Blue 
III 200 9.4 33.2 987 Green 
IV
 
300 7.66 28.4 841.6 Yellow 
                       * Values obtained one cycle before CB reclosing. 
 
In addition to these discrete values (obtained one-cycle before the reclosing), the results of the 
simulation are plotted in Figures 5.23 and 5.24. In 5.23, the RMS phase voltage measured at PCC2 
and frequency of the island are shown. From these measurements, one can observe the effect of 
the induction motor deceleration in case the load torque value increases. Therefore, the larger is 
the motor deceleration, the larger is the voltage and frequency decreasing during the island. 
Meanwhile, for no-load torque (scenario I) the voltage and frequency drop is not that significant, 
in case full-load torque (scenario IV), the voltage and frequency drop is noticeable.  
On the other hand, Figure 5.23 provides more evidence of the frequency and voltage oscillations 
showed in 5.22. Undeniable proof of the frequency drop that occurs during the island is given in 
the first plot where the rotor mechanical speed is shown. Hence, it is demonstrated that as has 
been stated in the previous subsection, the frequency during the island can be compared with the 
IM rotor speed in pu. As an example, for scenario II (150 Nm torque) frequency expressed in per 
unit (35.6/50 Hz) is 0.712 pu, whereas the mechanical speed (1064/1500 rpm) is 0.71 pu, 
therefore, this result is in accord with the comparison obtained in section 5.4. 
Besides that, the second plot of 5.23 shows the load torques, and as expected, before the fault are 
all positive and, after the fault the torques became negative. To a better detail, the third plot 
enlarges the second.  
From these two plots, it is seen that in case a large torque is applied (e.g., the full-load torque), 
once the CB recloses the circuit, the recovery process to reach the pre-island point operation is 
prolonged 1.4 s. However, in case low load torque is applied (e.g., no load), the motor recovers 
faster, it takes 0.2 s. 
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       Figure 5.23: Voltage and frequency comparison between scenarios with different load torque values. 
 
 
              Figure 5.24: Speed and torque comparison between scenarios with different load torques. 
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5.7 Permanent-faults 
 
As has been mentioned above in the document, the origin of the island object of study is produced 
due to a CB operation, which is preceded by a fault that occurs in the distribution network. The 
previous subsections have considered that the CB satisfactorily clears the fault and the beginning 
of the island coincides with the arc extinction. However, this might not be the case if the fault 
persists following the CB operation. Conceptually, in this thesis, a permanent fault will mean that 
the IM is feeding the fault following the CB operation. Consequently, the main aim of this section 
is to observe the effects of the IM when it is feeding a fault during the island. As a matter of fact, 
this situation frequently occurs in DNs where, following the CB operation, due to the random 
nature of the fault, it remains applied for a short period until it is dispelled (e.g., elements colliding 
in the electrical towers such as tree branches as well as other random items) or even for prolonged 
faults (e.g., a wire to the ground). Consequently, if the CB operates and the fault continues 
applied, the IM will feed the fault during the IO.  
From this point on, as explained, two options may occur following the non-satisfactorily CB 
clearing operation; after feeding the fault for a period of time (i.e., it can be a matter of few ms or 
even hundreds of ms), the fault is extinguished. Or alternatively, if the fault is permanently 
applied, the IM feeds the fault until voltage and frequency collapse. Indeed, from the protective 
point of view, this situation causes a protective misscoordination, as well as causes a high risk 
from the safety perspective. 
Having said that, this section shows and discusses five scenarios where several types of faults and 
locations have been simulated. The main data of the simulated scenarios is detailed in Table 5.6, 
whereas the simulation results are displayed in the following Figures 5.25 to 5.29.  
 
                                                     Table 5.6: Data of the simulated faults. 
Scenario 
Fault 
location 
 
Type 
fault 
  Rf 
 (Ω) 
 Fault   
current*1 
   (A) 
CB Clearing time*2 
        (ms) 
Fault extinction*3 
   (ms) 
I Node 3 SLG 0.1 473 210 540 
II Node 3 LL 0.1 1742 140 530 
III Node 3 LLLG 10 1272 160 190 
IV
 
Node 7 SLG 5 414 340 1100 
V
 
Node 3 LLG 20 485 280 680 
*1 RMS value measured at PCC1. *2 Time period between the beginning of the fault and CB opening. 
*3 Time period between the beginning of the fault and the extinction. 
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              Figure 5.25: Voltage, frequency and IM mechanical speed of permanent fault-scenario I. 
 
 
                 Figure 5.26: Voltage, frequency and IM mechanical speed of permanent fault-scenario II. 
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                Figure 5.27: Voltage, frequency and IM mechanical speed of permanent fault-scenario III. 
 
 
               Figure 5.28: Voltage, frequency and IM mechanical speed of permanent fault-scenario IV. 
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              Figure 5.29: Voltage, frequency and IM mechanical speed of permanent fault-scenario V. 
 
From the previous results, the following points can be underscored: 
 The lower deceleration occurs for SLG faults. Thus, for these faults, the IM may be 
capable of feeding the fault for a large period after the CB operation (e.g., roughly 
between 300 ms and 1 s). 
 The large deceleration occurs, as expected, for LLL faults where the contribution 
following the CB operation is negligible (e.g., roughly one or two cycles).  
 In case a SLG fault with high impedance fault occurs, the machine will be feeding the 
fault until the CB reclosing takes place. 
 By analysing the obtained simulations results, more evidence is provided to support that 
during the island, the frequency is imposed by the IM rotor speed. However, it is also 
demonstrated that depending on the severity of the fault, the voltage decreases rapidly to 
zero, and therefore, the frequency goes also to zero even when the machine is running at 
a certain speed. By observing Figure 5.27 (scenario III), voltage collapses at t = 1 s, where 
the machine is still at 1330 rpm speed at that time.  
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5.8 Conclusions 
 
This Chapter has shown the simulation results obtained from the implemented three-phase 
Matlab/Simulink model defined in the previous Chapter 4. The simulations have been divided 
into several sections, where each section seeks to address the influence of a particular factor into 
the IO. Thus, the impact of the following factors have been explored: 
 The electrical loads of the island and its load model. 
 The type of fault and its clearing time. 
 The reclosing time. 
 The load torque. 
 Permanent-faults. 
Firstly, it is crucial to underline that according to the term Peload in equation (4.46) of Chapter 4, 
the largest is this value, the largest may be the mechanical speed deceleration during the island 
when acting as a generator. The obtained results from these seven load scenarios substantiate this 
fact. On the other hand, the lower is this term, the lower voltage drops and smaller frequency 
deviations occur during the island. Besides, the load models defined in 4.3.6 (i.e., by equations 
4.30 and 4.31) proved to be crucial. Mainly, it is seen that type of load model that causes the IM 
higher deceleration is constant power; nevertheless, the one that causes less deceleration is 
constant impedance.  
Secondly, it has been demonstrated that the larger is the IM deceleration during the fault, the 
larger is the reacceleration once the fault is cleared. Given the relationship between the frequency 
during the island and the IM mechanical speed, it has been found that this post-fault reacceleration 
results in a frequency increasing during the island. To observe such effect, see the measurements 
in Figure 5.21 for a three-phase fault. On the other hand, it is seen that in case severe faults occur 
(i.e., three-phase faults close to the IM with a low resistance fault), once the CB has cleared the 
fault, voltage and frequency show a noticeable decrease in comparison with those which are less 
severe (faults with high resistance value). This can be appreciated by comparing third and fourth 
plots of Figure 5.16, where given the same type of fault and clearing time, by varying the 
resistance fault and location, results are slightly different.  
Unlike the faults simulated in 5.4, subsection 5.7 focused on permanent faults. In fact, this 
casuistry is an extended case of the fault type influence that has been analysed before. The main 
difference is that while in subsection 5.4 the fault has been considered satisfactorily cleared, in 
5.7, the IM feds the fault following CB operation. By observing the obtained results in 5.7, it can 
be concluded that following the CB operation, the IM is capable of feeding a fault during the 
island only if it is a SLG. For the rest of faults, it is observed that voltage collapses few ms after 
the CB operation and so does the frequency and this fact should not go unnoticed. Crucially, the 
voltage collapse occurs due to the IM rotor demagnetisation, and therefore, even with the IM 
running at a particular speed, it will no longer act as a generator. This effect is especially 
remarkable for severe three-phase faults.  
In third place, it has been demonstrated that the reclosing time plays a significant role and 
determines the duration of the island. By observing Figure 5.22, it can be said that the larger the 
reclosing time, the larger is the decrease in frequency and voltage. 
Fourthly, considering the measurements obtained from the simulated scenarios, the impact that 
has the term Γload in the islanding proved undeniable. This term belongs to the mechanical 
equation contained in the set of differential equations (4.39) defined in the previous Chapter 4. It 
can be concluded that the larger is this value, the larger is the deceleration of the IM during the 
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island. As a consequence, the higher is the decrease in voltage and frequency during the island 
and the larger is the time recovery after the CB reclosing. Particularly, Figure 5.23 (scenario IV 
of section 5.6) show the measurements for a full-load torque scenario, where the IM recovery 
takes 1.4 s to recover to a pre-fault point of operation. 
It is essential to underscore that a common feature observed for all simulated scenarios, is the fact 
that the larger is the IM deceleration, the larger is the voltage and frequency drop during the 
island. Furthermore, there has been more than sufficient proof of the relationship between IM 
rotor mechanical speed and the frequency during the island, which supports the analytical 
expressions of Chapter 4. 
In conclusion, some of the parameters analysed in this chapter have proven to be crucial to assess 
this IO. Note that some of these simulated scenarios will be used to validate the model in the 
subsequent Chapter 7, where the comparison between simulations results and the field 
measurements is presented.  
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Chapter 6 
Field measurements  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This section provides a summary of the field measurements and a discussion about the main 
conclusions derived from the recorded events. Two locations were selected for recording system 
variables (see Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4, section 4.2): node PCC1 (node 2), located at the beginning 
of feeder A, and node PCC2 (node 8), from which a large IMs are supplied. Although a high 
number of real events have been recorded, to not excessively extend the document, only seven 
events are analysed in this Chapter. A representative sample of these events is listed in Table 
6.1.The equipment used to record the events are the protective relays installed at both PCC1 and 
PCC2. The fault recorders register voltage and current signals with 32 samples per cycle. The 
over-current relays are equipped with an oscillography function; in PCC1 the relay registration is 
set to 400 ms, whilst in PCC2, this value is set to 600 ms.  
The main reason why each event is displayed in different figures is the memory limitation of the 
digital fault recorder; therefore, in each relay and for every event, two files are generated. Note, 
however, that for brevity purposes, the recordings from the relay located at (PCC1) will not be 
showed for all events. Measurements at PCC1, are plotted to display the type of fault that caused 
CB operation that precedes the IO. Thus, each Figure shows the measurements for each event at 
one location, which in turn, it is separated into two subfigures, named; (a) and (b). The first 
subfigure (a), shows the beginning of the event, whereas, (b), show the end of the event when the 
CB recloses the circuit.  All recorded events were caused by faults located in Feeder A, at either 
a system node or a distribution line midpoint (e.g., events 4, 7 and 9 of Table 6.1). An opening 
operation of the circuit breaker CB, see Figure 6.2, will always cause an island in which the large 
IM can continue operating after CB operation.  
Figure 4.7 in subsection 4.3.6, depicts the load profile measured at PCC1 during half month and 
the time of occurrence of some recorded events; namely events 1, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, as numbered 
in Table 6.1. For the sake of brevity, from the 9 listed events in Table 6.1, only seven will be 
displayed and discussed because, considering that they provide an acceptable sample to represent 
the phenomenon object of study. In fact, with the events discussed in this section, the required 
casuistry to achieve further validations will suffice.  
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                                           Table 6.1: A selected list of the real occurred events. 
Event Beginning Ending Fault type 
Fault 
current 
(A) 
Fault 
location 
tcl 
(ms) 
P 
(MW) 
V* 
(kV) 
1 17:01:09.776 17:01:10.636 SLG 218 Node 8 90 0.52 8.58 
2 07:44:39.544 07:44:40.354 SLG 224 Node 5 90 0.45 9 
3 04:10:35.580 04:10:36.880 LLG/SLG 707 Node 8 90 0.8 0 
4
 
18:14:54.263 18:14:55.128 SLG 240 Line 5 95 0.77 6 
5 17:13:58.281 17:13:59.096 SLG 350 Node 7 90 0.85 5 
6 09:52:38.440 09:52:39.395 SLG 300 Node 7 100 1.3 3.5 
7 11:49:04.702 11:49:05.456 SLG 367 Line 5 95 0.87 4.75 
8 16:04:15.667 16:04:16.607 LLG/SLG 360 Node 7 100 1.21 - 
9 12:24:19.550 12:24:20.469 SLG 264 Line 6 95 0.7 6.2 
* Values measured one-cycle before the CB reclosing. 
Fault current RMS current value sensed by the over-current relay at PCC1 
tcl The clearing time of the CB at PCC1 
P Active-power of feeder loads at the time the event occurs 
V RMS phase-A voltage value one-cycle before the reclosing takes place. 
6.2 Event I 
 
This event is caused by a single line-to-ground (SLG) fault at node 8 with a high-resistance fault 
of roughly 31.5 Ω. It is event 1 in Table 6.1, and is cleared by the circuit breaker CB installed at 
the head of feeder A. According to the voltages measured in both PCC1 and PCC2, the effect of 
line impedance from node 2 to 8 (11 Ω) is observable, thus, the voltage sag of 7.1 kV at node 8 
becomes 8.89 kV at the PCC1. The sequence is as follows: (i) SLG fault occurs at node 8; (ii) CB 
opens; (iii) CB recloses after a prefixed period (810 ms). Figures 6.1 and 6.2 show measurements 
recorded respectively at PCC1 and PCC2, and corresponding to the beginning and the end of Event 
I. Thus, Figure 6.1 depicts some recordings measured at the source side of PCC1. The two plots 
show frequency, voltage and current variations during a period that covers pre-fault, during-fault, 
and post-fault scenarios, including also the post-reclosing period. The beginning of the full event 
is depicted in Figure 6.1a; the upper arrows indicate the three parts of the transient process. One 
can observe voltage and current variations due to CB operation: the measured currents correspond 
to those flowing through feeder B; the frequency is that of the transmission system and remains 
constant; voltages are affected by substation grounding, and they exhibit a sag and two swells. 
Take into consideration that this can also affect the unfaulted feeder loads. Figure 6.1b plots the 
transient response caused by the reclosing operation: the current due to the re-energization, the 
effect of the current drawn due to the IM reacceleration and the effect of the out-of-phase 
reconnection are observable. On the other hand, Figure 6.2 depicts the measurements recorded at 
the MV side of the transformer at the load-side of PCC2 during the same period that Figure 6.2. 
After CB operation, the IM continues connected to the feeder, which does not longer supply active 
power. Consequently, the frequency in this part of the system steadily decreases until the reclosing 
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instant. Figure 6.2b also shows that, according to the recorded measurements, after the CB 
reclosing the IM reaccelerates until it recovers its rate speed, although, initially, the frequency 
(and the IM speed) decreases even more as a consequence of the reclosing transient. Take into 
account that frequency and voltage mismatches between the two CB terminals at the reclosing 
time will cause a transient torque that could seriously affect the machine. 
   
(a) 
 
  (b) 
Figure 6.1: Event I – Measurements at PCC1 for a SLG fault at node 8. 
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   (a) 
 
   
                                                                                  (b) 
 
                               Figure 6.2: Event I - Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG fault at node 8. 
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                                                                              (a) 
 
 
                                                                                      (b) 
 
                          Figure 6.3: Event II - Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG between nodes 6 and 7. 
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6.3 Event II 
 
This event corresponds to a SLG fault (phase c is the faulted one) that occurs at a midpoint of the 
line between nodes 6 and 7 (i.e., Line L5) with low resistance fault; it is event 4 in Table 6.1. 
Measurements obtained during the fault at PCC2 are Va = 18.92 kV, Vb = 21.6 kV and, Vc =3.8 
kV, whereas the fault current is 240 A. Figure 6.3 shows measurements recorded at PCC2. It is 
clear from Figure 6.3b that the IM is acting as a generator after the circuit breaker CB clears the 
fault. It is also noticeable that the values when the CB recloses are lower when compared with the 
previous Event I, due to the higher loads connected into the affected feeder at that instant. At the 
time occurs, the feeder loads value where 770 kW, which explains this accentuated drop in voltage 
and frequency during the island. Particularly, the voltage value one-cycle before the CB reclosing 
is 5.45 kV whereas frequency is 32 Hz. 
6.4 Event III 
 
Event III describes the particular case of a permanent fault. Therefore, it presents a different 
scenario in which the fault is prolonged due to the IM. It must be emphasized that, as stated before, 
this fact constitutes a high risk for the grid. Figure 6.4 shows measurements recorded at both PCC1 
and PCC2 corresponding to a permanent SLG fault that occurs at node 8, clearly observable by 
taking a look at the voltage sag magnitude for the faulty phase at the PCC2; see Figure 6.4 and 
event 3 in Table 6.1. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that the SLG in Feeder A appears 
simultaneously with a two-phase-to-ground (LLG) in an MV neighbor feeder. After the CB 
opening operation, the fault is fed by the IM. Figure 6.4b shows the measurements of the PCC2 
and evidences the untimely tripping operations by the head-CB. For this event, the fault was 
prolonged 800 ms after the CB aperture. The transient represented in Figure 6.4b can be divided 
into parts: the top arrows in this figure indicate the pre-fault situation, the SLG fed by the main 
grid, and the fault fed by the IM. Thus, the period of time when the fault is feed by the utility 
represents the clearing time of the CB at PCC1, and following this period, the IM is feeding the 
fault during the island. 
 
6.5 Event IV 
 
Event IV belongs to the event 7 in table 6.1 and the islanding operation is preceded by a SLG 
fault that occurred in a midpoint in line 5 which was cleared in 90 ms. By comparing voltages 
measured at PCC2 during the fault (i.e., the voltage sag and both voltage swells) for this event 
with those measured during Event II, it can be seen that the current values are noticeably larger. 
This fact underscores that the impedance seen by the fault point is higher.  In particular, this event 
occurred on 21 November 2016 at 11:49, where the power drawn at that time was 0.87 MW. 
Figures 6.5a and 6.5b show the measurements recorded at PCC2, corresponding to the beginning 
and the end of Event IV respectively. Note, that the voltage (voltage phase a) and frequency values 
measured one-cycle before the CB reclosing are 4.75 kV and 32 Hz. In the previous events, a 100 
ms of pre-fault have been displayed. Unfortunately, in this event due to a missoperation of the 
relay fault recorder in PCC2 when recording the event, no pre-fault has been recorded. 
   Chapter 6: Field measurements  
129 
 
(a) 
 
 
  
          (b) 
 
Figure 6.4: Event III – Measurements at PCC2 for a Permanent fault at node 8. 
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                 (a) 
 
 
                                                                                    (b) 
                              Figure 6.5: Event IV – Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG in a midpoint in Line 5.  
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 (a) 
 
 
                                                                                       (b) 
                                         Figure 6.6: Event V – Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG at node 7. 
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6.6 Event V 
 
Event V belongs to the event 5 in table 6.1 and the islanding operation is preceded by a SLG fault 
that occurs at node 7 which is cleared in 90 ms. By analysing voltage and current measurements 
at PCC1 as well as taking a look at the voltage sag magnitude in both PCC1 and PCC2, it can be 
seen that the fault is close to PCC2. In fact, if the voltage sag measured in PCC2 of event IV is 
compared with the one measured in event V, the voltage difference belongs to the impedance 
between buses. In this case, the resistance fault proved to be roughly 5 Ω. As for other events, the 
sequence is as follows: (i) SLG fault occurs; (ii) CB opens; (iii) CB recloses after 815 ms. Figures 
6.6a and 6.6b show the measurements recorded at PCC2, corresponding to the beginning and the 
end of event V. The power drawn by the feeder loads at that time the fault occurs, was 0.85 MW. 
Voltage (Phase a) and frequency measured one-cycle before the CB reclosing are 5 kV and 33 
Hz. Although in Figure 6.6b the frequency seems to be below this value, this frequency value 
contains a measurement error. Proof of this error, is the fact that the time period between the two 
voltage-zero-crossings have been computed before the CB reclosing, and proved to be 30.3 ms. 
 
6.7 Event VI 
 
Event VI belongs to the event 9 in table 6.1 and the islanding operation is preceded by a SLG 
fault that occurs at line L5, which is cleared in 95 ms. In this case, an additional measurement is 
available. The protective relay provisionally located at node 9 recorded an event on November 30 
at 12:24, which is compared with the other measurements at both PCC1 and PCC2. Figure 6.7 
shows depicts the recordings at PCC1 for the event beginning where the pre-fault, the SLG and 
the post-fault process can be identified. The fault current is 260 A, the voltage of the faulty phase 
measured at PCC1 is 7.55 kV, whereas the phase voltage measured at PCC2 is 5.5 kV due to the 
impedance between both nodes. Since the fault is originated upstream of the node 8, due to the 
low current flowing through impedance between nodes 8 and 9, the measured voltages at PCC2 
and at node 9 are very similar. The power drawn by the total amount of loads at the time the fault 
occurs proved to be 0.7 MW.  As for other events, the sequence is as follows: (i) SLG fault occurs; 
(ii) CB opens; (iii) CB recloses after 810 ms. Figures 6.7a and 6.7b show the measurements 
recorded at PCC1, corresponding to the beginning and the end of event VI respectively. By 
observing the third plot of Figure 6.7b, the magnetizing current due to transformers energization 
is observed following the CB reclosing at t = 0.07 s.  
Voltage and frequency measurements before, during and after the island are showed in the first 
and second plot of both Figures 6.8 and Figure 6.9 respectively. On the other hand, current 
measurements are showed in the third plot of Figures 6.8 and 6.9. The current measurements at 
PCC2 corresponds to the IMs and are displayed in Figure 6.9, whilst, the current measurements 
plotted in Figure 6.8 corresponds to the LV loads of node 19. Note that both current measurements 
are sensed at the MV side of the transformer. It should be underlined that currents at the beginning 
of Figure 6.9b are zero due to the operation of an under-voltage relay at that node. In Figure 6.7b 
the inrush current due to the energisation of the sum of MV/LV transformers in Feeder A is 
observed, similarly, in Figure 6.8b the inrush current drawn by the MV/LV transformer at node 9 
can be observed. One-cycle before the CB reclosing, voltage (for phase a) and frequency values 
are 6.2 kV and 34.1 Hz respectively.  
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                                                                                        (a) 
 
 
                                                                                         (b) 
                                       Figure 6.7: Event VI – Measurements at PCC1 for a SLG at Line L6. 
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                                                                                    (a) 
 
     
                                                                                   (b) 
                                        Figure 6.8: Event VI – Measurements at node 9
 
for a SLG at Line L6.  
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                                                                                    (a) 
 
      
                                                                                     (b) 
                                Figure 6.9: Event VI – Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG at node at line L6.  
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                                                                                    (a) 
 
 
                                                                                   (b) 
                           Figure 6.10: Event VII – Measurements at PCC2 for a SLG at node at Node 5. 
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6.8 Event VII 
 
Event VII belongs to the event 2 in table 6.1 and the islanding operation is preceded by a SLG 
fault that occurs really close to node 5 which is cleared in 90 ms. Voltages measured at PCC2 are 
slightly above when compared with those obtained in event II; Va = 4,86 kV, Vb =18.3, kV, Vc 
= 20.3 kV. Even though the fault occurred closely PCC1, the large resistance in line L4 due to the 
lower cross section, increases the fault impedance. Thence, voltage difference is attributed to this 
larger impedance, which can be proved by observing the fault currents. Thus, in event VII fault 
current is 240 A whereas in this event, is 224 A. As for all events, the sequence is as follows: (i) 
SLG fault occurs; (ii) CB opens; (iii) CB recloses after 810 ms. Figures 6.10a and 6.10b show the 
measurements recorded at PCC2, corresponding to the beginning and the end of event 
respectively. This event occurred on August 25 of 2017 at 07:44 h, where the power drawn by the 
feeder loads at that time was 0.45 MW. Voltage (Phase a) and frequency measured one-cycle 
before the CB reclosing are 9 kV and 41 Hz. 
 
6.9 Summary of events 
 
This chapter has shown a selection of events occurred in the real distribution network. From these 
measurements, the following points can be highlighted: 
 The discussed events give a realistic idea about the importance of the feeder loads which 
remain within the island at the time the fault occurs. Therefore, the occurred events with 
random load scenarios at different hours during the day, provide more evidence of this fact.  
 The discrete values obtained one-cycle before the CB reclosing for the seven analysed events 
are summarised in Table 6.2. By observing this table, it can be seen that the lowest drop in 
voltage and frequency before the CB reclosing coincides with an instant of the daily profile 
with low power demand (i.e., early in the morning). On the contrary, the larger voltage drops 
and frequency excursions, belong to the high power demand scenarios. 
 Since the only available data for the distribution operator are measurements at the MV side 
of the transformer which supplies the industry, the IM measurements such as speed or torque 
are unknown. However, given the pre-fault measured power, it can be deduced if the motors 
are operating with full-load torque or with low load torque. Hence, in some events where the 
power proved to be high, the voltage after CB drop to zero rapidly, meanwhile, when the 
power is low (i.e., motors with low load torque) voltage is prolonged during the island as can 
be seen from the previously discussed events. 
 As seen above, the faults have been cleared with a short period of time, roughly in 8 cycles. 
The relay located at the substation (i.e., beginning of the MV feeder 1) is equipped with a VI 
curve for ground-faults, and given the importance of the protective coordination between 
devices, the relay located at PCC1 has to clear the fault in the minimum time possible. 
Therefore, an instantaneous neutral setting is implemented in that relay.  
 As can be seen, SLG faults are the most common type of fault. Nonetheless, other faults such 
as LLLG or LLG faults had also been recorded during the period of analysis, but 
unfortunately, the motors were out of service at the time these faults occurred. 
 The reclosing times are those obtained from the fault recorder. Initially, the first reclosing 
was set to 0.8 s, however, as can be seen in event III, later on, the DSO prolonged to 1.3 s. 
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                                  Table 6.2: Summary of the main values of the recorded events. 
Event 
 V* 
(kV) 
   f* 
(Hz) 
I 8.58 40 
II 6 36.5 
III - - 
IV
 
4.75 32 
V 5 33 
VI 6.2 34.1 
VII 9 41 
                                        * Values obtained one-cycle before the CB reclosing. 
 
To summarise, this Chapter has showed a selection of real occurred events, which provides 
enough measurements to perform the model validation.  
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Chapter 7 
Model validation 
 
7.1 General criteria 
 
This Chapter is aimed at validating the model defined in Chapter 4 by comparing the results of 
the simulations displayed in Chapter 5 with the field measurements showed in Chapter 6. In this 
chapter, a thorough discussion about the accuracy obtained in the model validation is provided. 
Besides, the dependability of the equations defined in Chapter 4 is also analysed. 
Firstly, the validation will be discussed for each event separately, where the phase-voltages and 
the frequency are compared in separated plots. It is worth pointing that according to the previous 
Chapters, for voltage measurements, the RMS value is plotted instead of its waveform. In section 
7.6, an explanation about why the RMS value is used instead of the waveform is provided. In 
addition, the appropriateness of the measurement tools used during simulations is also discussed. 
Secondly, even though seven events have been studied in the previous Chapter, considering that 
the results of some events are very similar, only five events will be validated. From the results 
provided in Chapter 6, it can be seen that events IV and V are very similar (i.e., voltages and 
frequencies during the event are not significantly different) and the same happens for events I and 
VII, where frequency and voltage are almost equal. 
As mentioned earlier, field measurements are recorded at the MV side of the transformer (i.e., 
node 8); therefore, these are the only available measures for the distribution operator. That is the 
reason why the validation of the mechanical parameters obtained during the simulations such as 
IM rotor speed or torque cannot be made. However, from the analytical equations defined in 
Chapter 5, it is seen that the mechanical parameters of the IM are directly linked with the voltage 
and frequency during the island, thereby, with the available three-phase voltages and frequency 
measured during the occurred events, the model can be correctly validated. 
It is relevant to say that sampling frequency of the relay oscillography function is 32 samples per 
cycle, thereby, the discrete values obtained from the COMTRADE file downloaded from the 
relay, are extracted every half cycle. These values are compared with those obtained from the 
simulations for the same window of time, and therefore, regardless of the simulation time, only 
the period of time registered by the relay is compared. To fulfil a proper model validation, the 
comparison between simulated and measured signals has to be performed in the same plot. As 
mentioned above, the relay has a memory limitation and two files are generated for each event. 
Hence, in order to appropriately define the event, a collation is done every 10 ms between the end 
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of the first file and the beginning of the second. In fact, the relay triggers a 100 ms pre-fault and 
300 ms post-fault, thereby, the last values of the first file coincide with the initial values of the 
second file. The validation is separated into two subfigures, named (a) and, (b). The first subfigure 
(a), shows the frequency validation where measurements are plotted in a dashed-black line, 
whereas, simulations results are represented with a solid black line. On the other hand, the voltage 
validation is depicted in subfigures (b), where the solid lines represent the RMS phase voltages 
obtained from simulation, and dashed-lines represent measurements. Each phase voltage is 
displayed in a different colour; orange (Phase A), blue (Phase B) and green (Phase C).   
 
7.2 Validation of Event I 
 
Frequency: Figure 7.1a displays the frequency value; its oscillation demonstrates that the adopted 
model approaches the field measurement satisfactorily. At the reclosing time, the frequency is 40 
Hz. The pre-fault active-power of the Feeder A loads is 520 kW.  
Voltage: Figure 7.1b compares the three-phase voltages: simulation results are depicted in solid 
lines whilst field measurements are in dashed lines. The event starts in pre-fault conditions until 
the single line-to-ground (SLG) fault occurs in phase b at 0.1 s and it is cleared within 95 ms. 
Afterwards, the islanding operation takes place during 810 ms while the voltage (phase a) at the 
end of the event reaches 8.58 kV in both simulation and measurements. Moreover, as can be seen 
in Figure 7.1b, the simulated voltages at PCC2 during the fault (i.e., the voltage sag and both 
voltage swells) approach the field measurements with high accuracy, which not only demonstrates 
the model dependability but the feasibility of the fault location predicted in the previous section. 
Thus, phase voltages for both simulation and field measurements during the fault are as follows; 
Va = 17.3 kV, Vb = 22.1 kV and, Vc = 7.1 kV. 
 
7.3 Validation of Event II 
 
Frequency: Figure 7.2a displays the frequency; its variation demonstrates that the adopted model 
approaches the recorded event satisfactorily. At the reclosing time, the frequency is 36.5 Hz. The 
pre-fault active-power of the Feeder A loads is 770 kW when the fault occurs. 
Voltage: Figure 7.2b compares the three-phase voltages. The event starts at 0.1 s, the SLG that 
occurs in phase c is cleared within 95 ms, and the CB reclosing takes place at 1 s (i.e., 800 ms 
after the fault is cleared) with a voltage of 6 kV; such value is lower than in Event I due to the 
higher amount of feeder loads connected when the fault occurs. Moreover, as can be seen in 
Figure 7.4b, the simulated voltages at PCC2 during the fault (i.e., the voltage sag and both voltage 
swells) approach the field measurements with high accuracy. Voltages during the fault are as 
follows; Va = 18.92, kV, Vb = 21.6 kV and, Vc = 3.8 kV. 
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(a) 
 
                                                                                            (b) 
 
                                                                     Figure 7.1: Validation of Event I. 
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(a) 
 
                                                                               (b) 
 
                                                             Figure 7.2: Validation of Event II.  
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
                                                             Figure 7.3: Validation of Event III.  
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                                                                           (a) 
 
                                                                           (b) 
                                                          Figure 7.4: Validation of Event IV. 
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                                                                           (a) 
 
                                                                             (b) 
                                                     Figure 7.5: Validation of Event V. 
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7.4 Validation of Event III 
 
Frequency: Figure 7.3a shows that the simulation frequency profile approaches the recorded 
frequency satisfactorily during the event. Thus, at t = 1.1s, the frequency is 40.8 Hz for both 
simulation result and field measurement. Pre-fault active-power of Feeder A loads is 980 kW. 
Voltage: Figure 7.3b displays the three-phase voltages of a permanent fault. Firstly, the SLG fault 
(Phase a) that occurs in the Feeder A is fed by the main utility during 90 ms; the IM continue 
feeding this SLG fault after the CB has opened. It is noticeable that this type of event is highly 
risky for a DN; the IM is extending the time of fault after the CB operation. In this case, the 
voltage decreases fast, so when the CB reclosing takes place after 1.5 s (1.3 s after the fault 
clearing), the island has been de-energized. As for the frequency validation, voltage value before 
the reclosing is lower than in Event II due to the large deceleration when the IM is feeding the 
SLG fault. 
 
7.5 Validation of Event IV 
 
Frequency: In figure 7.4a the frequency comparison value is depicted. One-cycle before the CB 
recloses the circuit, the frequency is 33 Hz for both simulation and field measurement. It should 
be noted that by analysing the frequency of this event, as predicted after computing the period 
between voltage zero-crossings before the CB reclosing, the measurement observed in Figure 
6.6b contained a slight measurement error. The active-power drawn by Feeder A loads at the time 
the event occurs was 850 kW. 
Voltage: Figure 7.4b compares the three-phase voltages: simulation results are depicted in solid 
lines while field measurements are in dashed lines. The event starts in pre-fault conditions until 
the single line-to-ground (SLG) fault occurs in phase b at 0.1 s and is cleared within 90 ms. After 
the CB clearing, the islanding lasts 810 ms, meanwhile, at the time CB recloses the circuit, phase 
voltage reaches 6.2 kV in both simulation and measurements. Moreover, as can be seen in Figure 
7.4b, the simulated voltages at PCC2 during the fault (i.e., the voltage sag and both voltage swells) 
approach the field measurements with high accuracy, which again evidence not of the model but 
the feasibility of the fault location and resistance fault (Rf = 5 Ω) predicted in the previous section. 
Thus, phase voltages for both simulation and field measurements during the fault are; Va = 20.1 
kV, Vb = 4.8 kV and, Vc = 18.24 kV. 
 
7.6 Validation of Event V 
 
Frequency: In figure 7.5a, the frequency comparison value is depicted. One-cycle before the CB 
recloses the circuit, and the frequency is 34.1 Hz where the simulation accuracy can be seen. For 
this particular event, the pre-fault active-power of the Feeder A loads is 700 kW. 
Voltage: Figure 7.5b compares the three-phase voltages: simulation results are depicted in solid 
lines whilst field measurements are in dashed lines. The event starts in pre-fault conditions until 
the single line-to-ground (SLG) fault takes place in line L5 for phase b at 0.1 s and it is cleared 
within 95 ms. After the CB clearing, the islanding lasts 810 ms, meanwhile, at the time CB 
recloses the circuit, phase voltage reaches 6.2 kV in both simulation and measurements. Phase 
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voltages for both simulation and field measurements during the fault are; Va = 19.45 kV, Vb = 5.5 
kV and, Vc = 18.25 kV. 
 
7.6 Modelling features discussion 
 
This section briefly details the main features of several measurement devices which have a 
significant impact on the model validation. In this model, both voltage and current signals are 
sensed through the three-phase continuous measurement block which captures the voltage and 
current waveforms with a sample time of 50e-6 s. 
On the one hand, to obtain the RMS value, the first step is to obtain the amplitude of these signals 
with a phase-locked loop (PLL), and after that, dividing its value (by the square root of 2) with a 
gain block. To achieve such a task, we need two PLL blocks. The first PLL block (named PLL1) 
obtain the waveform of the three-phase signals as an input, and the outputs, are the frequency and 
angular speed of these signals. Once these values are obtained, the amplitude and angle of a signal 
are computed through another PLL (named PLL2) where the inputs are the three-phase signals 
(either voltages or currents) as well as the previously obtained frequency and angular speed from 
the previous PLL1. As an output, the amplitudes and angles are obtained. The parameters used in 
these PLL blocks are detailed in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2, which are displayed in Figure 7.6a and 
7.6b respectively.  
By observing the RMS phase voltage during the validation, for all events, during the recovery 
(i.e., roughly between 100 and 120 ms after the CB reclosing) a slight oscillation is observed. As 
a result of the frequency oscillation during the recovery, an overvoltage in the RMS phase voltage 
is observed (e.g., see Figure 7.5a between t = 1.1 s and t = 1.21s). However, this over-voltage in 
the RMS value is not real, is produced due to the frequency-dependence of the PLL block. Hence, 
if the voltage waveform is taken into consideration instead of its computed RMS value, this 
voltage oscillation disappears. Accordingly, Figure 7.7 pinpoints this fact, where the voltage 
waveforms for both field measurements (Figure 7.7a) and simulation results (Figure 7.7b) are 
compared. This figure shows that, for modelling purposes, the simulation results obtained from 
the model match with high fidelity the recorded events in the real DN. 
                                           
                                                                           (a) 
                                               
                                                                           (b) 
                                                  Figure 7.6: PLL Blocks of the Matlab model. 
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On the other hand, the frequency of the island is obtained from the voltage waveform through 
PLL1. If one takes a look at the frequency validations, measurement values recover faster than 
simulations. If the time between the voltage zero-crossings during this recovery is computed, both 
frequencies coincide, which evidence the influence of the regulator parameters of the PLL on the 
frequency measurements. The values of PLL1 and PLL2 are both shown in Tables 7.1 and 7.2, 
respectively. 
                                                     Table 7.1: Parameters of the PLL1. 
Parameters PLL1 Values 
Minimum frequency 20 
Initial inputs (Phase/ Frequency) (0 Deg./50 Hz) 
Regulator gains 
Kp = 180 
Ki  = 3200 
Kd = 1 
 
Time constant*(s)
 
1e-4 
Maximum freq. derivative (Hz/s) 80 
Filter cut-off frequency (Hz/s) 25 
Sample time 50e-6 s 
                                   * Time constant for for derivative action. 
 
                                                  Table 7.2: Parameters of the PLL2. 
Parameters PLL2 Values 
Initial frequency 50 Hz 
Initial frequency 20 Hz 
Initial inputs (Mag/ Degrees) (1 pu/ 0) 
Sample time 50e-6 s 
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                     (a) 
 
                                                                                      (b) 
 
          Figure 7.7: Phase voltage waveform comparison. (a) Field measurements; (b) Simulation results. 
 
7.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown and discussed the results of the model validation by comparing the 
simulation results of Chapter 5 with the real occurred events provided in the previous Chapter 6. 
The comparison is made for the three-phase voltages and frequency separately. Only voltage and 
frequency have been compared, given the fact that are the main parameters of interest during the 
IO. Although seven events have been discussed in Chapter 6, in this section, only five events have 
been validated. The reason is that two of them have very similar results. Therefore, it has been 
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considered that these five events give a close enough representative sample to prove the model 
dependability. 
 From the previously showed validations, the following aspects can be highlighted: 
 By observing both voltages and frequencies for the five validated events, the fidelity of the 
implemented model can be observed. 
 It should be stressed that this Chapter has demonstrated the high accuracy of the selected 
elements in the model. Particularly, loads modelling (i.e., both value and model type) was 
initially one of the most challenging element to model because it is random in nature. 
Nonetheless, as can be seen, the effectiveness of the selected model and values fitted the 
recorded events properly.  
 It has been observed that the PID controller parameters implemented in the PLL can slightly 
influence the simulations results. However, with the applied settings in both PLL blocks (i.e., 
PLL1 and PLL2), it has been proven that the transient object of study has been adequately 
modelled and its validation gives ample evidence of it. 
 Even though the field measurements are obtained from the fault recorder function in the relay 
which makes 32 samples/cycle and the sampling time in the simulations is much higher (50e-
6 s), the comparison between them gives an acceptable representation to perform the model 
validation. 
This chapter has proven the suitability of the implemented model and has given a thorough 
discussion regarding the appropriateness of the measurement devices of the model. 
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Chapter 8 
Voltage sags during the island 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This Chapter is aimed at describing the voltage sags that occurs during the IO. Crucially, a new 
voltage sag topology is proposed. The function that follows the magnitude of this proposed 
voltage sag will be analytically modelled and further validated. As has been recalled in Chapter 
3, voltage sags are a certain reduction in the RMS phase voltage during a certain period of time 
(e.g., typically larger than two cycles and less than 1s). The Chapter aims at contributing to the 
voltage sags studies. 
This Chapter is organised as follows: 
 The first part gives a general overview of the proposed voltage sag, where the main features 
are briefly defined (section 8.2). 
 Secondly, section 8.3 details the analytical expression that follows the magnitude of this 
novel voltage sag type.  
 The third part examines the voltage sag duration, as well as focuses on its recovery process 
once the CB recloses the circuit. See section 8.4. 
 Once the voltage sag has been analytically modelled, in order to prove its feasibility, the 
simulations carried out in chapter 5 will be used to compute the analytical expression for 
each sag magnitude. See section 8.5. 
 To provide more evidence about the validity of this new voltage sag, the previously 
validated events in Chapter 7 will also be used to compute the analytical expression for each 
sag magnitude. Besides, in section 8.6, the relationship between the influential factors of 
the analysed IO in Chapter 5 (i.e., electrical loads, the load torque and the reclosing time) 
and the analytical expression of the voltage sag magnitude is investigated. 
Lastly, the main conclusions of this chapter are provided in subsection 8.7. 
 
8.2 Main features of the new voltage sag type 
 
As can be seen from the results in the previous Chapters 5, 6 and 7, the portion of the grid 
downstream the CB, remains energised before the CB reclosing due to the large induction motors. 
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As has been already mentioned, this IO occurs due to the IMs inertia which following the CB 
transiently act as generators, thus energising the grid. The process for this IO is as follows: (i) a 
fault occurs; (ii) after a given time, the CB opens; (iii) CB recloses after the reclosing time. 
Thence, between the fault inception and the fault clearing, the fault causes a voltage sag. 
Nonetheless, the voltage sag object of study in this Chapter is the one originated by the IMs during 
the period of time between the CB opening and the reclosing. Since the magnitude of a voltage 
sag can be categorised as constant or non-constant (e.g., see characterisation in Chapter 3), the 
present type object of study belongs to the second one. Therefore, the originated voltage sag 
during the island will be defined by its magnitude, its duration and its recovery. The analytical 
expression that follows the sag magnitude during the IO is defined in section 8.3. Meanwhile, the 
duration and recovery stages are established in section 8.4. 
 
8.3 Novel voltage sag magnitude: Analytical expression 
 
The IM stator voltage dictates the analytical expression that follows the voltage sag during the 
island. To obtain the expression of this voltage sag, the IM equations have to be recalled. In 
steady-state, the IM acts as a motor and is being supplied by the grid and running at a specific 
point of operation. This point of operation is defined by the mechanical load torque coupled with 
the rotor shaft and its mechanical speed. When a fault occurs, depending on the characteristics of 
the originated voltage sag, the IM will decelerate according to its severity (i.e., voltage sag 
magnitude and duration). The pre-islanding conditions will dictate the voltage sag magnitude 
during the IO. Hence, the IMs’ initial kinetic energy is expressed as Equation (8.1) 
                                            
_ _
21
2
TKin initial pre islandingE J ω=
 
(8.1) 
where EKin_initial is the initial kinetic energy before the CB opening, JT is the total moment of inertia 
(considering the rotor inertia and mechanical load), and ωpre_islanding is the mechanical speed before 
the island is formed. Since the IMs are the only sources once the CB has opened the circuit, the 
voltages during the island are defined by the set of equations (4.39) of subsection 4.5.2 in Chapter 
4. These equations are recalled here: 
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By solving the described set of Equations (8.2) during the island, the voltage sag magnitude 
between ti and tf can be obtained. Indeed, the voltage decay following the CB has already been 
observed in the previous Chapters. In such a way, the analytical expression of this sag magnitude 
with respect to time follows the following form: 
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(8.3) 
where Vsag(t) is the RMS phase-voltage value, the scaling factor of the equation is defined by the 
pre-fault RMS phase voltage, and b is a non-dimensional coefficient which dictates the rate of 
decay. It is crucial to highlight that the scaling factor is the Vpre-fault if the first instant ti is set to 1. 
Given the natural tendency of the IM to decelerate due to the lack of grid supply, conceptually b 
coefficient has to be below zero. However, note that if b has negative values close to zero, the 
voltage remains almost constant during the island (e.g., see scenarios I, II and III of section 5.3 in 
Chapter 5). Whereas, larger negative b values correspond to higher voltage drops (e.g., see 
scenarios IV to VII).  To clearly observe such reasoning, Figure 8.1 plots the analytical function 
that follows the magnitude of this sag for a given b value.  
 
                                      Figure 8.1: Voltage sag analytical function for a given b parameter. 
As mentioned earlier, the analytical expression of the voltage sag magnitude is given by the IM 
stator voltages, which result from solving the differential equations in (8.2). By solving this set 
of equations, the non-dimensional b factor can be obtained. Particularly, in Figure 8.1, ti = 1 s, tf 
=1.5 s and, b= −1.52 s. As discussed above, this curve expression is only valid between ti and tf, 
where in fact, the voltage sag characteristic is of interest. 
 
8.4 Voltage sag duration and recovery 
 
8.4.1 Voltage duration 
Voltage sag duration is defined as the period between the disturbance inception and its recovery; 
see the first plot of Figure 2.3 in Chapter 2. Typically, the voltage sag duration depends directly 
on the protective device's settings. However, for this particular case, the voltage sag duration 
depends on the preset reclosing settings. As stated before, this reclosing operation is widely 
implemented in DN relays, principally to avoid the need to operate the CB for non-permanent 
faults manually (e.g., self-extinguished faults). Commonly, DSOs set the first reclosing between 
0.5 and 1 s. 
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8.4.2 Voltage recovery 
As has been seen in Chapter 3, sags can be caused by several events (e.g., faults, induction motors 
starting, transformer energisation, etc.). Therefore, the recovery process may differ depending on 
what factor caused the sag. If the voltage sag is caused by a fault, the recovery begins when the 
CB clears the fault current at the zero-crossing and ends when voltage is recovered (see the 
discrete recovery of Chapter 3). Nevertheless, for the other disturbances, the recovery time 
depends on each situation. 
For the voltage sag object of study, the beginning of the recovery takes place once the CB recloses 
the circuit. It is worth pointing out that, unlike other voltage sags, this sag recovers in two steps. 
The first step is due to the CB zero-crossing, which has to occur at the same instant for the three-
phases, and the second stage corresponds to the time period until the voltage reaches its pre-fault 
value. In fact, the voltage recovery during the second step is due to the high current drawn by the 
IM as a result of the out-of-phase reclosing and its subsequent IM reacceleration (due to the 
deceleration during the IO). Two factors dictate the transient caused by the out-of-phase reclosing; 
the first is the difference in voltage amplitude between the grid and island, and the second is the 
difference in frequency between the grid and island. 
 
8.5 Voltage sag magnitude: Simulation results 
 
8.5.1 Overview 
The main goal of this part is to obtain the analytical expression of the voltage sag magnitude for 
each simulated scenario in Chapter 5. Thus, since the simulations in Chapter 5 have been 
classified for each influential factor, the voltage sag analytical expression will also be computed 
here for each influential factor separately. Firstly, the originated voltage sags during the IOs in 
subsection 5.3 (electrical loads influence) are analysed. Secondly, the voltage sags obtained from 
the simulations in subsection 5.4 are evaluated (fault type influence). Thirdly, the resulting 
voltage sags obtained from simulations performed in subsection 5.5 (reclosing time impact), are 
evaluated. In fourth place, the magnitude of the voltage sags during the island from subsection 
5.6 are analysed.  
As an example, taking advantage of the implemented three-phase model, an additional scenario 
with the same conditions of Subsection 5.3 and considering the sum of electrical loads in the 
island 380 kW (mainly constant impedance) has been simulated. Figure 8.2 shows the obtained 
measurements during this simulation (only phase a is showed) where the RMS phase voltage one-
cycle before the CB reclosing is 8 kV. In that Figure, the following stages can be identified; (i) 
the pre-fault situation before t = 0.8 s, (ii) the voltage sag due to the SLG between t = 0.8 s and t 
= 1 s, (iii) the proposed voltage sag which occurs between t = 1 s and t = 1.58 s and lastly, (iv) 
the recovery process between t = 1.58 s and t = 1.72 s. The solid black line represents the 
simulation results, whereas the solid blue line represents the analytical function which describes 
the sag magnitude. Additionally, the solid blue double arrows are also added to show the voltage 
sag magnitude decrease between ti (t = 1.05 s) and tf (t = 1.58 s). 
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         Figure 8.2: Comparison between the voltage sag analytical expression and simulation results. 
 
8.5.2 Simulation results 
Voltage sags for different load scenarios 
In subsection 5.3 of Chapter 5, the influence of the electrical loads which remain during the island 
at the time the fault occurs has been investigated. Thus, by taking advantage of these simulations 
(i.e., those showed in Figures 5.2 to 5.8), the non-dimensional factor b can be obtained. The pre-
fault phase-voltage value in equation (8.3) is set to 14.4 kV.  
Figures 5.2 to 5.8 of Chapter 5 illustrate that fact that in scenarios where the amount of loads 
which remain within the island is low, the voltage drop during the island is negligible, see for 
instance scenarios I, II and III. Consequently, the voltage reduction in these scenarios cannot be 
considered as a voltage sag. Moreover, for these particular scenarios, b value is almost zero.  
Given the above assumption, the voltage sag magnitude will only be analysed and discussed for 
scenarios IV to VII. For a better understanding, the Figures of Chapter 5 will be shown again, 
thus achieving a clear idea about the function that follows the voltage sag magnitude. Given the 
negligible unbalance between phases, in these voltage comparisons, only one phase is displayed 
(phase a).  
• Voltage sag obtained from Scenario IV 
The phase voltage measurements obtained for Scenario V in subsection 5.3.1, are shown in Figure 
8.3. As can be seen in that Figure, the phase voltage one-cycle before the CB reclosing is 11.1 
kV. Figure 8.4 shows a comparison between the phase-voltage showed in the previous Figure and 
the analytical expression that follows the magnitude of this voltage sag. For this scenario, the 
coefficient b proved to be -0.61. 
• Voltage sag obtained from Scenario V 
The phase voltage measurements obtained for Scenario V in subsection 5.3.1, are shown in Figure 
8.5. As can be seen in that Figure, the phase voltage one-cycle before the CB reclosing is 9.8 kV. 
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Figure 8.6 shows a comparison between this voltage value and the analytical expression that 
follows the magnitude of this voltage sag. For scenario V, the coefficient b proved to be -0.87. 
• Voltage sag obtained from Scenario VI 
The phase voltage measurements obtained for Scenario VI in subsection 5.3.1, are shown in 
Figure 8.7. From that Figure, it is seen that the phase voltage one-cycle before the CB reclosing 
is 8.39 kV. Figure 8.8 shows a comparison between this voltage value and the analytical 
expression that follows the magnitude of this voltage sag. For this scenario, the coefficient b 
proved to be -1.316. 
• Voltage sag obtained from Scenario VII 
The phase voltage measurements obtained for Scenario VII in subsection 5.3.1, are shown in 
Figure 8.9. As can be seen in that Figure, the phase voltage one-cycle before the CB reclosing is 
6.1 kV. Figure 8.10 shows a comparison between this voltage value and the analytical expression 
that follows the magnitude of this voltage sag. For scenario V, the coefficient b proved to be -
2.06. 
                             Table 8.1: Summary of the voltage sag parameters for each simulated scenario. 
Scenario* 
 
 V*1 
(kV) 
   b 
 
 
I 13.7 -0.1 
 
II 13 -0.25 
 
III 12.4 -0.38 
 
IV
 
11.1 -0.61 
 
V 9.8 -0.87 
 
VI 8.31 -1.31 
 
VII 6.19 -2.06 
 
                                              * This notation belongs to the scenarios of Subsection 5.3.1. 
                                              *1 RMS Phase voltage (for phase a) one-cycle before the reclosing. 
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                  Figure 8.3: Results obtained from Scenario IV of subsection 5.3.1 in Chapter 5. 
 
 
                  Figure 8.4: Voltage sag magnitude analytical function and simulations of scenario IV. 
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                     Figure 8.5: Results obtained from Scenario V of subsection 5.3.1 in Chapter 5. 
 
 
                     Figure 8.6: Voltage sag magnitude analytical function and simulation of scenario V. 
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                    Figure 8.7: Results obtained from Scenario VI of subsection 5.3.1 in Chapter 5. 
 
 
                   Figure 8.8: Voltage sag magnitude analytical function and simulations of scenario VI. 
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                      Figure 8.9: Results obtained from Scenario VI of subsection 5.3.1 in Chapter 5. 
 
 
                   Figure 8.10: Voltage sag magnitude analytical function and simulation of scenario VI. 
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Voltage sags for different fault types 
In subsection 5.4 of Chapter 5, the influence of the type of fault that caused the CB operation 
before the islanding has been investigated. Since the voltage sag that occurs during the IO for an 
SLG fault has been already discussed in the previous subsection, this part aims to examine the 
voltage sag that occurs during the island for the rest faults. The results obtained from these 
simulations (i.e., those showed in Figures 5.18 to 5.21) have been used to assess the voltage sags 
during these IOs. As concluded in chapter 5, depending on the duration and severity of the fault 
that caused the CB operation (i.e., the duration and magnitude of the voltage sag due to the fault), 
voltage and frequency during the island are highly influenced. The analysed scenarios are as 
follows; LLL, LLG, LL, and LLLG. In order to help the reader, these Figures of Chapter 5, are 
renumbered and displayed again. Thus, Figures 5.18 to 5.21 are now Figures 8.11 to 8.14. All 
these Figures show the voltage sag during the island (i.e., between t = 1s and the CB reclosing (t 
= 1.5 s) 
• Island caused by a LLL fault (Scenario V in subsection 5.4 ) 
 
Figure 8.11 display the magnitude of the voltage sag caused during the island. Immediately 
following CB clearing (t = 1s), the voltage drops with respect to the voltage value during the fault. 
However, the RMS phase voltage recovers (equally for the three-phases) from the 7.3 kV at the 
beginning of the event to 8.49 kV when the CB recloses (at t = 1.5 s). The magnitude of this sag 
changes during the island, from (0.5 pu) to (0.58 pu).  Due to this recovery, the voltage sag that 
occurs during the island is categorized as non-constant. 
 
• Island caused by a LLG fault (Scenario VI in subsection 5.4 ) 
Figure 8.12 shows the voltage sag caused has a magnitude of 0.83 pu, which remains constant 
during the island. Thus, the magnitude of this sag can be classified as constant. 
• Island caused by a LL fault (Scenario VII in subsection 5.4 ) 
In Figure 8.13, it can be seen that the voltage sag caused during the island has a magnitude of 
0.88 pu, which remains constant during the island. As for the previous case, the magnitude of this 
sag can be classified as constant. 
 
• Island caused by a LLLG fault (Scenario VIII in subsection 5.4 ) 
Figure 8.4 illustrates the magnitude of the voltage sag caused during the island. Immediately 
following CB clearing (t = 1s), the voltage drops with respect to the voltage value during the fault. 
However, the RMS phase-voltage recovers during the island from the 11.3 kV at the beginning 
of the event to 12.3 kV when the CB recloses (at t = 1.5 s). Due to this voltage recovery during 
the island, this sag can be categorised as non-constant. 
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                                                   Figure 8.11: Island caused by a LLL fault. 
 
 
                                                Figure 8.12: Island caused by a LLG fault. 
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                                                   Figure 8.13: Island caused by a LL fault. 
 
 
                                                Figure 8.14: Island caused by a LLLG fault. 
 
Simulations results with different reclosing times 
In subsection 5.5 of Chapter 5, the impact of the reclosing time implemented in the relay has been 
investigated, and as expected, the larger is this time, the larger is the drop in voltage and frequency 
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during the island. This part is focused on describing the voltage sag that occurs during the island 
for different reclosing times. As has been observed, the magnitude of the voltage sag decreases 
with time, meanwhile, the curve that follows this magnitude proved to be the same. To observe 
such effect, see Figure 8.15, where, even though three times are implemented (t1= 0.5 s, t2= 0.8 s 
and t3= 1 s) and the voltage decreases from one time to the next, the function which defines the 
voltage sag is the same. This function is plotted in blue, whereas the voltage obtained from 
simulation with T1 is displayed with a dashed-black curve, T2 is displayed with a dotted-black 
curve and, T3 is displayed with a dashed-dotted-black curve. 
 
                  Figure 8.15: Voltage sag magnitude analytical expression for different reclosing times. 
 
Simulations results with different load torques 
In subsection 5.6 of Chapter 5, the impact of the load torque coupled with the IM rotor shaft has 
been investigated. From these simulations, it has been found that, as expected, the larger is the 
load torque, the larger is the drop in voltage and frequency during the island. Furthermore, by 
comparing these results with those obtained in some particular scenarios in subsection 5.3, voltage 
and frequency appear to be similar.  
This similarity between results has been identified in four cases. Particularly, given the same 
reclosing time (t = 0.5 s) and fixing the active-power of loads in the island to 80 kW, the voltage 
obtained in Scenario II of subsection 5.3.1, shows the same voltage as the scenario I of subsection 
5.6. Scenario V of subsection 5.1.3 is very close to scenario II of 5.6. The voltage in scenario III 
during the simulations for the load torque influence is between scenarios V and VI of subsection 
5.13. The last scenario of the load torque influence (scenario IV) provides exactly the same 
voltage values in comparison with scenario VII of subsection 5.1.3.  
Since the previously mentioned events are very similar, it is not necessary to reassess them to 
obtain the same voltage sag magnitude. 
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8.6 Voltage sag validation 
 
This section is aimed at determining the analytical expressions that follow the magnitude of the 
voltage sag that occurs during the island for the seven validated events in Chapter 7. For that 
matter, the parameter b required to compute the analytical expression (8.3) for each voltage sag 
magnitude is provided in Table 8.2. It has to be underscored that, for the sake of brevity, the 
values obtained from each scenario will not be displayed in Figures. Note that, Table 8.2 is a 
modified version of Table 6.1, where the sixth column provides the coefficient b of each sag 
magnitude.  
 
                   Table 8.2: List of the occurred events with the voltage sag magnitude coefficient. 
Event Beginning Ending Fault type Fault location    b 
P 
(MW) 
V* 
(kV) 
1 17:01:09.776 17:01:10.636 SLG Node 8 -1.25 0.52 8.58 
2 07:44:39.544 07:44:40.354 SLG Node 5 -1.17 0.45 9 
3 04:10:35.580 04:10:36.880 LLG/SLG Node 8 - 0.8 0 
4
 
18:14:54.263 18:14:55.128 SLG Line 5 -2.03 0.77 6 
5 17:13:58.281 17:13:59.096 SLG Node 7 -2.6 0.85 5 
6 09:52:38.440 09:52:39.395 SLG Node 7 - 1.3 3.5 
7 11:49:04.702 11:49:05.456 SLG Line 5 -2.73 0.87 4.75 
8 16:04:15.667 16:04:16.607 LLG/SLG Node 7 - 1.21 - 
9 12:24:19.550 12:24:20.469 SLG Line 6 -2 0.7 6.2 
 
8.7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has investigated the voltage sags that occur during the IO under several scenarios. 
Since in Chapter 5 the simulated scenarios were divided into four groups considering each 
influential factor, the present voltage sags evaluation has been organized according to that 
classification; (i) power of loads in the island, (ii) the type of fault that originated the island, (iii) 
the reclosing time and, (iv) load torque. By analysing the full range of voltage sags obtained in 
this Chapter, the following points can be stressed: 
 This Chapter has evaluated the voltage during the island under several conditions and has 
concluded that a new voltage sag can be categorised. Due to the lack of supply following the 
CB clearing operation, voltage decays with time during the island, and therefore, the 
magnitude of this voltage sag is considered as non-constant. Thus, this voltage sag enhances 
the voltage sags with non-constant magnitude provided in Chapter 3. 
 By considering the results in 8.5.2, the high fidelity of the predicted analytical function has 
been demonstrated. Note that for scenarios where the sum of all electrical loads in the island 
is low, the voltage drop during the island is negligible, and consequently it makes no sense to 
compute any function to model a voltage sag.  Importantly, it has been observed that the 
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proposed function to model the voltage sag magnitude proved valid for any tested scenario 
only if the IO is caused by a SLG. On the other hand, if another fault originates the island, 
the voltage sag magnitude does not follow this function. For instance, it is seen that during 
the two-phase faults (both LLG or LL faults), the voltage remains constant at a specific value 
during the fault, whereas, for the three-phase faults (either LLL or LLLG) the voltage recovers 
during the island.  
 For the proposed voltage sag, the other features such as duration and recovery have also been 
defined. The duration of this voltage sag depends on the reclosing time, which commonly 
ranges between 0.5 s and 1.3 s. Secondly, the recovery takes place in two steps, where the 
first coincides with the CB reclosing. The second step begins with this CB reclosing and ends 
when the voltage is recovered. 
 It has been observed that the reclosing time has no effects into the function that follows the 
voltage sag magnitude. The larger is the reclosing time, the larger is the voltage drop, but the 
function is the same. 
 The dependability of the proposed analytical expression to model this voltage sag, have been 
demonstrated by taking advantage of the already validated scenarios in Chapter 7.  
By carefully observing the obtained results, the main goal of this Chapter has been accomplished. 
Thus, a new voltage sag has been analytically modelled and subsequently validated by both 
simulations and real measurements.  
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Chapter 9 
Islanding detection 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
By observing the results of the previous Chapters 5, 6 and 7, it has been proven that, even with 
no generation units, due to large induction motors, an IO may occur in a distribution network. 
Therefore, during the time period between the CB fault clearing and its reclosing operation (i.e., 
roughly between 0.5 s and 1s) the induction motors are energising the grid, thus forming an island.  
Indeed, IOs are generally expected in case DG units energise the grid following the CB operation. 
Nevertheless, the current approach is slightly different and utterly unexpected for the DSO. As 
stated in Chapter 2, in order to prevent unintended IOs, several DSO guidelines force the DG to 
trip after the occurrence of the fault. Essentially, the obligation to remove these DG units is 
because the DSO does not supervise these islands. Among the available guidelines, a very useful 
one is the IEEE Std. 1547, which forces the DG to trip before 2 s after the loss of mains has 
occurred. In IOs with DG, the balance between the generation capacity and the amount of loads 
plays a pivotal role, thereby, both voltage and frequency during the island depend on this 
relationship. Conversely, for the island object of study in this thesis, voltage and frequency during 
the island are influenced by four factors. These factors have been cited several times in the text 
and are listed again; (i) the power drawn by the loads which remain in the island, (ii) the type of 
fault that originated the CB opening, (iii) the load torque coupled with the IM and lastly (iv), the 
reclosing time.  
As has been stated earlier, to prevent these undesired events, ID methods can be classified into 
three main types (e.g. active-based methods, passive-based methods and communication-based 
methods). Focusing on the passive-based methods, its guiding principle is based on using the 
available local measurements at the target position where the source is located. At this point, it is 
worth recalling the most common parameters used in the passive-methods, which fundamentally, 
are the following ones: the rate-of-change of frequency (ROCOF), the rate of change of voltage 
(ROCOV), under/over voltage (UVP/OVP), under/over frequency (UFP/OFP), the rate-of-change 
of active and reactive power (ROCOP/ROCOQ) or the vector surge (VS) protection. Other ID 
indicators have been proposed in the available literature, see for instance [9.1-9.2]. However, only 
the previously mentioned parameters will be used in this thesis, which in turn, are the most 
commonly used for these purposes [9.3-9.6]. 
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As a result of the aforementioned, the main goal of this Chapter is to implement a technique which 
merges several passive-based methods used for ID with an additional criterion. The latter has 
been implemented to fulfil the maximum efficiency in islanding detection. Besides, the most used 
indicators in the passive-based ID methods will be tested and discussed to make a comparison 
with the proposed hybrid islanding detection method (HIDM). To obtain the tripping times for 
both the passive-based methods and the HIDM, several scenarios will be simulated using the 
Matlab/Simulink model described in Chapter 4. 
This Chapter is organised as follows: 
 A brief review of the main used settings in the passive-based ID methods is done in section 
9.2. 
 The proposed algorithm is described in section 9.3. 
 In subsection 9.4, the results obtained from the performed simulations are shown. In it, a 
thorough discussion regarding the resulting tripping times for each simulated scenario is 
provided. Moreover, the evidence required to support this new technique has been obtained 
by testing both islanding and non-islanding scenarios. 
Eventually, the main conclusions of this chapter are summarised in section 9.5. 
 
9.2 Passive-based methods review 
 
As has been dscribed above, the local measurements are the cornerstone of a passive-based 
method. Nevertheless, with the sensed variables at the target position, several indicators can be 
computed. This section reviews the main principles of some passive-based ID methods that will 
be used in the hybrid technique proposed in this thesis. It is essential to mention that the ID has 
been the subject of many research studies; see, for instance, [9.7]. The most common indicators 
are listed down below: 
1. Under/Over Frequency (81U/81O) 
Frequency values are usually captured every cycle, at voltage zero-crossing. The classical 
frequency thresholds for a 50 Hz system are 50.5 Hz for over-frequency values and 49.5 Hz for 
under-frequency values. As a rule of thumb, relays generate a trip signal with a delay after any of 
these thresholds has been exceeded. Both under/over frequency protection can be implemented 
using either a time curve or a fixed time. The tripping time can be adjusted between 0.16 s for the 
highest deviation, and 300 s for the minimum deviation; see [9.8]. For variations beyond 95% of 
rated the frequency, a 0.16 s fixed-time delay is used. Slight frequency deviations in transmission 
levels may involve frequency nuisance tripping with this method.  
2. Under/Over Voltage (27/59) 
Voltages are measured to obtain the RMS value of the phase-to-ground voltages. Commonly used 
voltage thresholds are set to 1.2 pu for over-voltages and 0.8 pu for under-voltages. Voltage 
deviation protection can be set using either a time curve or a fixed time. Typically, the delay is 
set to 100 ms for both over- and under-voltage protection. Nonetheless, for voltages between 1.1 
pu and 1.2 pu, the time delay is set to 500 ms. A succinct assessment concerning voltage curves 
for ID detection is presented in [9.9]. 
3. ROCOF (81R)/ROCOV 
ROCOF and ROCOV are methods based on the derivative with respect to time of respectively 
frequency and voltage measurements. Usually, df/dt is measured over a few cycles, generally 
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between 2 and 50, and its value is sent to a low-pass filter to remove the high-frequency 
harmonics. A value of 1.2 Hz/s is seen as an inadmissible frequency rate of change. This value 
typically ranges from 0.1 to 3.5 Hz/s; see, for instance, [9.10-9.11]. A minimum voltage 
supervision is also implemented in ROCOF relays; commonly 0.85 pu. In this thesis, the 
frequency is measured every cycle during four cycles, and the values are stored in order to 
compute the derivative, which is obtained with the following expression: 
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  (9.1) 
where Ti is the period of each of the four cycles after the first frequency value is captured; 
subindices 1 and 5 refer respectively to the first and the last values that are measured to compute 
the derivatives. Although measurements are available for a minimum of four cycles, false tripping 
could occur if only four cycles were selected. Here, a 7-cycle supervision is considered; for a 50 
Hz power frequency, this is a time delay of 140 ms, a widely used setting in ROCOF relays. 
Voltage derivative will be similarly computed as for the ROCOF relay. A typical rate-of-change 
of 0.25 pu/s is used with a time delay of 140 ms; however, as for the ROCOF, a 140-ms delay 
will be used in the present work for this derivative. 
4. ROCOP/ROCOQ (32R) 
The rate-of-change in both active and reactive powers is a reasonable indicator for islanding 
detection, considering that, except for a balanced situation, it competes favourably for a quick IO 
detection. The active and reactive power derivatives are computed as follows: 
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Summary of settings 
The settings used for each method in this particular study and the main features of each technique 
are summarized in Table 9.1. These settings have been adopted taking into account the settings 
commonly used in ID methods, like those described before, and settings based on field experience 
from prescribed events. 
 
9.3 HIDM features 
 
9.3.1 Overview 
This section is aimed at detailing the performance of the proposed HIDM. Essentially, the new 
hybrid method merges several existing passive ID principles, reviewed in the previous section, 
with a directional criterion in order to achieve high accuracy and avoid false tripping events. 
Figure 9.1 summarises the steps to be made from the measurements needed to detect an islanding 
scenario. The rest of this section is dedicated to describe the variables involved in the method, the 
settings, and the architecture of the implemented HIDM.                                         
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                                     Table 9.1: Parameters used in the passive-based ID methods. 
ID method 
(ANSI/IEEE code) 
            Principle Settings 
 
    Time-delay  
          (ms) 
81U Under-Frequency supervision 47.5 Hz 120 
81O Over-Frequency supervision 52.5 Hz 120 
27 Under-Voltage supervision 0.8 pu 120 
59
 
Over-Voltage supervision 1.2 pu 120 
ROCOF Frequency derivative with 0.85 pu 
voltage supervision 1.2 Hz/s 140 
ROCOV Voltage derivative 0.25 pu/s 140 
ROCOP Active power derivative 0.3 MW/s 140 
 
                                                   
              Figure 9.1: Flowchart to compute the state variables and the pattern for islanding detection. 
 
9.3.2 Directional criterion 
Directional protection is widely adopted for selectivity purposes. According to ANSI-IEEE 
terminology, directional power protection can be either 32P or 32Q (i.e., for active and reactive 
power, respectively). In addition, 32R protection can be used to prevent reverse power. The 
directional protection proposed in this work uses the direct-sequence angles of both voltage and 
current. The conditions proposed to detect IO are based on the following restrictions: 
                                                                      190 270I< ϕ <  
  (9.3) 
where V and I are the voltage and current angles, respectively, while the subindex “1” indicates 
direct sequence. 
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The zone of actuation of this detection method is displayed in Figure 9.2, in which the angle of 
the direct-sequence voltage is compared with the angle of the direct-sequence current: the system 
will trip when the angle is between 90 and 270 degrees. 
                                                              
                        Figure 9.2: Graphical representation of the adopted directional protection. 
9.3.3 Input, outputs and intermediate variables 
Data analysis is one of the main tasks of the proposed method, for which the classification of local 
measurements is essential. This process involves two steps: the first one is focused on sensing the 
electrical magnitudes (independent variables); the second one provides the output (dependent 
variable); that is, islanding/non-islanding condition. To carry out these tasks, voltage and current 
values are measured every cycle (i.e. every 20 ms). The time-domain vector of the state variables 
is defined as follows: 
                                   1, 1, 1 1, 2 1, 3 1,[ ( )] [ ( ), ( ), ( ), , ( )]j T j j j jk k k k k nX t x t x t x t x t= ⋯      (9.4a) 
                                   2, 2, 1 2, 2 2, 3 2,[ ( )] [ ( ), ( ), ( ), , ( )]j T j j j jk k k k k nX t x t x t x t x t= ⋯      (9.4b) 
                                   ⋮  
                                   ⋮  
                                   ⋮  
 
                                       8, 8, 1 8, 2 8, 3 8,[ ( )] [ ( ), ( ), ( ), , ( )]j T j j j jk k k k k nX t x t x t x t x t= ⋯      (9.4k) 
 
where is the mth state vector for a particular jth event at the kth target location. These forms can 
also be annotated by means of the following transposed 8-dimension vector expression: 
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As mentioned earlier, this vector captures the time-domain variables each cycle (20 ms) during 
the desired period tn. The state variables for every jth event at every kth location, are defined in 
Table 9.2; see also Fig. 9.1. Considering N events, the matrix expression of the whole range of 
events can be expressed as a N × 8 matrix: 
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Input and output variables for a given jth event at a kth target location, are stored together through 
the following two-dimension vector S: 
                                                            { },( )k kS X Y=  
  (9.6) 
where Yk is the independent vector containing a binary output for every jth event at a kth location: 
Yk = 1 for an islanding event and Yk = 0 for a non-islanding event. The state vector Xk is obtained 
from the measurements of the three-phase voltages and currents, (Va, Vb, Vc) and (Ia, Ib, Ic), as 
shown in Figure 9.2. Crucial information derived from these inputs are the angles of the phase 
voltages (Va, Vb, Vc) and currents (Ia, Ib, Ic). 
                                                           Table 9.2: State variables for ID. 
Symbol Variable 
x1 ΔV Voltage deviation (pu) 
x2 Vφ  Voltage angle (Deg.) 
x3 Iφ  Current angle (Deg.) 
x4 Δf Frequency deviation (Hz) 
x5 df/dt ROCOF (Hz/s) 
x6 dV/dt ROCOV (pu/s) 
x7 dP/dt ROCOP (MW/s) 
x8 dQ/dt  ROCOQ (MVAr/s) 
 
9.3.4 Architecture 
The architecture of the proposed HIDM is based on the decision tree (DT) shown in Fig. 9.3. The 
tree is organised as follows: firstly, the voltage and frequency magnitude deviations are measured; 
next, the algorithm estimates the state derivatives (d/dt) to avoid undesirable false-tripping 
operations and achieve the minimum non-detection zone (NDZ); the last step focuses on 
implementing the directional criterion, which assures high feasibility in preventing all scenarios, 
even those where voltage and frequency remain within the threshold settings. 
Since a DT is a binary tree constructed by groups of datasets, the three mentioned stages are 
divided into several levels. To achieve the maximum precision in the settings of each level, the 
DT has been created by analysing a wide range of previous events captured for a two-year period 
in the real DN as well as considering the full range of simulated scenarios in the present study. 
As can be seen from Figure 9.3, the first six-level settings of the DT belong to the passive-based 
settings described in Table 9.1. 
In order to avoid misclassification and nuisance tripping, the current HIDM consists of a seven-
level DT and considers a seven-cycle parameter cluster. Besides, the DT assumes a system with 
multiple-feeders; three in this work. This fact underscores that disturbances on neighbour feeders 
can cause false-islanding detection and, consequently, false tripping. To date, most of the research 
studies focused on ID, have only considered one MV feeder. The present HIDM correctly deals 
with this issue. 
   Chapter 9: Islanding detection 
 
176 
 
                                                            Figure 9.3: Seven-level HIDM. 
Matlab implementation of the HIDM 
The seven-level HIDM used to detect the IO has been implemented in the previously described 
model in Chapter 4.To achieve a better understanding; Figure 9.4 depicts this model with the 
additional blocks. As can be seen in this Figure, the HIDM block is used to trip the CB located at 
PCC2 (i.e., the interconnection between the industry and the grid) where the IMs are connected. 
The output of the HIDM algorithm (purple-block in Figure 9.4) is sent to the CB.  
On the other hand, the blue-block located at the bottom-right part of this Figure is the one which 
receives the independent variables (i.e., three-phase voltages and currents from measurement 
blocks) and compute the state variables Xk of the HIDM algorithm to obtain the dependent variable 
Yk (i.e., (1) for islanding or (0) for non-islanding). Particularly, In1, In2 and In3 are the three RMS 
phase voltages, In4 is the frequency obtained from the voltage signal through a PLL block and, 
In5 is the frequency derivative obtained from the derivative block. The latter block implements a 
low-pass filter to avoid high-frequency transients. Finally, In6 and In7 are the active and reactive 
powers computed through the previously obtained voltages and currents. The content of this block 
is detailed in the following Figure 9.5. 
As stated above, the HIDM is based on a DT which merges several passive-based protective 
functions such as UVP/OVP (27/59), UFP/OFP (81m/81M), ROCOF (81R), ROCOV, ROCOP 
and ROCOQ with an additional directional criterion. As can be seen in Figure 9.5, each passive-
based technique is computed in a separate block. Therefore, each one will be shown in a different 
Figure. 
Voltage supervision is computed in one block (both under and over-voltage) and the detail of this 
protection is displayed in Figure 9.6. In this block, apart from the UVP and OVP, a widely adopted 
additional supervision criterion has been added. This supervision checks if the voltage is between 
1.1 pu and 1.2 pu during 500 ms. Note that the whole range of simulated scenarios in this Chapter 
have been carried out with a reclosing time of 0.5 s; thereby, this makes this protective setting 
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incapable of tripping. However, this supervision may be really useful in scenarios with larger 
reclosing times.  
The Frequency supervision is carried out for both under and over frequency through the block 
depicted in Figure 9.7. This protection trips for either a frequency deviation above or under the 
threshold and these signal is passed through a delay block aimed at applying the 120 ms delay for 
this supervision. Thus, if the input is true, it applies a time-delay to this signal, on the other hand, 
if this become false, the output is false with no time-delay. ROCOF protection is implemented as 
in Figure 9.8. It can be seen that a minimum voltage of 0.8 pu is required to trip. The ROCOV 
protection is implemented in a similar way as for the ROCOF, see Figure 9.9. Note that the rate 
of change of voltage has to exceed the threshold for the three phases. 
 
                                                   Figure 9.4: Matlab model with the proposed HIDM. 
 
 
                                  Figure 9.5: Matlab implementation of the seven-level HIDM block. 
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                                           Figure 9.6: Scheme of the UVP/OVP protection. 
                         
                                             Figure 9.7: Scheme of the UFP/OFP protection. 
 
                                                    Figure 9.8: Scheme of ROCOF protection. 
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                                              Figure 9.9: Scheme for ROCOV protection. 
 
                                                                          (a) 
 
                                                                          (b) 
                                               Figure 9.10: ROCOP and ROCOQ protections. 
The rate of change of both active and reactive power are both computed as can be seen in Figure 
9.10. 
In order to avoid a false-tripping due to the initial transient when the simulation begins, the clock 
must be larger than 0.5s. Similarly, to prevent undesired trappings after the island, for the 
derivatives, the clock must be lower than 1.5 s to initiate a trip. 
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By observing Figure 9.5, each parameter belongs to one level of the DT, where the deviation is 
compared to each threshold. In the case at least one of them is exceeded, the directional criterion 
is then applied, and if the latter proves to be false, it is a non-islanding event. On the contrary, if 
the directional criterion is true, the islanding is detected and subsequently, the CB tripping is 
ordered. Note that if any indicator becomes true, the last stage is again the directional criterion. 
By observing the last block in Figure 9.5, the obtained signal from the HIDM algorithm is 
compared with zero. Since a zero signal is required to open the CB, if the HIDM becomes true, 
this comparison allows us to obtain a zero for tripping. 
9.3.5 Time constraints in islanding detection 
A crucial limitation is the available time to detect the IO; as commented above, the preset 
reclosing time is commonly set between 0.5 s and 1 s. It is important to keep in mind that, by 
default, it is assumed that the substation CB will satisfactorily clear the fault. Thus, only 
temporary faults are considered. The mechanical time delay will last three cycles for both the 
substation CB (node PCC1 in the test system; see Fig. 1) and the CB at the target position (node 
PCC2). Considering the foregoing, the maximum time available to detect the IO and trip the CB 
at the target location may be computed as follows: 
                                                                 max clr rec CBt t t t= + +    (9.8) 
where tclr is the clearing time, which, in turn, depends on the selected relay characteristic curve as 
well as on the sensing time, trec is the reclosing time, which is set in the relay of the head CB 
(PCC1), and tCB is the mechanical time delay for the head CB after the relay orders the reclosing 
operation. 
 
9.4 Simulations 
 
9.4.1 Overview 
This section presents the study carried out to test the performance of the proposed HIDM and 
compare it with the ID techniques described above. As has been seen in the previous Chapters, 
following the CB opening, due to the lack of supply, the equilibrium between torques is broken, 
the IM speed derivative becomes negative and, thereby, only the dynamic torque (i.e. the torque 
due to the non-zero derivative of the rotor speed) drives the machine. In order to observe the 
influence of each factor towards the tripping times, the simulations have been classified into three 
main groups. The first group focuses on analysing the impact of the loads which remain on the 
island at the time the fault occurs. The second group analyses the IO considering different types 
of faults. Lastly, the third group is aimed at determining the tripping times for both islanding and 
non-islanding events, thus, the dependability of the proposed method will be demonstrated.  
As a general rule, considering the massive amount of signals and computed parameters obtained 
during the simulations, to not extend excessively the document, only the tripping times obtained 
for each case will be provided. However, to substantiate these tripping times, the parameters 
obtained from each passive-based protection will be displayed for the second case of each group, 
thus showing how the variables are computed. The measurements obtained from the simulations 
for each protective function will be organized in different figures. Hence, the first figure will show 
the voltage values (i.e., the three-phase voltages and its time derivatives) so as to observe the 
results of the UVP/OVP and ROCOV protections. The second figure will show the frequency and 
its derivative to observe both UFP/OFP and ROCOF protection results. In the third figure, the 
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active and reactive-power derivatives will be shown to observe both ROCOP and ROCOQ 
protection results. Lastly, a fourth figure will show the active-power to observe the effectiveness 
of the directional criterion. Summarising, the simulations have been divided into these three 
principal groups:  
1. Simulations aimed at estimating the tripping times by assuming fixed fault conditions and 
using different feeder loads values. As assumed in the previous Chapters, the load value 
specified in this subsection is the sum of all LV loads that remain within the island at the 
time the fault occurs. 
2. Simulations aimed at estimating the tripping time under different types of faults and fixing 
a particular value for feeder loads. 
3. Islanding and non-islanding events aimed at proving the dependability of the proposed 
HIDM and observing the nuisance tripping of the conventional ID methods for these 
particular scenarios. 
The hypothesis that have been considered for all scenarios are listed hereunder: 
• Simulations have been performed using the described three-phase Matlab model described in 
Chapter 4. 
• A constant impedance load model has been considered for all simulated scenarios.  
• The power factor for all loads is set to 0.98 (lg.). Simulations have been carried out within 
the MATLAB/Simulink environment, taking advantage of the toolbox SimPowerSystems, 
and using a discrete mode with a fixed sample time of 50·μs. 
• For all simulated scenarios, the tripping times are computed with respect to the beginning of 
the event. 
• The simulation time is set to 2 s and the faults are initiated at 0.9 s for all scenarios. 
• To observe the tripping time of each technique, the CB has been is disabled, otherwise if the 
CB is opened, the IMs would be removed from the grid. Hence, the obtained times belong to 
the time that each technique would have tripped separately. It should be noted that each 
technique is equipped with a time delay block (i.e., each method with its particular delay). In 
case the input is true (i.e., the threshold is exceeded for a particular method) this block applies 
a delay to the input signal, nevertheless, if this become false, the output is false with no delay. 
That is the reason why in some Figures, several protection functions relapse and following a 
certain time are again activated. However, due to the above mentioned, the tripping time is 
considered as the first time that a tripping signal is activated. 
9.4.2 Tripping times for different feeder load scenarios  
The first group of simulations are based on the following considerations: 
1. A SLG fault with a fault resistance of 5 Ω occurs at node 7, the CB located at PCC1 
(header of feeder A) is set with a very inverse overcurrent curve for phase-faults (50) and 
extremely inverse curve for ground-faults (50N). Therefore, the fault is cleared within 
100 ms. 
2. The reclosing time is set to 0.5 s. 
3. No mechanical load is applied to the IM. 
The following four scenarios have been simulated: 
• Case 1: Feeder load is set to 426 kW. 
• Case 2: Feeder load is set to 75 kW. 
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• Case 3: Feeder load is set to 64 kW. 
• Case 4: No-load scenario. 
The resulting tripping times for these four cases are shown in Table 9.3. The results of both 
voltage (first plot) and frequency (second plot) obtained from the simulations are displayed in 
Figure 9.11. Besides, to demonstrate the feasibility of the tripping times summarised in this table, 
for each case, the resulting tripping signals are provided (see Figures 9.12-9.15). As mentioned 
earlier, for the sake of brevity, the obtained values of each block (i.e., each passive-based values) 
will only be displayed for one case, particularly case 2. Thereby, Figures 9.16-9.19 show the 
results obtained during the simulation of case 2. 
                                                    Table 9.3: Tripping times of subsection 9.4.2. 
ID method 
(ANSI/IEEE code) 
 
Case 1 
(ms) 
 
Case 2 
(ms) 
 
Case 3 
(ms) 
 
Case 4 
(ms) 
 
81U   270   465   544 No Trip  
81O No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip  
27   359 No Trip No Trip No Trip  
59
 
No Trip No Trip No Trip  No Trip  
ROCOF No Trip   308   320 No Trip  
ROCOV   404 No Trip No Trip   780  
ROCOP No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip  
HIDM No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip  
 
 
                                Figure 9.11: Voltage and frequency from simulations of subsection 9.4.2. 
                  A novel assessment of unintentional islanding operations in distribution networks 
183 
 
                                       Figure 9.12: Tripping times for Case 1 of subsection 9.4.2. 
 
 
                                        Figure 9.13: Tripping times for Case 2 of subsection 9.4.2. 
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                                   Figure 9.14: Tripping times for Case 3 of subsection 9.4.2. 
 
 
                                          Figure 9.15: Tripping times for Case 4 of subsection 9.4.2. 
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                 Figure 9.16: UVP/OVP and ROCOV protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.2. 
 
 
                 Figure 9.17: UFP/OFP and ROCOF protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.2. 
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                  Figure 9.18: ROCOP and ROCOQ protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.2. 
 
 
                Figure 9.19: Directional criterion protection results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.2. 
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Results discussion 
Voltage supervision only trips for under-voltage in case 1, because for the rest of cases, voltage 
do not exceed the established thresholds.  
The UFP/OFP trips for cases 1, 2 and 3; nevertheless, in case 4, this protection does not trip.  
By observing the state derivatives, ROCOF relay trips for cases 2 and 3 and does not trip for cases 
1 and 4. In case 1 this protection does not generate the trip because the voltage is below 0.8 pu, 
whereas in case 4, the frequency remains stable at 50 Hz during the island and, its rate of change 
is close to zero. On the other hand, the ROCOV protection trips for cases 1 and 4, the first tripping 
belongs to a negative derivative (due to voltage decrease) and the second is due to a positive 
derivative (i.e., voltage increasing). Lastly, the rate of change of active and reactive powers do 
not trip neither during the fault nor during the island.  
Moreover, these results reveal that, as expected, the lower is the feeder load value, the lower is 
the voltage and frequency deviation during the island. Remember that faults are cleared within 
100 ms, which avoids tripping by UVP/OVP.  
It is worth noting that in the fourth case only the HIDM is capable of undertaking such task within 
the time constraint.  
9.4.3 Tripping times for different types of faults 
The second study aims at estimating the tripping times when different types of faults originate the 
island. The fault position is always node seven and all faults are simulated with a resistance value 
of 5 Ω. Moreover, the following hypothesis have been considered for all cases: 
1. The sum of all LV feeder loads is set to 200 kW. 
2. IM is under no-load torque at the time the fault occurs. 
3. A clearing time of 200 ms is assumed. Nevertheless, it is essential to keep in mind that 
the fault current depends on the type of fault, and for the same protection settings and 
curves, this time may slightly vary. The used curves in these simulations are those 
described in subsection 4.3.5 of Chapter 4. 
The main goal of this section is to study the resulting tripping times when the island is caused by 
different types of faults. Thus, each case belongs to a particular type of fault: 
• Case 1: SLG fault. 
• Case 2: LL fault. 
• Case 3: LLG fault. 
• Case 4: LLL fault. 
The resulting tripping times are shown in Table 9.4 whilst in Figure 9.20, the resulting phase 
voltage (first plot), IM mechanical speed (second plot) and, frequency (third plot) are depicted. 
Additionally, for each case, the tripping times are represented in a separate figure. In these eight 
figures (i.e., Figure 9.21 to 9.24), the tripping time and the duration of the event are displayed. 
Thereby, the effectiveness of each method can be observed.  
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                                                 Table 9.4: Tripping times of subsection 9.4.3. 
ID method 
(ANSI/IEEE code) 
 
Case 1 
(ms) 
 
Case 2 
(ms) 
 
Case 3 
(ms) 
 
Case 4 
(ms) 
 
81U 412  466   474 620  
81O No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip  
27 120  120   120 120  
59
 
120 No Trip   120 No Trip  
ROCOF 362 No Trip No Trip No Trip  
ROCOV 146 No Trip   142 143  
ROCOP No Trip No Trip  No Trip  No Trip  
HIDM No Trip No Trip  No Trip  No Trip  
 
 
 
               Figure 9.20: Voltage, mechanical speed and frequency from simulations of subsection 9.4.3. 
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                                         Figure 9.21: Tripping times for Case 1 of subsection 9.4.3. 
 
 
                                          Figure 9.22: Tripping times for Case 2 of subsection 9.4.3. 
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                                      Figure 9.23: Tripping times for Case 3 of subsection 9.4.3 
. 
 
                                      Figure 9.24: Tripping times for Case 4 of subsection 9.4.3. 
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               Figure 9.25: UVP/OVP and ROCOV protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.3. 
 
 
                 Figure 9.26: UFP/OFP and ROCOF protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.3. 
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                   Figure 9.27: ROCOP and ROCOQ protections results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.3. 
 
 
                Figure 9.28: Directional criterion protection results for case 2 in subsection 9.4.3. 
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Results discussion 
From these results, it is observed that the type of fault plays a pivotal role, and depending on the 
severity of the fault, the IM post-fault reacceleration affects the frequency during the IO. Thus, 
the highest reacceleration takes place for the LLL faults, whereas the lowest one occurs for the 
SLG faults. As a consequence, the frequency drop during the island, as expected, is lower than 
the one caused by a SLG. A proof of this effect is that the larger tripping for UFP protection takes 
place for a LLL fault.  
The clearing time also plays a significant role. In this case, the tripping time of the substation 
protection is set to 200 ms, which makes the UVP at the target location to trip before the substation 
clearing time. Moreover, due to the originated voltage sag, ROCOV protections also trip if the 
clearing times are larger than 140 ms, which causes nuisance tripping for faults upstream the CB 
located at PCC1. It is noteworthy to mention that ROCOV tripping is initiated if the rate of change 
of voltage exceeds the threshold for the three phases. Therefore, no ROCOV tripping occurs in 
the second case (LL fault); however, for the rest of the cases it trips in approximately 140 ms. 
Figures 9.25-9.28 provide evidence of how these tripping times are obtained. 
Another interesting insight is the post-fault voltage recovery; the voltage caused by SLG faults 
recovers rapidly. Meanwhile, those caused by three-phase faults recover more slowly. 
 
9.4.4 Testing the NDZ capabilities of the HIDM  
All the case studies analyzed in previous sections assume an islanding scenario caused by a fault 
located upstream the PCC. Actually, the voltage at the IM location can exhibit deviations caused 
by events, located at neighbour feeders and even at the transmission system, that do no create an 
islanding condition. In order to better analyse the performance of the proposed HIDM, new 
scenarios have been simulated. First, some situations in which an islanding scenario does not 
occur: 
• Case 1: Three-phase voltage sag with 0.9 pu voltage drop and 400 ms duration 
produced by IMs starting located at the same MV feeder. 
• Case 2: Solid SLG fault at an MV-neighbor feeder (Feeder 1) and cleared in 300 ms. 
• Case D3: Progressive frequency drop due to a lack of active-power generation as a 
consequence of a fault at the HV transmission system. The MV level experiences a sag 
of 0.3 pu voltage drop and 180 ms duration, whereas frequency decreases 2.5 Hz within 
2 s.  
• Case 4: LLL fault with a resistance of 5 Ω at an MV-neighbor feeder (Feeder B) and 
cleared in 300 ms. 
• Case 5: Solid SLG fault at the transmission network which is cleared in 250 ms; MV 
grid experiences a sag type C.  
The list of tested islanding events are detailed hereafter: 
• Case 6: SLG fault with a 5 Ω resistance applied at node 7, feeder load is set to 320 kW, 
reclosing time 500 ms, no mechanical load torque, and 100 ms clearing time. 
• Case 7: SLG fault with a 5 Ω resistance applied at node 7, feeder load is set to 53 kW, 
reclosing time 500 ms, no mechanical load torque, and 100 ms clearing time. 
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• Case 8: SLG Fault with a 10 Ω resistance applied at node 12, feeder load is set to 30 
kW, reclosing time 500 ms, no mechanical load torque, and 100 ms clearing time. 
Table 9.5 provides the tripping times obtained from the simulations for each passive-based 
technique as well as for the HIDM. Besides, for each case, the obtained tripping signals are 
represented in a separate figure. Therefore, in these eight figures (i.e., Figure 9.29 to 9.37), the 
tripping time and the duration of the event are displayed. By observing these results, the 
effectiveness of each method can be observed, which correctly discriminates between both 
islanding and non-islanding events. 
Table 9.5: Summary of the tripping times obtained from simulations for islanding and non-islanding events. 
ID method 
(Ansi/IEEE) 
Case 1 
(ms) 
Case 2 
(ms) 
Case 3 
(ms) 
Case 4 
(ms) 
Case 5 
(ms) 
Case 6 
(ms) 
Case 7 
(ms) 
Case 8 
(ms) 
81U No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip 290 558 625 
81O No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip 
27 No Trip 120 120 No Trip 120 432 No Trip No Trip 
59
 
No Trip 120 No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip 
ROCOF No Trip No Trip 140 No Trip No Trip 252 310 No Trip 
ROCOV No Trip 140 140 140 No Trip 415 No Trip No Trip 
ROCOP 238 No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip 
HIDM 238 No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip No Trip 
 
 
                                         Figure 9.29: Tripping times for case 1 of subsection 9.4.4 
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                                         Figure 9.30: Tripping times for case 2 of subsection 9.4.4. 
 
 
                                          Figure 9.31: Tripping times for case 3 of subsection 9.4.4 
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                                            Figure 9.32: Tripping times for case 4 of subsection 9.4.4. 
 
 
                                            Figure 9.33: Tripping times for case 5 of subsection 9.4.4 
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                                         Figure 9.34: Tripping times for case 6 of subsection 9.4.4.  
 
 
                                            Figure 9.35: Tripping times for case 7 of subsection 9.4.4. 
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                                            Figure 9.36: Tripping times for case 8 of subsection 9.4.4. 
 
 
               Figure 9.37: UVP/OVP and ROCOV protections results for case 2 of subsection 9.4.4. 
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               Figure 9.38: UFP/OFP and ROCOF protections results for case 2 of subsection 9.4.4. 
 
 
               Figure 9.39: ROCOP and ROCOQ protections results for case 2 of subsection 9.4.4. 
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                   Figure 9.40: Directional criterion protection results for case 2 of subsection 9.4.4. 
 
Results discussion 
As can be seen from Table 9.4, for the non-islanding events (i.e., cases 1 to 5), at least, two 
passive-based methods trip, which evidences a missoperation. As an example, both UVP and 
ROCOV trip for faults upstream the CB located at PCC2 which occurs for cases 2 to 5. However, 
as can be seen, the HIDM does not trip during these scenarios. 
On the other hand, during islanding events (i.e., faults at the same feeder where the IMs are 
located) the fastest tripping time is achieved by the HIDM, meanwhile, due to the low deviation 
in either voltage or frequency, several techniques ID missoperate. Particularly, in case 8, it can 
be observed that, except for HIDM, no other passive method is capable of tripping within the 
required time constraint. The analysed events prove that the proposed algorithm correctly 
discriminates between islanding and non-islanding events. 
 
9.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has proposed a new technique to detect the islanding operations that have been 
analyzed in the previous Chapters. The architecture, the main features and the settings of this tool 
have been defined. To observe the effectiveness of this ID hybrid method, a wide range of 
scenarios have been simulated according to three main groups, where in each one, different 
hypothesis are considered. This method merges several passive-based methods with an additional 
criterion to enhance the ID. 
Based on the results obtained from the simulations, some interesting aspects can be pinpointed: 
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 Given the number of simulated scenarios, it can be concluded that some damage to the grid 
and to the IMs can result during unintentional IOs. Therefore, fast tripping performance is 
required.  
 During islanding events (i.e., the ones which imply the opening the CB of feeder A) if the 
amount of load level in the island is low, the ID becomes a significant challenge because 
voltage and frequency do not exceed the thresholds of the most common ID techniques within 
the time constraint. Nevertheless, for larger load levels in the island, most of the available ID 
indicators will trip correctly. 
 All the simulated scenarios assume a situation in which the IMs are operating without 
mechanical load at the moment the fault occurs. Although this can be seen as a non-realistic 
scenario, it also represents the worst scenario in which IMs will act as generators. 
 By observing the simulated non-islanding events (i.e., faults upstream the CB at PCC1), it 
transpires that both voltage protections (UVP/OVP) and ROCOV untimely trip.  
 Even though the passive-based ID methods can be adjusted with other thresholds closer to 
the rated values, it has to be underscored that doing that; more untimely tripping operations 
will occur. For instance, the typical voltage settings for UVP and OVP are set to 0.8 pu and 
1.2 pu with a delay of 100 ms and voltage between 1.1 and 1.2 pu with a time delay of 500 
ms. If these settings are replaced with more restrictive values, these methods will untimely 
trip for disturbances such as voltage sags due to induction motor starting, capacitors switching 
over-voltages or voltage drops during transformer energisation.  
A significant conclusion of this Chapter, is that the implemented HIDM exhibits high robustness 
and feasibility: it can discriminate between IO and non-IO events, which guarantees that the IO 
would be cleared before any rapid reclosing from the DN could take place. Moreover, it proved 
to be the fastest method in detecting the island when compared with the available passive-based 
ID methods. 
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Chapter 10 
General Conclusions and future work 
 
10.1 General conclusions 
 
As has been stated above, IOs occurs when a portion of the network remains energised after being 
removed from the main grid, and this situation has been considered as an abnormal scenario by 
the DSOs. IOs in DNs have elicited interest among researchers and DSOs in the recent years; 
essentially, the main reason for this interest lies in how to prevent them. Up until now, these IOs 
were expected only in the presence of distributed generation (DG) units, which following the CB 
disconnection, continue energising this portion of the network. Nonetheless, the main 
accomplishment of this thesis is the assessment of an IO where there are no DG resources, but 
large induction motors. This IO begins with the CB fault clearing and ends when this CB recloses 
the circuit to restore the supply. As a matter of fact, due to its inertia, the motors transiently act 
as generators between the CB opening and its reclosing, thus energising the island. Therefore, the 
cornerstone of the present doctoral thesis is the evaluation of this particular unintentional IO. 
Chapter 4 has provided an accurate model based on the real grid where the field measurements 
have been obtained. The mathematical equations of each element of the model are also detailed. 
By observing those equations, several factors were expected to be influential for the IO. 
Particularly, these possible influential factors are as follows; the power drawn by the amount loads 
which remain in the island, the load torque coupled with the motors, the reclosing time and the 
type of fault that originated the island. In the subsequent Chapters, the influence of such expected 
factors has been demonstrated. 
Once the model has been developed in Chapter 4, the main objective of the subsequent Chapters 
5, 6 and 7 have been to carry out its validation. Since a model validation is a crucial task for the 
accurate simulation of transient events, the best way to perform a model validation is to compare 
field or lab recordings and simulation results. Therefore, the first step of the model validation lies 
in simulations (Chapter 5), where a wide range of scenarios have been tested. The second step 
focuses on displaying the field measurements obtained from real occurred events (Chapter 6). 
Lastly, the obtained results from the two previous stages are compared in Chapter 7.    
Considering the above, the results of Chapters 5, 6 and 7 illustrate the following conclusions: 
• It has been found that the feeder loads which remain connected within the island at the 
time the fault occurs play a pivotal role in this transient and dictate the survivability of 
the island. As expected, the lower is this value, the smaller are voltage and frequency 
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deviations during the island. It can be seen that the hypotheses of neglecting the 
frequency-dependence in load modelling by considering mainly active-power loads, 
approaches satisfactorily the field measurements. A noteworthy aspect regarding the load 
modelling is that, unfortunately, only two devices were available (locations PCC1 and 
PCC2) and therefore, there were no measurements at load nodes. However, by virtue of 
the obtained results in Chapter 7, the model selected for each load provides a close enough 
simulation result to that obtained from measurements. Besides, given the fact that the 
occurrence of the events is random in time, the model validation has considered several 
load conditions, which is one of the most challenging tasks to fulfil in load modelling. 
• Since the type of load torque decelerates the machine during the island, the higher is this 
value, the higher is the deceleration during the island and therefore, the higher is the 
voltage drop and frequency excursion during the IO. However, most of the simulated 
scenarios assume a situation in which the IMs are operating without mechanical load at 
the moment the fault occurs. Although this can be seen as a non-realistic scenario, it also 
represents the worst scenario in which IMs will act as generators. 
• As expected, the larger is the reclosing time, the larger is the island duration. This fact 
makes that, in turn, large voltage drops and frequency excursions occur during the IO.  
• It has been found that depending on the type of fault that originated the CB operation, 
both voltage and frequency during the island are highly influenced. Since the motors are 
the only source during the island, the frequency of the island is dictated by the motors 
mechanical speed. An interesting insight is that the larger is the post-fault reacceleration 
(i.e., depending on the during-fault deceleration), the lower is the frequency excursion 
during the island. This fact is especially observed in severe disturbances such as three-
phase faults close to the motors.  
• By observing both voltage and frequency comparisons in each event of Chapter 7, the 
high accuracy achieved in the model has been demonstrated. 
Once the model has been already validated, and the dependability of this IO has been proven, two 
major studies are of interest. The first is focused on the voltage sag that occurs during the island, 
which is explored in Chapter 8. The second is aimed at implementing a suitable tool to prevent 
this IO and is explored in Chapter 9. 
Chapter 8 contributes to the present Power Quality studies, where a new voltage sag topology has 
been defined. The main features of this sag are as follows; its magnitude is non-constant, its 
duration depends on the reclosing time, and its recovery takes place in two-stages. Crucially, the 
curve that follows the non-constant magnitude has been analytically modelled and subsequently 
validated with several recorded events. 
Considering the previously mentioned aspects, it is apparent that, in order to guarantee the power 
quality and safety, these IOs have to be detected and the motors have to be tripped in the minimum 
time possible. In this vein, Chapter 9 has analysed the passive-based ID methods used in the 
presence of DG resources and has compared these results with the proposed HIDM.  
From these results, it can be clearly seen that the fastest method in detecting this type of island is 
the HIDM, which provides evidence of its dependability. But, a crucial aspect is that under certain 
conditions of load where voltage and frequency do not exceed the typical ID thresholds, the only 
method capable of tripping with the required time constraints is the HIDM. 
To sum up, the main contributions of this thesis can be summarized into three main points: 
• The first accomplishment of this thesis lies in the model development, which has been 
successfully achieved.  
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• As a second main accomplishment, this thesis has contributed to the voltage sag studies. 
The new voltage sag topology that occurs during the island has been defined, analytically 
modelled and further validated. 
• The third contribution focused on implementing a new technique to prevent these IOs, 
and based on the obtained results, it proved to be really effective for ID purposes. 
Finally, it can be stated that this thesis has successfully contributed to improve the current research 
on distribution network studies in terms of islanding operations. Nevertheless, and perhaps even 
more importantly, it has also contributed to solve real problems identified in a distribution 
network, which underscores its high value in practical engineering. 
 
10.2 Future work 
 
As seen in the previous section, the studied IOs were categorised as unintentional, and therefore, 
naturally the objective of the DSOs is to avoid these type of events. This may, in fact, be the 
starting point for future research, where instead of avoiding IOs, these operations can be seen as 
a valuable resource for the DSO. Based on this premise, the following points will summarise the 
future research: 
• Although some efforts have been done by the research community towards the intentional 
islanding operations in wide-area power systems, an interesting point to take into 
consideration for future research is to test these techniques into DNs. The main advantage 
of fostering such intentional islanding operations in distribution networks is, essentially, 
to reduce the time and number of interruptions, thus increasing grid reliability. Actually, 
with the rapid proliferation of the DG based on renewable energies embedded in the DNs 
such as rooftop PV or other types of DG, these units can be an asset to enhance grid 
resilience. Moreover, apart from the DG units, other tools will be of utmost importance 
to achieve successful results in the aforementioned intentional islands, for example; 
energy storage, smart meters, SCADA systems or state estimators. On the other hand, 
techniques such as demand-response or local energy markets, will undoubtedly, be 
benefited if these intentional operations are feasible. 
• Additionally, even though some reliability studies carried out with DG operating in grid-
connected mode provided fruitful results in the past, these studies can now be repeated 
by using these intentional islands. 
By considering the previous points, it is clear that there is a lot of work to do towards the so-called 
active distribution networks. 
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